JX 


UC-NRLF 


SB    ED    ISfl 


tSITY   OF   PENNSYLVANIA 


Relations  of  the  United  States 
with  Sweden 


BY 


KNUTE  EMIL  CARLSON 


A  THESIS 

PRESENTED  TO  THE  FACULTY  OF  THE  GRADUATE  SCHOOL 

IN  PARTIAL  FULFILLMENT  OF  THE  REQUIREMENTS 

FOR  THE  DEGREE  OF  DOCTOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


II.   RAY   HAAS  &  CO. 

Printers  and  Publishers 

Allentown,  Pa. 

1921 


EXCHANGE 


UNIVEESITY   OF    PENNSYLVANIA 

Relations  of  the  United  States 
with  Sweden 


BY 
KNUTE  EMIL  CARLSON 

H 


A  THESIS  '  -  N  :,'-; 

PRESENTED  TO  THE  FACULTY  OF  THE  GRADUATE  SCHOOL 

IN  PARTIAL  FULFILLMENT  OF  THE  EEQUIREMENTS 

FOR  THE  DEGREE  OF  DOCTOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


H.   RAY  HAAS  &  CO. 

Printers  and  Publishers 

Allentown,  Pa. 

1921 


COPYRIGHT,   1921, 
BY 

KNUTE  EMIL  CARLSON 


INTRODUCTION 

The  world  war  has  emphasized  the  already  apparent  fact 
that  the  United  States  had  become  a  world  power  that  must  be 
considered  in  a  settlement  of  all  important  international  ques- 
tions. Other  nations  thought  that  the  United  States  was  too 
much  absorbed  in  her  own  economic  and  industrial  pursuits  to 
take  any  part  in  world  problems,  but  she  has  proved  in  this 
war  that  her  interests  are  wide  as  the  world.  The  United  States 
has  also  proved  that  economic  development  has  not  prevented 
the  fostering  of  advanced  ideals  in  regard  to  international  rela- 
tions. These  ideals  have  grown  up  with  the  nation  and  are  not 
a  recent  outburst  of  patriotic  emotion. 

In  the  light  of  this  general  fact  it  has  been  considered  im- 
portant to  study  more  carefully  the  negotiations  between  the 
United  States  and  Sweden  to  ascertain  the  nature  of  the  relations 
with  that  country,  the  problems  that  have  been  involved,  and 
how  those  problems  have  been  solved.  A  study  of  those  nego- 
tiations has  revealed  the  following  facts: 

First,  Sweden  assumed  a  decidedly  friendly  attitude  toward 
the  United  States  from  the  very  beginning  and  this  friendship 
is  illustrated  by  the  fact  that  Sweden  was  the  first  nation  to  ask 
the  privilege  to  make  a  treaty  with  the  United  States  as  early  as 
1784,  by  opening  up  of  the  island  of  St.  Bartholomew  as  a  free 
port  in  order  to  aid  in  the  development  of  the  mutual  commerce, 
and  by  requesting  the  exchange  of  public  ministers. 

Second,  when  the  two  countries  were  suffering  from  the 
effects  of  the  war  between  England  and  Napoleon,  Sweden  in- 
vited the  United  States  to  join  in  a  league  of  neutral  nations  to 
protect  the  interest  of  the  neutrals.  This  proposition  was  con- 


VI  INTRODUCTION 

sidered  by  the  American  Government,  which  fact  is  proved  by 
the  instructions  to  John  Jay  and  the  correspondence  between 
James  Monroe  and  the  Secretary  of  State. 

Third,  the  Napoleonic  wars  brought  on  claims  against 
Sweden  as  well  as  against  other  European  powers,  for  she  also 
became  involved  in  the  Continental  System.  Although  the  in- 
demnity losses  incurred  was  tardily  agreed  upon,  the  Swedish 
Government  always  frankly  admitted  the  justice  of  the  claims 
of  the  American  merchants  and  expressed  willingness  to  pay 
the  indemnity.  This  willingness,  on  the  part  of  the  Swedish 
Government,  to  settle  the  claims  is  illustrated  by  the  fact  that 
the  Crown  Prince  offered  a  quantity  of  cannons  and  gun  powder, 
his  personal  property,  as  a  payment  on  the  claims,  and  also 
that  the  Government  offered  to  sell  the  island  of  St.  Barthol- 
omew to  the  United  States  and  to  deduct  from  the  purchase  price 
the  amount  of  the  claims. 

Fourth,  Swedish  consular  officers  tendered  their  good  ser- 
vices in  behalf  of  American  sailors  and  American  commerce  in 
Algiers. 

The  source  material  used  in  preparing  this  study  is  indicated 
in  the  footnotes  and  in  the  appended  bibliography.  The  mater- 
ial listed  there  has  been  carefully  examined,  and  all  irrevelent 
material  has  been  omitted  from  the  bibliography. 

At  present  only  the  earlier  part  of  the  study  of  the  relations 
between  the  two  countries  is  published,  but  it  is  the  intention  of 
the  author,  as  soon  as  recent  material  becomes  available,  to  pub- 
lish also  that  part  of  the  study  which  deals  with  the  problems 
growing  out  of  the  world  war. 


CONTENTS 


Introduction    V 

Chapter       I.     Negotiations  During  the  American  Revolution     1 

Chapter     II.     Proposed  Alliance 26 

Chapter  III.     The  Stralsund  Claims   45 

Chapter  IV.     Commercial   Negotiations    72 

Select  Bibliography 91 


VII 


CHAPTER  I 
RELATIONS  DURING  THE  AMERICAN  REVOLUTION 

The  Declaration  of  Independence  required  as  a  necessary 
consequence  the  establishment  of  foreign  relations.  Before  that 
time  the  inhabitants  of  the  eastern  shore  of  North  America  had 
belonged  to  a  European  Power,  and  their  relation  with  other 
nations  was  therefore  part  and  parcel  of  the  European  balance 
of  power.  When  independence  was  declared  and  on  the  way 
to  become  a  fact  these  inhabitants  were  no  longer  a  mere  attach- 
ment to  another  power.  The  question  that  must  be  decided, 
however,  was  whether  these  young  states  should  send  representa- 
tives to  other  nations  to  request  admission  into  the  family  of 
nations,  or  should  they  quietly  await  until  independence  had 
been  achieved  and  let  the  commercial  advantages  of  the  country 
solicit  the  invitation  from  older  nations.  The  latter  view  was 
stated  in  a  letter  from  Dr.  Franklin  to  Arthur  Lee  when  he  was 
on  his  fruitless  mission  to  Spain.  He  said:  "A  virgin  state 
should  preserve  the  virgin  character,  and  not  go  about  suitoriiig 
for  alliances,  but  wait  with  decent  dignity  for  the  application 
of  others.  "*  . 

Another  class  of  statesmen  with  a  "broader  appreciation  of 
political  necessity"  advocated  a  policy  of  diplomatic  advances. 
The  question  of  independence  involved,  from  their  point  of 
view,  a  great  number  of  European  interests,  and  they  deemed 
themselves  warranted  in  demanding  effective  support  in  exchange 
for  commercial  opportunities.  The  personification  of  this  poli- 

1  Sparks,  J.  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  II,  57;  Franklin  to  Lee, 
March  21,  1777. 


2          RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

cy  seems  to  be  John  Adams  who  wrote:  "I  think  we  have  not 
meanly  solicited  for  friendship  anywhere.  But  to  send  ministers 
to  every  court  in  Europe,  especially  the  maritime  courts,  to 
propose  an  acknowledgement  of  the  independence  of  America 
and  treaties  of  amity  and  commerce,  is  no  more  than  becomes  us, 
and  in  my  opinion  is  our  duty  to  do.  It  is  perfectly  consistent 
with  the  genuine  system  of  American  policy,  and  a  price  of 
respect  due  from  new  nations  to  old  ones".2  Already  about  a 
month  earlier  he  had  written  to  the  President  of  Congress :  ''The 
counsels  of  the  sovereigns  of  Europe  are  not  easily  penetrated ; 
but  it  is  our  duty  to  attend  to  them,  and  throw  into  view  such 
information  as  may  be  in  our  power,  that  they  may  take  no 
measure  inconsistent  with  their  and  our  interest  for  want  of 
light — a  misfortune  that  may  easily  happen.  In  this  view,  I 
could  wish  that  the  United  States  had  a  minister  in  each  of  the 
maritime  courts — I  mean  Holland,  Russia,  Sweden,  and  Denmark 
and,  as  the  cabinet  of  Berlin  has  much  influence  in  the  politics 
of  Europe,  Prussia". 3  Arthur  and  William  Lee  also  wrote  to 
Congress  ' '  stating  that  they  were  informed  by  reliable  authority 
that  Spain,  Holland,  Prussia,  Germany,  Tuscany,  and  Sweden 
were  anxious  to  receive  American  ministers". 4  Fortunately 
for  the  young  republic  the  latter  view  prevailed. 

The  war  of  the  American  Revolution  had  not  proceeded  fai* 
before  the  European  nations  became  involved  in  one  way  or 
another,  since  England  "claimed  the  right  to  search  neutral 
vessels  for  contraband  of  war,  and  she  exercised  this  right  in 
a  high-handed  manner".  Finding  it  impossible  to  obtain  redress 
from  England,  Gustavus  III,  of  Sweden  instructed  his  minister 
at  London  (December  1778)  to  deliver  a  remonstrance  to  the 

2  Sparks,  Diplomatic  Corresp.,  V,  361;  Adams  to  Franklin,  October  14, 
1780. 

•Wharton,  F.  Revolutionary  Diplomatic  Corresp.,  IV,  57;  Adams  to 
the  President  of  Congress,  September  16,  1780. 

4  Wharton,  Revolutionary  Diplomatic  Corresp.,  I,  460. 


NEGOTIATIONS  DURING  THE  AMERICAN  REVOLUTION  3 

English  Government  "  couched  in  such  sharp  terms  that  Lord 
Suffolk  expressed  himself  unable  to  distinguish  it  from  a  formal 
declaration  of  war ' '. B 

This  action  on  the  part  of  Sweden  must  have  been  fairly 
well  considered  for  already  in  October  the  court  of  Denmark 
through  its  envoy  in  Stockholm  inquired  if  the  armed  neutrality 
of  1756  ought  not  to  be  renewed. 6  The  King  of  Sweden  answer- 
ed in  a  cordial  tone  that  he  wished  once  more  to  appeal  to 
England  if  perchance  any  relief  would  be  granted  without 
adopting  extreme  measures.  But  at  the  same  time  Gustavus 
III  requested  his  minister  in  Russia  to  find  out  if  Russia  would 
co-operate.  About  the  end  of  December  1778  the  Empress  of 
Russia  answered  that  she  would  co-operate  if  it  became  neces- 
sary. 

When  the  protest  of  Sweden  failed  to  bring  about  the  nec- 
essary relief  from  England,  the  King  of  Sweden  proposed  to 
Denmark  and  Russia  that  the  northern  powers  should  protect 
their  commerce  by  entering  into  a  convention.  This  action  on 
the  part  of  Sweden  was  well  known  to  England  for  on  December 
22,  1778,  the  British  Ambassador  of  Petrograd  wrote  to  the 
Earl  of  Suffolk  regarding  the  contemplated  action  in  the  follow- 
ing words,  "I  trust  your  Lordship  will  not  tax  me  with  negli- 
gence, if  the  messenger  is  not  yet  departed.  I  cannot  prevail 
on  Count  Panin  to  give  me  an  answer,  and  I  depend  so  little 
on  his  promise  of  his  enabling  me  to  despatch  him  to-morrow, 
that  I  lose  no  time  in  acquainting  your  Lordship,  that  on  Satur- 
day last  the  Swedish  Minister  after  enlarging  greatly  on  our 
conduct  towards  neutral  ships,  made  a  formal  proposal  to  this 
Court  to  join  with  that  of  Stockholm  in  forming  a  combined 
fleet,  sufficiently  strong  to  protect  the  trade  of  the  north  against 


6  Bain,  Gustavus  III  and  his  Contemporaries,  I,  210 ;  Fenberg,  Sverigea 
Ilistoria,  V,  299. 

8  Albedyhll,  Recueil  de  memoire.,  15. 


4          RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

the  attacks  made  upon  it.  Mr.  Nolken  [the  Swedish  ambassador 
at  Petrograd]  added,  that,  if  the  Empress  adopted  this  plan, 
there  was  no  doubt  that  Denmark  would  also  subscribe  to  it; 
and  that  the  commerce  of  these  countries,  now  so  interrupted, 
would  be  by  this  means  carried  on  with  security". 7  The  Am- 
bassador continued,  "I  have  reasons  to  believe  the  idea  of 
taking  so  violent  a  measure  as  that  of  arming  an  united  naval 
force  was  immediately  rejected;  but  that,  that  of  the  trade  of 
these  countries  being  illegally  interrupted,  and  the  necessity  of 
devising  proper  methods  for  its  better  security,  was  fully  ad- 
mitted ". 8 

The  foreign  affairs  of  Denmark  were  conducted  at  this  time 
by  Andreas  Peter  Bernstorff  sr.,  and  his  policy  had  always 
been  hostile  to  Sweden.  One  writer  states  that  "the  insuper- 
able jealousy  between  Sweden  and  Denmark,  and  the  disinclina- 
tion of  Russia  to  offend  England,  prevented  for  a  time,  the 
formation  of  a  Northern  League".9  Count  Bernstorff  worked 
out  a  plan  of  co-operation  between  Denmark  and  Russia  ex- 
pecting to  leave  Sweden  outside  of  the  confederation.  Russia, 
however,  had  not  the  same  interest  in  protecting  neutral  com- 
merce as  the  two  Scandinavian  states,  because  its  shipping, 
outside  the  Baltic,  was  negligible,  and  privateers  could  therefore, 
in  fact,  only  disturb  the  commerce  to  and  from  Archangel ;  but 
this  commerce  was  carried  on  mainly  by  the  English  them- 


While  Russia  hesitated  to  enter  whole-heartedly  into  a 
convention  to  protect  the  commerce  of  neutral  nations,  Sweden 
invited  other  neutrals  to  send  delegates  to  "a  congress  at  Stock- 
holm in  1778"  to  induce  Russia  to  head  a  league  for  arming 
the  neutrals.  Dr.  Franklin  must  have  known  about  this  congress 

1  Malmesbury,  Diaries  and  Correspondence,  I,  189. 

'  Ibid.  189. 

•Bain,  Gustavus  III,  and  his  Contemporaries,  (1746-1792),  I,  210. 

10  Hildebrand,  Sveriges  Historia,  VIII,  54. 


NEGOTIATIONS  DURING  THE  AMERICAN  REVOLUTION  5 

for  he  wrote  about  it  to  the  Danish  minister  approving  a  claim 
for  compensation  for  attending  such  a  convention  on  December 
25,  1778,  in  the  following  words:  "I  have  considered  the  propo- 
sition, and  see  no  objection  to  it.  I  will  write  to  Congress  in 
favor  of  it,  if  desired ".  " 

On  December  31,  1778,  the  English  Ambassador  at  Petro- 
grad  again  wrote  about  this  subject  to  the  Earl  of  Suffolk  as 
follows:  "In  one  of  his  last  conversations  he  [Count  Panin] 
told  me  that  he  was  obliged  to  express  Her  Imperial  Majesty's 
wishes,  that  we  should  put  a  little  more  circumspection  in  our 
mode  of  proceeding  against  the  ships  of  Neutral  States;  that 
we  should  otherwise  irritate  powers  now  well  disposed  toward 
us;  that  Denmark,  Sweden,  and  Holland  had  respectively  solic- 
ited the  Empress  to  join  with  them  in  a  representation  to  us  on 
this  subject ". 12 

The  northern  neutrals  did  not  stop  with  mere  protests  foi 
on  February  14,  1779,  the  Swedish  envoy  at  Petrograd  was 
requested  to  make  a  proposal  to  that  court,13  and  on  the  18th 
of  the  same  month,  the  King  of  Sweden,  after  having  reached  an 
agreement  with  Denmark,  issued  a  declaration  according  to 
which  the  two  nations  were  to  convoy  their  merchant  vessels. 
About  this  agreement  John  Adams  wrote  to  Arthur  Lee :  * '  The 
declaration  of  the  Northern  Powers  against  the  right  of  England 
to  stop  their  merchant  vessels  and  arming  to  support  their  rights 
are  important  events".14  Russia  had  promised  to  help  protect 
the  commerce  which  went  north  of  Norway,  and,  although  Den- 
mark considered  this  offer  unsatisfactory,  Sweden,  anxious  to 
obtain  any  improvement  in  her  relation  with  Russia,  accepted 
whatever  could  be  obtained  for  the  time  being.  It  was  this  eon- 

"  Wharton,  The  Revolutionary  Diplomatic  Corresp.,  I,  618. 
u  Malmesbury,  Diaries  and  Correspondence,  I,  190. 
"Albedyhll,  Recueil  de  memoire,  18. 

"Wharton,  Revolutionary  Diplomatic  COM-.,  Ill,  214;  Adamt  to  Arthur 
Lte,  June  9,  1779. 


6          RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

federation  to  which  John  Adams  referred  when  he  wrote  to  the 
President  of  the  Continental  Congress:  ''Russia,  Sweden,  and 
Denmark,  comprehended  under  the  denomination  of  the  northern 
powers,  have  been  thought  'by  some  to  be  interested  in  our  return 
to  the  denomination  of  Great  Britain.  Whether  they  consider 
themselves  in  this  light  or  not,  their  late  declarations  against  the 
rights  of  England  to  interrupt  their  navigation  and  their  arming 
for  the  protection  of  their  commerce  on  the  ocean,  and  even  in 
the  English  channel,  are  unequivocal  proofs  of  their  opinion  con- 
cerning the  right  in  our  contest  and  of  their  intentions  not  to 
interfere  against  us ". 15 

The  burden  of  arming  the  convoys  fell  rather  heavily  on 
Sweden,  for  Russia's  aid  was  faultering  and  doubtful,  and  Den- 
mark began  to  negotiate  with  England  anew  for  the  amelioration 
of  commercial  restrictions. 16  For  Sweden,  however,  any  under- 
standing with  Russia  was  preferable  to  the  condition  that  pre- 
ceded the  adoption  of  the  convention;  besides  that  she  could 
render  effective  aid  to  her  old  friend  and  ally,  France,  in  her 
endeavor  to  assist  the  young  American  Republic. 

The  fundamental  principles  of  the  convention  between 
Sweden  and  Denmark  were  repeated  almost  verbatim  in  the 
convention  proclaimed  by  Russia  on  March  10,  1780.  Although 
the  formulation  of  these  principles  did  not  effect  any  compro- 
mise on  the  part  of  Great  Britain,  their  formulation  and  en- 
forcement by  an  armed  force  of  nations  constituted  an  advance 
in  the  history  of  public  law. 

Early  in  1780,  however,  when  Spain  sunk  two  Russian  mer- 
chant vessels,  Russia  became  at  once  interested  in  a  more  vigor 
ous  enforcement  of  the  principles  contained  in  the  convention 
of  the  armed  neutrality;  and  the  Empress  Catherine  II,  invited 
Sweden  and  Denmark  to  join  with  her  to  protect  their  commerce 

15  Wharton,  Op.  Cit.,  Ill,  285. 

10  Hildebraml,  Sveriges  Historia,  VIII,  54. 


NEGOTIATIONS  DURING  THE  AMERICAN  REVOLUTION  7 

against  disturbances  of  hostile  fleets.  At  this  time  Denmark 
was  less  interested  in  the  enforcement  of  neutral  rights  than  a 
year  and  a  half  earlier,  for  in  the  meantime  she  had  entered 
into  a  treaty  with  England  which  would  grant  her  most  of  the 
privileges  she  desired,  but  Russia  finally  induced  Denmark  to 
join. 

The  following  principles,  quoted  almost  word  for  word 
from  the  earlier  convention,  constituted  the  basis  of  the  armed 
neutrality  on  which  Russia  invited  her  neighbors  to  join  with 
her: 

1.  "That  all  neutral  vessels  ought  to  navigate  freely  from 

one  port  to  another,  as  well  as  upon  the  coasts  of  the 
powers  at  war; 

2.  "That  the  effects  belonging  to  the  subjects  of  the  bellig- 

erent powers  shall  be  free  in  neutral  ships,  excepting 
always  contraband  goods; 

3.  "That  her  Imperial  majesty,  in  consequence  of  the  limits 

above  fixed,  will  adhere  strictly  to  that  which  is  stipu- 
lated by  the  tenth  and  eleventh  articles  of  her  treaty 
of  commerce  with  Great  Britain,  concerning  the  man- 
ner in  which  she  ought  to  conduct  herself  toward  all 
the  belligerent  powers; 

4.  ' '  That  as  to  what  concerns  a  port  blocked  up,  we  ought 

not,  in  truth,  to  consider  as  such  any  but  those  which 
are  found  so  well  shut  up  by  a  fixed  and  sufficient 
number  of  vessels  belonging  to  the  power  which  at- 
tacks it  that  one  cannot  attempt  to  enter  into  such 
a  port  without  evident  danger ; 

5.  "That  these  principles  alone  laid  down  ought  to  serve 

as  a  rule  in  all  proceedings  whenever  there  is  a  question 
of  legality  of  prizes". 17 


"Wharton,   Op.  Cit.,  Ill,   608;    cf.   Malmesbury,   Diaries   and   Corres 
pondence,  I,  251. 


8          EELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

From  the  facts  stated  above,  it  becomes  clear  that  the  armed 
neutrality  was  in  force  prior  to  the  proclamation  of  Catharine 
II,  and  that  it  originated  with  Sweden  and  Denmark  rather  than 
with  Russia.  As  a  matter  of  fact  the  armed  neutrality  of  1779- 
1780  was  only  a  fruitition  of  earlier  agreements  to  the  same 
effect.  If  an  attempt  is  made  to  find  the  origin  of  the  idea,  and 
the  principles  involved,  it  becomes  necessary  to  go  back  into 
the  close  of  the  sixteenth  century.  Those  agreements,  far  less 
known  than  the  later  one,  were  nevertheless  effective  in  bringing 
about  the  desired  end;  and  the  honor  for  their  establishment 
belong  to  Denmark  and  Sweden;  the  first  thought  about  it  un- 
doubtedly emanated  from  Denmark. 

It  was  during  the  war  of  the  allied  powers  against  Louis 
XIV  that  England  and  Holland  entered  into  an  agreement,  in 
August  1689,  which  united  their  powers  under  William  III,  to 
checkmate  France.  According  to  the  first  article  of  their  agree- 
ment all  commerce  with  France  was  to  be  prohibited.  This 
treaty  contradicted  earlier  treaties  between  these  countries  and 
the  northern  powers;  and  when  the  privateers  began  to  make 
commerce  dangerous  the  governments  of  Sweden  and  Denmark 
became  uneasy.  For  this  reason  the  Danish  Government  in- 
structed its  minister  at  tne  Court  of  Sweden  to  propose  that 
a  united  force  of  armed  vessels  be  fitted  out  to  convoy  their 
merchant  vessels.  Sweden  whose  politics  at  this  time  was  other- 
wise hostile  to  Denmark,  consented  to  the  proposal  and  the 
result  was  the  "Tractat  till  Navigationens  och  Commerciens 
sakerhet"  (A  Treaty  for  the  Safety  of  Commerce  and  Naviga- 
tion), which  was  concluded  at  Stockholm,  March  10,  1691,  and 
was  renewed  by  the  Danish  Minister  Jens  Juel,  March  17,  1693. 
These  are  the  earliest  agreements  of  their  kind  and  were  not 
without  results,  for  both  England  and  Holland  found  themselves 


NEGOTIATIONS  DURING  THE  AMERICAN  REVOLUTION          9 

obliged  to  make  good  the  losses  sustained  by  the  northern 
powers. 18 

The  third  league  of  nations  to  enforce  the  right  of  neutral 
commerce  was  brought  about  on  July  12,  1756  by  signing  of  a 
formal  convention  at  Stockholm. 19  It  was  later  extended  in 
1759  by  the  entrance  of  Russia.  The  existence  of  this  union 
and  the  reason  for  it  do  not  seem  to  be  very  well  known  to 
English  readers,  but,  because  this  union  is  closely  related  to 
the  later  one,  a  short  account  of  it  may  be  included  here. 

The  events  are  intimately  connected  with  the  seven  years 
war.  The  war  which  broke  out  in  the  American  colonies  be- 
tween France  and  England  had  not  even  been  officially  declared 
when  English  vessels  began  to  visit  and  search  all  merchant 
vessels  en  route  for  France.  The  question  of  contraband  be- 
came especially  important,  but  since  the  treaty  of  peace  at 
Utrecht,  1713,  [parg.  XIX,XX]  specifically  stated  what  was  to 
be  considered  contraband,  this  question  ought  to  have  been  rather 
easily  solved.  But  the  English  Government  made  a  different 
application  of  the  rule  in  each  instance  and  counted  as  contra- 
band many  other  commodities  known  only  to  their  own  priva- 
teers. Thus  the  old  selfish  system  was  in  full  swing.  Very  soon 
the  effects  of  this  system  became  known  among  the  northern 
powers.  Already  in  August  1755  England's  disregard  for  neu- 
tral rights  went  so  far  that  an  English  frigate,  sent  to  the 
sound  to  convoy  English  vessels  home,  visited  and  searched  a 
Swedish  vessel  just  outside  of  Helsingor,  under  the  pretense 
that  it  was  searching  for  goods  destined  to  France.  This  act 
was  performed  right  under  the  Danish  guns  on  Kroneborg; 

M  For  a  summary  of  the  agreements  see  Sprinchorn,  Ett  bidrag  till 
den  vapnade  neutralitetens  historia  i  Norden  in  Historisk  Tidskrift  (188]- 
82),  I,  248.  For  a  full  discussion  of  the  earlier  treaties  see  Reedlz,  H.  C. 
Damnarks  og  Sveriges  forbindelse  till  de  neutrala  haudelsrettigheters 
beskyttelse  i  aarene  1690  till  1693;  De  Skaml  literataelakapes  skrifter,  21 
Bend.  Copenhagen  1826. 

"Albedyhll,  Recueil  de  memoir*.,  11. 


10        RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

therefore  the  act  aroused  the  indignation  of  the  Danish  Govern- 
ment, and  Baron  Bernstorff  sr.  who  together  with  A.  G.  von 
Moltke  controlled  the  politics  of  Denmark,  instructed  the  Danish 
envoy  at  London  to  unite  with  the  Swedish  Minister  in  a  protest. 
Von  Moltke  also  suggested  to  the  Swedish  minister  at  Copen- 
hagen that  Sweden  and  Denmark  ought  to  agree  on  a  plan  to 
safeguard  their  shipping  during  the  war  between  France  and 
England.  The  negotiations  proceeded  rapidly  and  in  February 
1856  a  plan  was  submitted  to  a  secret  committee  of  the  Riksdag. 
The  proposition  was  read,  discussed  and  approved  in  about  half 
an  hour,  which  fact  may  indicate  the  care  with  which  the  propo- 
sition had  been  prepared  by  the  Government.  After  a  counter 
proposition  was  received  from  Denmark,  a  mutual  agreement  was 
reached  and  the  convention  was  signed  July  12,  1856. 20 

The  Proclamation  of  Catharine  II,  on  March  10,  1780,  came 
therefore,  not,  as  has  been  often  assumed,  as  something  entirely 
new  and  unheard  of,  but  as  an  expression  of  the  experience  of 
the  northern  nations. 21  The  principle  which  the  earlier  agree- 
ments had  tested  were  embodied  in  the  new  one.  The  only  ex- 
ception was  the  agreement  of  1756  wherein  Denmark  objected 
to  the  principle  of  free  ships,  free  goods,  on  the  ground  that 
she  did  not  desire  unnecessarily  to  offend  England. 

The  declaration  of  the  northern  neutrals  struck  at  the  very 
center  of  English  interests.  "In  some  confused  minutes  of  a 
debate  in  the  House  of  Lords  on  the  14  of  April  [1780]  it  is 
said  that  Lord  Camden  expressed  his  astonishment  and  regret 

20  Sprinchorn,  C.  Ett  bidrag  till  den  vapnade  neutralitetens  historia  i 
Norden,  in  Svensk  Historisk  Tidskrift  (1881-2),  I,  250  f. 

21  Mr.  Bain  in  Gustavus  III,  and  his  contemporaries,  I,  149,  asserts  that 
the  action  of  Catharine  II,  was  taken  in  revenge  because  England  would  not 
co-operate  with  her  in  suppressing  the  revolution  in  Sweden  1772;   there- 
fore when  England  asked  for  20,000  soldiers  to  restrain  "the  increasing 
frenzy  of  his  Majesty 's  unhappy  and  deluded  people  on  the  other  side  of  the 
Atlantic,"  and  a  draft  treaty  to  that  effect  was  actually  sent  to  Gunning, 
Catharine  II  explained  away  her  promise. 


NEGOTIATIONS  DURING  THE  AMERICAN  REVOLUTION         n 

at  the  memorial  from  Russia The  thought  of  that  mani- 
festo made  him  shudder  when  he  first  read  it,  particularly  as  he 

knew  how  his  country  stood  in  respect  to  other  powers "." 

John  Adams  significantly  added  that  if  the  Court  of  England 
had  had  only  common  information  "they  would  have  known 
that  this  combination  of  maritime  powers  has  been  forming 
these  eighteen  months,  and  was  nearly  as  well  agreed  to  a  year 
ago  as  it  is  now ' '. 23 

England  did  not,  however,  willingly  accede  to  the  principles 
of  the  armed  neutrality  for  she  held  that  Sweden  was  inspired 
by  an  excessive  friendship  for  France  and  therefore  also  for  the 
United  States.  The  measure  she  adopted  to  counteract  the  armed 
neutrality  seems  therefore  specifically  aimed  against  Sweden. 
John  Adams  wrote  about  it  to  the  President  of  Congress  on  April 
4,  1780,  in  the  following  words :  ' i  The  Swedish  frigate  Illerim, 
of  thirty-four  guns,  commanded  by  Captain  Ankerloo,  on  the 
28  of  February,  at  half  after  eight  o'clock  at  night,  met  an 
English  privateer  belonging  to  Minorca,  of  twenty-eight  guns. 
The  Swedish  captain  after  hailing  the  privateer,  let  her  continue 
her  course,  and  went  on  quietly  his  own :  about  half  an  hour  after, 
the  privateer  returning  ranged  herself  astern  of  the  frigate 
and  unexpectedly  discharged  both  his  broadsides,  loaded  with 
langrage,  which  killed  three  sailors,  broke  the  thigh  and  right 
leg  of  the  Captain,  wounded  the  Lieutenant  and  some  people 
of  the  crew.  Ankerloo,  who  in  the  evening  had  been  obliged  by 
a  violent  gale  of  wind  to  draw  in  his  guns  and  shut  up  his  ports, 
not  finding  himself  prepared  for  battle,  his  officers  took  immediate 
measures,  with  the  utmost  alertness,  for  repulsing  the  privateer, 
which  did  in  fact  at  last  receive  a  broadside  from  the  frigate; 
but  on  the  whole,  she  escaped  in  the  night,  by  the  force  of  sails 
and  oars.  After  this  perfidy  on  the  part  of  the  English,  Anker- 


22  Wharton,  Dipl.  Corr.  of  the  Am.  Rev.,  Ill,  632. 
23Wharton,  Op.  Cit.,  Ill,  676. 


12        RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

loo  would  have  entered  Marsailles  for  the  sake  of  dressing  his 
wounds,  but  having  met  with  contrary  winds  and  bad  weather 
for  three  days,  he  put  into  Malaga,  where  he  went  ashore  to 
the  house  of  the  Swedish  consul,  where  he  is  since  dead  of 
wounds".24 

England  even  claimed  the  right  to  search  merchant  vessels 
under  convoy.  The  following  has  been  taken  from  a  report  to 
the  President  of  Congress  from  John  Adams  dated  January 
16,  1782.  "They  write  from  Stockholm,  that  the  Court  of 
London  has  thought  proper  to  make  representations  to  that  of 
Sweden,  concerning  a  recounter,  which  a  convoy  of  merchant 
ships,  under  escort  of  the  Swedish  frigate,  the  Jaramas,  had 
with  the  English  squadron  of  commodore  Stewart,  who  would 
have  visited  these  ships.  The  Court  of  London  pretends  that  he 
was  authorized  to  make  such  a  visit,  even  in  virtue  of  the 
articles  of  the  convention  of  the  armed  neutrality,  concluded 
between  the  three  powers  of  the  north;  but  that  the  court  of 
Stockholm,  far  from  blaming  the  refusal  of  the  captain  of 
the  Jaramas,  to  permit  the  visit,  had  highly  approved  his  conduct, 
and  answered  that  this  officer  had  acted  conformably  to  his  duty, 
for  that  the  regulation  in  one  of  the  articles  of  the  convention 
of  the  armed  neutrality  in  regard  to  the  visit  of  merchant  ships, 
respected  only  vessels,  which  navigated  without  convoy,  but  not 
at  all  those  which  should  be  found  under  convoy,  and  conse- 
quently under  the  protection  of  a  sovereign  flag  the  warranty  of 
the  nature  of  their  cargo,  and  of  the  property". 25  The  decision 
of  the  Court  of  Sweden  was  referred  to  Catharine  II,  and  she 
approved  it  and  assured  the  Swedish  Government  of  her  co- 
operation to  defend  the  right  of  neutrals. 

The  Continental  Congress  carefully  discussed  the  informa- 
tion received  from  the  representatives  in  Europe,  and  on  Sep- 

*  Sparks,  J.  Dipl.  Corr.,  II,  699  f. 

M  Sparks,  J.  Dipl.  Corr.  of  the  Am.  Bey.,  VI,  841. 


NEGOTIATIONS  DURING  THE  AMERICAN  REVOLUTION         13 

tember  26,  1780,  a  "committee  to  whom  was  referred  the  motion 
of  Mr.  [Samuel]  Adams,  reports  that,  Whereas  her  Imperial 
Majesty  of  all  the  Russias,  animated  with  the  clearest  sentiment 
of  Justice,  equity  and  moderation,  and  a  strict  regard  to  the 
unquestionable  rights  of  neutrality  and  the  most  perfect  freedom 
of  commerce  that  can  consist  with  such  neutrality  has  notified 
both  to  the  belligerent  and  neutral  Powers,  the  following  propo- 
sitions to  which  his  Most  Christian  Majesty,  the  Illustrious  ally 
of  these  United  States  and  his  Catholic  Majesty  two  of  the 
belligerent  Powers,  and  most  of  the  neutral  Powers  in  Europe 
have  acceded. 

"The  Congress  of  the  United  States  of  America  willing 
to  testify  their  moderation  and  regard  to  the  rights  of  neutrality 
and  freedom  of  commerce,  as  well  as  their  respect  for  the 
Powers  and  potentates  who  have  adopted  the  propositions  have: 

"Resolved,  That  all  neutral  vessels  have  by  the  Law  of 
Nations  a  right  to  navigate  freely  to  and  from  ports  and  on 
the  coasts  of  the  powers  at  war,  when  not  prohibited  by  treaty 
or  municipal  law. 

' '  That  in  the  case  aforesaid  the  effects  of  belligerent  Powers, 
or  belonging  to  their  subjects  shall  be  free  in  neutral  vessels 
except  always  contraband.  That  the  term  contraband  be  con- 
fined to  those  articles  expressly  declared  such  by  the  articles  of 
the  Treaty  of  Amity  and  Commerce  of  the  6th  day  of  February 
1778,  between  his  Most  Christian  Majesty  and  these  United 
States. 

"That  with  regard  to  ports  or  places  blocked  up  or  closely 
invested,  none  shall  be  considered  as  such  but  those  which  by 
a  seige  or  blockade  are  so  closely  invested  that  an  attempt  cannot 
be  made  to  enter  such  ports  or  places  without  evident  danger. 

"That  the  above  principles  serve  as  a  rule  in  all  proceed- 
ings of  justice  in  the  United  States  on  all  questions  of  capture. 

"Ordered  that  the  committee  of  Foreign  Affairs  transmit 
copies  of  the  above  act  to  the  Minister  Plenipotentiary  of  these 


14        RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

States  at  the  Court  of  Versailles  to  be  by  him  communicated  to 
the  Neutral  Powers  in  Europe  and  others  whom  it  may  con- 
cern".26 

The  same  day,  September  26,  1780,  Robert  Livingston  intro- 
duced a  resolution  of  the  following  content :  '  *  Congress  have  con- 
sidered the  declaration  of  the  Empress  of  all  the  Russias,  rela- 
tive to  the  rights  of  neutral  vessels.  The  regulations  it  contains 
are  useful,  wise,  and  just.  The  acts  of  a  sovereign  who  pro- 
motes the  happiness  of  her  subjects  and  extends  her  views  to 
the  welfare  of  nations,  who  forms  laws  for  a  vast  empire  and 
corrects  the  great  code  of  the  world,  claims  the  earliest  attention 
of  a  rising  republic  therefore 

' '  Resolved,  That  the  Board  of  Admiralty  report  instructions 
for  the  commanders  of  armed  vessels  commissioned  by  the  Uni- 
ted States  conformable  to  the  principles  contained  in  the  said 
declaration. 

"  Resolved,  That  copies  of  the  above  resolution  be  transmit- 
ted to  the  Minister  of  the  United  States  respectively,  and  to 
Monssre  de  Marbois,  charge  des  affaires,  from  his  Most  Christian 
Majesty".27 

On  October  4  it  was  decided  to  consider  the  report  on  the 
resolution,  relative  to  the  armed  neutrality  of  the  north,  on  the 
following  day. 28  On  the  5th,  Congress  took  into  consideration 
the  report  of  the  committee  on  the  motion  relative  to  the  propo- 
sition of  the  Empress  of  Russia;  and  thereupon  came  to  the 
following  resolution; 

"Her  Imperial  Majesty  of  all  the  Russias,  attentive  to  the 
freedom  of  commerce,  and  the  rights  of  nations,  in  her  declara- 
tion to  the  belligerent  and  neutral  powers,  having  proposed 
regulations,  founded  upon  principles  of  justice,  equity,  and 


20  Journals  of  Cont.  Congress,  XVIII,  864  ff. 
27  Journals  of  the  Cont.  Congress,  XVIII,  866. 
M  Journals  of  the  Cont.  Congress,  XVIII,  899. 


NEGOTIATIONS  DURING  THE  AMERICAN  REVOLUTION         15 

moderation,  of  which  their  Most  Christian  and  Catholic  Majes- 
ties, and  most  of  the  neutral  maritime  powers  of  Europe,  have 
declared  their  approbation. 

''Congress,  willing  to  testify  their  regard  to  the  rights  of 
commerce,  and  their  respect  for  the  sovereign,  who  hath  pro- 
posed and  the  powers  that  have  approved  the  said  regulations ; 

"Resolved,  That  the  Board  of  Admiralty  prepare  and  re 
port  instructions  for  the  commanders  of  armed  vessels   com- 
missioned by  the  United  States,  conformable  to  the  principles 
contained  in  the  declaration  of  the  Empress  of  all  the  Russias, 
on  the  rights  of  neutral  vessels ; 

1 '  That  the  ministers  plenipotentiary  from  the  United  States, 
if  invited  thereto,  be  and  hereby  are  respectively  empowered 
to  accede  to  such  regulations  conformable  to  the  spirit  of  the  said 
declaration,  as  may  be  agreed  upon  by  Congress  expected  to 
assemble  in  pursuance  of  the  invitation  of  her  Imperial  Majesty. 

"Ordered,  That  copies  of  the  above  resolutions  be  trans- 
mitted to  the  respective  ministers  of  the  United  States  at  for- 
eign courts,  and  to  the  honorable  the  minister  plenipotentiary 
of  France".29 

The  Board  of  Admiralty  reported  November  27,  1780,  giving 
the  following  instructions  to  the  commanders  of  ships  of  war 
and  private  armed  vessels: 

1.  "Permit  all  neutral  vessels  freely  to  navigate  in  the 

high  seas  or  coasts  of  America,  except  such  as  are 
employed  in  carrying  contraband  goods  or  soldiers  to 
the  enemies  of  the  United  States; 

2.  ' '  You  shall  not  seize  or  capture  any  effects  belonging  to 

the  subjects  of  belligerent  powers  on  board  neutral 
vessels,  excepting  contraband  goods". 

3.  The  term  "contraband"  should  be  interpreted  in  the 

light  of  the  treaty  of  February  6,  1778,  with  France. 

29  Journals  of  the  Continental  Congress,  XVIII,  905  f . 


16        RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

4.  Any  one  who  violated  those  regulations  should  lose  his 

commission. 

5.  These  principles  should  serve  as  basis  for  determining 

the  legality  of  prizes. 80 

In  keeping  with  these  instructions,  Congress  adopted  a  reso- 
lution June  26,  1781,  to  request  the  Board  of  Admiralty  to  "  in- 
form John  Barry  Esq.,  commander  of  the  frigate  Alliance  that 
Congress  approve  his  conduct  in  releasing  the  ship  belonging  to 
subjects  of  the  republic  of  Venice,  retaken  by  him  from  a  British 
privateer  on  the  4th  of  March  last,  it  being  their  determination 
always  to  pay  the  utmost  respect  to  the  rights  of  neutral  com- 
merce"81 

The  ministers  plenipotentiary  who  represented  the  United 
States  in  Europe  performed  their  part  expeditiously.  John 
Adams  wrote  to  the  President  of  Congress  March  19,  1781,  "1 
have  been  advised  to  do  nothing  in  consequence  of  my  commis- 
sion to  the  States  at  present,  for  fear  of  throwing  before  the 
people  new  objects  of  division  and  dissension.  I  have,  however, 
communicated  to  their  High  Mightinesses  and  to  the  ministers  of 
Russia,  Denmark,  Sweden,  and  France,  the  resolution  of  Congress 
of  the  5th  of  October,  relative  to  the  principles  of  the  neutral 

confederation ". 82    And  Dr.  Franklin  wrote  to  John  Jay 

on  April  12,  1781,  "I  thank  you  for  sending  me  the  copy  of  the 
Resolution  relating  to  the  Empress  of  Russia,  tho'  I  had  before 
received  it,  and  was  already  communicated  to  her  Imperial 
Majesty,  who  I  am  informed  is  much  pleased  with  it". 83 

Congress  also  issued  instructions  to  Mr.  Dana,  December 
19,  1780,  when  he  was  sent  to  Russia  authorizing  him  to  "sub 
scribe  to  any  treaty  for  that  purpose ' '  of  protecting  the  freedom 

"Journals  of  the  Cont.  Congress,  XVIII,  1097;  comp.  1008. 
n  Journals  of  the  Cont.  Congress,  XVIII,  1098 ;  Journals  of  CongreM, 
VII,  109. 

"John  Adams'  Works  (ed.  C.  F.  Adams),  VII,  381. 
"Life  and  Writings  of  Franklin  (ed.  Smyth),  VIII,  238. 


NEGOTIATIONS  DURING  THE  AMERICAN  REVOLUTION         17 

of  commerce  and  the  rights  of  nations  "conformable  to  the 
spirit"  of  the  declaration,  "and  which  is  consistant  with  the 
dignity  and  sovereignty  of  the  United  States  as  a  free  and  inde- 
pendent nation ".  He  was  authorized  to  sign  a  treaty 

with  any  one  of  the  neutral  nations  or  with  all  of  them,  and  to 
"use  every  means  which  can  be  devised  to  obtain  the  consent 
and  influence  of  that  Court  that  these  United  States  shall  be 
formally  invited,  or  admitted  to  accede  as  principal  and  as  inde- 
pendent nation  to  the  said  convention". 34 

In  a  letter  to  Livingston,  dated  September  5,  1782,  Francis 
Dana  pointed  out  that  Congress  must  *  *  have  misapprehended  the 
nature  of  the  Confederation  proposed  to  maintain  the  freedom 
of  commerce  and  navigation My  commission  and  in- 
structions are  in  part  founded  upon  the  supposition"  that  neu- 
trals and  belligerents  alike  were  invited  "to  enter  into  a  general 
convention  for  that  purpose,  and  authorized  me  to  accede  to 
the  same  (if  invited  thereto)  on  the  part  of  the  United  States, 
whereas  the  declaration  is  in  the  nature  of  a  notification  to  the 
belligerent  powers  only,  and  contains  a  complaint  of  the  inter- 
ruption the  commerce  and  navigation  of  neutral  nations.  .  .  . 
had  suffered  from  the  subjects  of  the  belligerent  powers,  in  viola- 
tion of  the  rights  of  neutral  nations ' '.  The  proclamation  stated 
those  rights  and  to  protect  them  the  neutrals  had  fitted  out  the 
greater  portion  of  their  marine  forces. 35 

Mr.  Dana  continued  by  saying  that  this  was  the  only  passage 
he  had  "been  able  to  find  in  all  the  acts  relative  to  this  subject 
which  gives  the  least  idea  of  a  Congress  for  general  negotia- 
tion".36 

On  January  3,  1783,  Mr.  Dana  explained  that  the  maritime 


34  Journals  of  the  Cont.  Congress,  XVIII,  1168-73. 

35  Wharton,  Dipl.  Corr.  of  the  Am.  Rev.,  V,  700  ff . 

36  Wharton,  Dipl.  Corr.  of  the  Am.  Rev.,  V,  700. 


18        RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

convention  appeared  "from  its  nature,  as  well  as  from  its  terms, 
to  be  limited  to  the  duration  of  the  present  war".  " 

From  the  evidence  at  hand  it  seems  fair  to  conclude  that 
Russia  did  not  mean  to  help  the  United  States  to  establish  their 
independence;  she  entered  the  armed  neutrality  for  her  own 
interest.  Catharine  II  enjoyed  the  flattery  and  praise  the  reso- 
lution of  the  Continental  Congress  bestowed  upon  her,  but  she 
stubbornly  refused  to  receive  their  minister.  The  French  min- 
ister to  the  United  States  received  a  despatch  from  Count  d<; 
Vergennes,  dated  March  9,  1781,  of  which  he  notified  congress. 
Count  de  Vergennes  considered  "that  the  resolves  of  Congress 
which  had  been  adopted  on  the  association  of  the  neutral  powers, 
were  found  very  wise  by  the  council  of  the  king;  and  that  it 
was  thought  they  might  be  of  service  in  the  course  of  the  nego- 
tiations. The  French  ministry  did  not  doubt  that  they  would  be 
very  agreeable  to  the  Empress  of  Russia.  But  they  were  not 
of  the  same  opinion  with  the  respect  to  the  appointment  of  Mr. 
Dana,  as  a  minister  to  the  court  of  Petersburg".  The  reason  was 
that  the  Empress  had  expressed  the  greatest  impartiality  and 
expected  that  peace  would  be  established  only  through  her  med- 
iation. 38 

This  question  is  further  illustrated  by  a  letter  which  Dr. 
Franklin  received  from  Francis  Dana,  and  which  Dr.  Franklin 
reported  to  Congress.  He  wrote:  "This  day  I  received  a  letter 
from  Mr.  Dana,  dated  at  St.  Petersburg,  April  29,  in  which  is 
the  following  passage:  We  yesterday  received  news,  that  thb 
States  General  had  on  the  19th  of  this  month  acknowledged  the 
Independence  of  the  United  States.  This  event  gave  a  shock  here, 
and  is  not  well  received,  as  they  at  least  profess  to  have  flattered 
themselves,  that  the  mediation  would  have  prevented  it,  and 


3TWharton,  Dip.  Corr.  of  the  Am.  Bev.,  VI,  194;   Sparks,  Dipl.  COIT 
IV,  664. 

M  Journals  of  the  Cont,  Congress,  XX,  562. 


NEGOTIATIONS  DURING  THE  AMERICAN  REVOLUTION         19 

otherwise  bro't  on  a  partial  peace  between  Great  Britain  and 
Holland".39 

In  view  of  these  facts  it  is  not  surprising  that  Hamilton 
made  a  motion  in  Congress,  seconded  'by  Madison  on  May  21, 
1783,  "that  Dana  be  informed  that  the  primary  object  of  his 
mission  to  St.  Petersburg  was  terminated,  and  that  the  benefits 
of  a  commercial  treaty  were  remote  and  without  present  induce- 
ments". Mr.  Hamilton  also  referred  to  the  armed  neutrality 
in  the  following  words:  "That  though  Congress  approve  the 
principles  of  the  armed  neutrality,  founded  on  the  liberal  basis  of 
a  maintenance  of  the  rights  of  neutral  nations  of  the  privileges 
of  commerce,  yet  they  are  unwilling,  at  this  juncture,  to  become 
a  party  to  a  confederacy  which  may  hereafter  too  far  compli- 
cate the  interests  of  the  United  States  with  the  politicks  of 
Europe,  and  therefore,  if  such  a  progress  is  not  yet  made  in 
this  business  as  may  make  it  dishonorable  to  recede,  it  is 
their  desire,  that  no  further  measures  may  be  taken  at  present 
towards  the  admission  of  the  United  States  into  that  confeder- 
acy".40 

From  these  facts  it  is  clear  that  the  policy  of  Russia  was 
only  to  weaken  both  England  and  France  so  that  she  should 
be  able  so  much  more  easily  to  pursue  her  policy  toward  Poland 
for  its  final  partition.  In  the  weakened  condition,  France  would 
not  be  able  to  watch  so  carefully  the  Russian  advances  into 
Poland.  Denmark  was  her  ally  and  came  into  the  armed  neu- 
trality under  the  pressure  of  Russia,  because  she  had  entered 
into  a  treaty  with  England  which  gave  her  partial  satisfaction. 
Sweden,  therefore,  remains  as  the  only  member  of  the  armed 
neutrality  which  on  account  of  its  friendship  with  France  and 
the  United  States  was  willing  to  aid  the  friends.  This  is  strik- 


39  Life  and  Writings  of  Franklin,  VIII,  534. 

40  Journals  of  Congress,  For.  Affrs.,  346;   also  in  Writings  of  James 
Madison  (G.  Hunt,  ed.),  I,  469. 


20        RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

ingly  illustrated  by  the  fact  that  Sweden  was  the  first  country 
to  request  a  treaty  with  the  United  States,  by  the  treatment  of 
the  American  ministers  by  the  Swedish  ministers  in  Europe,  and 
by  their  offer  to  grant  United  States  vessels  a  haven  of  safety  in 
the  harbors  of  their  country. 

On  December  20,  1781,  Mr.  Carmichael  wrote  to  Kobert 
Livingston  from  Madrid:  "The  new  minister  of  Sweden  is  open 
in  declaring  his  partiality  for  our  cause,  and  signified  that 
he  would  have  waited  on  Mr.  Jay  on  his  arrival  here,  as  it  is  the 

custom  of  those  last  come  to  do His  conduct  to  myself 

shows  that  this  was  not  a  mere  compliment,  for  he  has  invited 
me  several  times  to  dine  with  him,  and  visited  me ' '. 41  In  a 
similar  spirit  John  Adams  wrote  from  the  Hague,  September  4, 
1782:  "The  minister  from  Sweden,  the  Baron  d 'Ehrenswerd,  is 
lately  removed  to  Berlin,  to  my  great  regret,  as  he  appeared  to 
me  a  very  good  character,  and  behaved  very  civilly  to  me  several 
times  when  I  met  him  at  court  and  at  the  French  ambassa- 
dor's". 42  Again  John  Adams  wrote  on  November  19,  1782: 
The  Swedish  minister  went  to  a  gentleman  and  asked  him  to 
introduce  him  to  Mr.  Jay  and  me,  which  he  did.  The  minister 
told  us  he  had  been  here  since  1766 ' '.  4S 

Dr.  Franklin  reported  on  July  1,  1782,  that  "the  ambassador 
from  the  King  of  Sweden"  had  asked  him  whether  he  had  powers 
to  conclude  a  treaty  of  commerce  with  Sweden.  The  minister 
said  that  his  master  "was  desirous  of  such  a  treaty  with  the 
United  States",  and  had  directed  him  to  ask  Dr.  Franklin 
that  question.  The  King  had  charged  his  minister  to  tell  Frank- 
lin "that  it  would  flatter  him  greatly  to  make  it  with  a  person 
whose  character  he  so  much  esteemed ". 44 

Regarding   the    treaty   Franklin   wrote    to    Livingston    on 

41  Wharton,  Dipl.  Corr.  of  the  Am.  Rev.,  V,  62. 

42  Wharton,  Dipl.  Corr.  of  the  Am.  Rev.,  V,  691 

43  Wharton,  Dipl.  Corr.  of  the  Am.  Rev.,  VI,  56. 

44  Wharton,  Op.  Cit.,  V,  558. 


NEGOTIATIONS  DURING  THE  AMEEICAN  REVOLUTION         21 

August  12,  1782,  in  the  following  words :  "I  understand  from 
the  Swedish  Ambassador  that  their  treaty  with  us  will  go  on 
as  *soon  as  ours  with  Holland  is  finished,  and  the  treaty  with 
France  with  such  improvements  as  that  with  Holland  may 
suggest,  being  the  basis".45  The  continental  congress  adopted 
a  resolution  September  19,  1782:  "That  a  commission  and  in- 
structions" should  be  issued  "for  negotiating  a  treaty  of  amity 
and  commerce  with  the  King  of  Sweden".  Arthur  Lee,  Ralph 
Izard,  and  James  Duane  were  appointed  as  a  committee  to  draft 
the  instructions.  *8  The  committee  was  ready  to  report  a  plan 
for  a  treaty  and  instructions  on  September  28,  1782.  The  com- 
mission was  issued  to  Franklin  and  in  case  of  his  death  or  incap- 
acity to  John  Adams.  *7  The  instructions  were  issued  to  Frank- 
lin ' '  to  negotiate  and  conclude  the  proposed  treaty  of  amity  and 
commerce  with  the  person  or  persons  that  shall  be  appointed 
by  his  Swedish  Majesty  at  Paris,  and  not  elsewhere,  unless  some 
other  place  should  be  fixed  upon  for  negotiating  a  general  peace  j 
in  which  case  you  may  negotiate  and  conclude  it  at  the  same 
place".  The  Committee  suggested  that  the  treaty  should  run 
for  twelve  years  only  "  as  we  shall  be  better  able  to  judge  by 
experience  what  commercial  regulations  will  be  most  beneficial 
for  the  citizens  and  subjects  of  the  contracting  Powers". 

The  instructions  continued  by  saying  that  "it  is  possible 
that  the  fourth  article  in  the  plan  of  a  treaty  may  be  objected  to 
on  the  part  of  the  King  of  Sweden,  as  unequal,  he  having  more 
ships  of  war  than  the  United  States,  and  not  being  engaged  in 
any  war  which  may  render  protection  necessary  to  the  ships  of 
his  subjects.  He  may  also  apprehend,  that  the  giving  protection 
to  our  vessels  may  involve  him  in  war  with  Great  Britain.  To 
this  it  may  be  answered  that  the  fifteenth  article  is  as  unequal 
in  favor  of  Sweden,  giving  her  the  benefit  of  the  carrying  trade, 

*Wharton,  Dipl.  Corr.  of  the  Am.  Rev.,  V,  655. 

46  Journals  of  the  Cont.  Congress,  XXIII,  592,  610. 

47  Journals  of  the  Cont.  Congress,  XXIII,  621. 


22        RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

which  cannot  be  enjoyed  by  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  .  .  . 
Therefore  the  one  article  may  be  set  against  the  other." 

The  essential  object  of  the  treaty  was  declared  to  be  "the 
recognition  of  our  Independence  by  another  European  power." 
In  order  to  obtain  that  Franklin  was  authorized,  if  necessary, 
not  to  adhere  to  the  fourth  article  "to  prevent  the  conclusion  of 
the  treaty. ' '  On  the  same  principle  he  was  authorized  to  use  his 
discretion  in  extending  the  terms  of  the  treaty  to  twenty  years 
but  no  farther.  He  was  also  allowed  to  "recede  from  the  stipula- 
tion proposed  in  the  9th  article,  that  whatever  shall  be  found 
laden  by  the  Subjects  and  Inhabitants  of  either  party  on  any  ship 
belonging  to  the  enemies  of  the  other  should  be  subject  to  confisca- 
tion. ' ' 48  During  the  debates  Congress  changed  the  time  for  the 
duration  of  the  treaty  to  fifteen  years  instead  of  twelve  as  sug- 
gested by  the  committee.  49 

The  American  ministers  in  Europe  also  considered  that  an 
important  victory  had  been  won  through  the  invitation  from 
Sweden  to  form  a  treaty.  On  December  14,  1782,  John  Adams 
wrote  to  Robert  Livingston  from  Paris:  "There  is  more  matter 
than  time  to  write  at  present.  The  King  of  Sweden  has  done  the 
United  States  the  great  honor  in  his  commission  to  his  Minister 
to  treat  with  them,  by  inserting  that  he  had  a  great  desire  to  form 
a  connection  with  States  which  had  so  fully  established  their 
independence,  and  by  their  wise  and  gallant  conduct  so  well  de- 
served it ;  and  his  Minister  desired  it  might  be  remembered  that 
his  Sovereign  was  the  first  who  had  voluntarily  proposed  a 
treaty  with  us."50  Only  ten  days  later  Franklin  could  write: 
"The  Swedish  ambassador  has  exchanged  full  powers  with  me. 
I  send  a  copy  of  his  herewith.  We  have  had  some  conferences  on 
the  proposed  plan  of  our  treaty,  and  he  has  despatched  a  courier 
for  further  instructions  respecting  some  of  the  articles. ' ' 51 

48  Journals  of  the  Cont.  Congress,  XXIII,  622-24. 

*  Writings  of  James  Madison  (G.  Hunt,  ed.),  I,  243. 

60  Sparks,  Dipl.  Corr.,  IV,  3. 

61  Wharton,  Dip].  Corr.  of  the  Am.  Bev.,  VI,  163. 


NEGOTIATIONS  DURING  THE  AMERICAN  REVOLUTION          23 

The  work  on  the  treaty  progressed  so  rapidly  that  it  could 
be  signed  on  April  3,  1783.  Shortly  after  the  treaty  was  signed 
Count  Gustavus  Philip  Creutz,  who  for  seventeen  years  had  been 
Minister  at  the  Court  of  Versailles,  was  recalled  to  succeed  Count 
Shaffer  as  secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs.  As  his  successor  at  Paris 
was  chosen  the  young  Baron  Eric  Magnus  de  Stael  von  Holstein, 
son-in-law  of  M.  Necker,  the  French  minister  of  finance. 52 

The  treaty  proper  contained  twenty-seven  articles  of  which 
the  first  one  provided  for  a  "firm  and  universal  peace"  between 
the  United  States  and  Sweden.  The  treaty  provided  that  if  one 
country  granted  any  commercial  privilege  to  any  other  nation 
in  regard  to  tariff  or  harbor  facilities  that  privilege  should  also 
apply  to  the  commerce  between  the  two  contracting  parties.  The 
principle  of  free  ships,  free  goods,  excluding  contraband,  was 
incorporated  from  the  armed  neutrality.  In  one  article  the 
treaty  specified  that  contraband  should  include  material  of  war, 
like  arms,  great  guns,  canon  balls,  and  even  matches.  But  con- 
traband goods  destined  to  an  enemy  country  should  not  be  con- 
fiscated outright  until  legal  investigation  had  been  completed  in 
order  to  grant  justice  to  the  parties  concerned.  No  privateer 
of  either  nation  was  allowed  to  take  prizes  from  the  other,  but 
if  a  prize  had  been  taken  the  person  who  had  taken  the  prize 
was  responsible  in  person  and  goods  to  make  satisfaction  to  the 
injured  party.  In  order  that  the  government  should  be  able  to 
guarantee  this  last  point,  it  should  require  from  every  person 
who  wished  to  fit  out  a  privateer  a  security  so  large  that  the 
treaty  obligations  could  be  fulfilled.  If  one  nation  should  be  at 
war  and  his  enemy  had  taken  vessels  from  its  friendly  ally,  this 
one,  if  he  retook  the  vessel,  should  return  it  to  its  lawful  owner. 

The  treaty  also  prescribed  the  details  to  be  followed  if  the 
two  countries  should  be  at  war  with  a  common  enemy.  The  fol- 
lowing procedure  should  be  carried  out: 

02  Bain,  Gustavus  III,  etc.,  I,  254. 


24        RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

1.  If  the  vessel  was  retaken  from  the  enemy  by  a  man  of 

war  from  the  other  nation,  and  the  vessel  had  not  been 
in  the  possession  of  the  enemy  more  than  24  hours, 
then  it  should  be  returned  to  the  original  owner  on 
paying  one-third  of  the  value  of  the  ship  and  cargo ;  if 
the  vessel  should  have  been  in  possession  of  the  enemy 
more  than  24  hours,  it  should  belong  to  the  captor. 

2.  If  the  vessel  was  retaken  during  the  24  hours,  it  should 

be  returned  to  the  owner  on  paying  one-thirtieth  of 
the  value  of  the  vessel  and  cargo,  and  one-tenth  if  re- 
taken after  24  hours,  for  the  crew  of  the  capturing 
vessel. 

3.  Prizes  taken  in  the  above  manner  should  be  returned  to 

the  owner  after  he  had  given  security  to  assure  the 
carrying  out  of  the  above  stipulation. 

4.  Privateers  of  one  nation  shall  be  admitted  into  the  har- 

bors of  the  other  reciprocally. 

The  twenty-seventh  article  suggested  that  the  treaty  should 
be  ratified  within  eight  months,  or  sooner  if  possible,  counting 
from  the  day  of  the  signature. 53 

On  July  29,  1783,  Congress  took  up  the  treaty  for  considera- 
tion and  with  a  few  verbal  changes  it  was  ' '  adopted  and  ratified 
by  nine  states  being  present."  Congress  thereupon  authorized 
Benjamin  Franklin  "to  deliver  this  our  act  of  ratification  in  ex- 
change for  the  ratification  of  the  said  treaty  by  his  Majesty  the 
King  of  Sweden. ' '  The  act  was  signed  by  the  President  of  Con- 
gress, Elias  Boudinot  on  July  29,  1783,  and  of  our  sovereignty 
and  independence  the  eight ' '. 54 

A  committee  consisting  of  James  Madison,  Mr.  Higginsoii, 


68  Journal  of  the  Am.  Cong.  (1774-1788),  IV,  241  f.,  Malloy,  Treaties, 
Conventions,  and  International  Acts,  II,  1725  ff.,  Secret  Journal  of  Con- 
gress, III,  369. 

"Journal  of  the  American  Congress  (1774-1788),  IV,  247. 


NEGOTIATIONS  DURING  THE  AMERICAN  REVOLUTION         25 

and  Alexander  Hamilton  was  appointed  to  draught  a  proclama- 
tion declaring  the  treaty  in  force,  and  the  report  was  submitted 
and  adopted  on  September  5,  1783.  The  proclamation  required 
all  the  citizens  and  inhabitants,  and  "more  especially  all  officers 
and  others  in  the  service  of  the  United  States"  to  govern  them- 
selves ' '  strictly  in  all  things  according  to  the  stipulations ' '  of  the 
treaty. 55 

55  Journal  of  the  American  Congress   (1774-1788),  IV,  278. 


CHAPTER  II 

PROPOSED  ALLIANCE 

"It  appears  that  no  powers  are  at  present  vested  in  any 
person  in  Europe  to  agree  to  any  treaty  similar  to  that  entered 
into  by  Russia,  Sweden,  Denmark  and  the  United  Provinces  of 
the  Netherlands,  after  the  peace  shall  be  concluded",  wrote  Rob- 
ert Livingston  on  June  3,  1783,  in  a  report  to  Congress. x  Nine 
days  later  a  committee  of  Congress  took  up  the  idea  and  said: 
"The  resolution  of  the  5th  of  October,  1780,  empowers  the  Min- 
isters of  these  States,  if  invited  thereto,  to  accede  to  such  regula- 
tions conformable  to  the  spirit  of  the  declaration  of  Russia.  .  .  . 
in  pursuance  of  the  invitation  of  her  Imperial  Majesty.  Our 
Ministers  received  no  invitation,  and  special  powers  were  after- 
wards given  to  Mr.  Dana,  which,  in  their  nature  superceded  that 
resolution.  Mr.  Dana  was  by  his  commission  and  instructions, 
empowered  to  sign  the  treaty,  or  convention,  for  the  protection  of 
commerce,  in  behalf  of  the  United  States,  either  with  her  Im- 
perial Majesty  in  conjunction  with  other  neutral  Powers,  or,  if 
that  shall  be  inadmissible,  separately  with  her  Imperial  Majesty, 
or  any  of  those,  that  is,  those  neutral  Powers.  The  treaty  being 
only  made  to  continue  during  the  war,  his  powers  terminated 
with  the  war,  or  at  most  extended  only  to  sign  it  with  neutral 
Powers,  and  not  to  form  a  new  separate  treaty".  Thereupon 
Congress  adopted  the  following  resolution:  "Whereas,  the  pri- 
mary object  of  the  resolution  of  October  5,  1780,  and  of  the  com- 
mission and  instructions  to  Mr.  Dana  relative  to  the  accession  of 
the  United  States  to  the  neutral  Confederacy,  no  longer  can 

1  Wharton,  Dip.  Corr.  of  the  Am.  Rev.,  VI,  473. 


PROPOSED  ALLIANCE  «7 

operate  ....  But  inasmuch  as  the  liberal  principles  on  which 
the  said  confederacy  was  established  are  conceived  to  be,  in  gen- 
eral, favorable  to  the  interests  of  nations,  and  particularly  to 
those  of  the  United  States  .... 

' '  Resolved,  That  the  Ministers  Plenipotentiary  of  these  Unit- 
ed States  for  negotiating  a  peace  be,  and  they  are  hereby,  in- 
structed, in  case  they  should  comprise  in  the  definitive  treaty 
any  stipulation  amounting  to  a  recognition  of  the  rights  of  neu- 
tral nations,  to  avoid  accompanying  them  by  any  engagements 
which  shall  oblige  the  contracting  parties  to  support  those  stipu- 
lations by  arms ' '.  2 

From  this  resolution  it  appears  that  Congress  was  still  warm- 
ly attached  to  the  principles  of  the  armed  neutrality,  although 
it  seems  that  no  representative  of  the  United  States  was  ever 
invited  to  sign  a  convention  with  any  neutral  nation  incorporat- 
ing them.  But  it  is  equally  clear  that  Congress  was  anxious  to 
avoid  being  implicated  in  the  dynastic  quarrels  of  European 
affairs. 

The  question  was  soon  presented  to  the  American  representa- 
tives in  Europe.  John  Adams  wrote  to  Robert  Livingston  on 
July  7,  1783,  less  than  a  month  after  the  above  resolution  had 
been  adopted :  ' '  The  Dutch  ambassadors  did  once  propose  a  meet- 
ing to  us,  and  had  it  at  my  house.  Dr.  Franklin  came,  but  Mr. 
Jay  did  not,  and  Mr.  Laurens  was  absent.  The  ambassadors  de- 
sired to  know  whether  we  had  power  to  enter  into  any  engage- 
ments, provided  France,  Spain,  and  Holland  should  agree  to  any, 
in  support  of  the  armed  neutrality.  We  showed  them  the  reso- 
lution of  Congress  of  the  5  of  October,  1780,  and  told  them  that 
Mr.  Dana  had  been  since  vested  with  a  particular  commission  to 
the  same  effect.  We  never  heard  anything  further  about  it". 3 

Thus  the  American  revolutionary  war  ended  without  the 


2  Sparks,  Dip.  Corr.,  V,  500  ff. 

3  Sparks,  Dip.  Corr.,  TV,  45. 


28        RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

principles  of  the  armed  neutrality  having  gained  common  recog- 
nition or  become  a  part  of  international  treaties  except  in  rare 
cases.  Apparently  there  seemed  to  be  no  specific  need  for  adopt- 
ing those  principles  after  peace  had  once  more  been  established. 
But  the  peace  was  not  to  endure  very  long  for  the  revolutionary 
movements  in  France  soon  began  to  attract  the  attention  of  Eu- 
rope, and  developed  so  fast  that  on  January  21,  1793,  Louis 
XVI,  perished  by  the  guillotine.  Only  eleven  days  later  France 
declared  war  on  Great  Britain  and  Holland.  The  progress  of  the 
French  Revolution  was  followed  with  a  great  deal  of  interest 
both  in  the  United  States  and  Europe,  and  the  old  principles  of 
the  armed  neutrality  were  again  brought  forth  to  protect  the 
position  of  neutrals. 

Gustavus  III  of  Sweden  planned  to  place  himself  at  the  head 
of  a  coalition  against  the  revolutionary  element  in  France  in 
order  to  force  them  to  re-establish  the  King  on  the  throne.  Spain, 
Russia,  and  Prussia  were  to  co-operate  with  him,  but  the  King  of 
Sweden  was  to  be  the  leader  of  the  expedition.  Spain,  though 
interested,  did  not  seem  to  have  the  courage  of  her  conviction, 
and  Catharine  II,  busy  with  her  plans  in  Poland,  was  glad  to  see 
her  neighbor  absorbed  in  other  directions  and  therefore  tacitly 
consented  to  the  plan  without  granting  any  effective  assistance. 
The  Swedish  Ambassador  Baron  E.  M.  Stael  von  Holstein,  who 
had  represented  his  country  at  Paris  since  1783,  was  recalled  in 
December,  1791,  and  ordered  not  to  return  to  Sweden  because 
he  had  "become  faithful  to  the  French  system".4  But  the 
assassination  of  Gustavus  III  quickly  made  'a  change  in  the  en- 
tire alignment  of  nations. 

One  of  the  results  of  this  change  was  that  Dumaureiz  decided 
to  recall  the  French  charge  d 'affairs  in  Stockholm,  M.  Gaussen, 
and  "replaced  him  with  a  citizen  who  was  completely  in  sym- 


*S.   J.   Boethius,   Gustaf   ]V,  Adolf  foimyndareregering  och   franska 
revolutionen,  in  Svensk  Historisk  Tidskrift   (1887-8),  VII- VIII,  109. 


PROPOSED  ALLIANCE  29 

pathy  with  the  Revolution  and  not  neglect  to  reap  advantage 
of"  what  was  called  "the  memorable  catastrophe  which  in  Swe- 
den seemed  to  give  a  new  turn  to  the  administration". 5  Both 
the  new  French  ambassador,  Yerninac,  and  Baron  Stael  had  a 
new  convention  between  the  two  countries  much  at  heart.  Baron 
Stael,  contrary  to  orders  from  home,  went  to  Sweden,  and, 
through  the  aid  of  a  friend  Baron  Karl  Goran  Bonde,  succeeded 
in  gaining  access  to  the  Prince  Regent  and  won  his  personal 
favor. 6  The  news  that  France  had  conquered  the  Austrian 
Netherlands  and  the  retreat  of  Prussia  before  Verninac  started 
for  Sweden,  must  have  influenced  the  Swedish  administration  to 
a  very  large  degree  in  its  attitude  toward  France.  Before  the 
end  of  November,  1792,  therefore,  we  find  Baron  Stael  von  Hoi- 
stein  started  upon  a  diplomatic  journey  which  had  been  agreed 
upon  between  the  Prince  Regent  and  M.  Verninac  7  to  form  a 
commercial  treaty  between  the  two  countries.  The  plan  was 
even  enlarged  so  as  to  permit  Denmark  and  Turkey  to  enter  into 
it.  But  the  war  rolled  on  absorbing  nation  after  nation  in  its 
currents. 

Sweden,  desirous  of  being  neutral,  decided  to  invite  its 
neighbors  to  renew  the  armed  neutrality,  not  without  suggestions 
from  France.  Catharine  II  of  Russia,  having  received  England 's 
sanction  on  the  second  partition  of  Poland,  entered  into  an  agree- 
ment with  England  on  March  25,  1793,  to  renounce  her  former 
principles  in  regard  to  neutral  commerce.  She  demanded  that 
Sweden  should  follow  her  example,  and  when  the  Prince  Regent 
refused  she  took  that  as  an  excuse  for  discontinuing  her  subsidies 
to  Sweden,  according  to  the  Drottningholm  declaration  of  1791.  * 

5  The  correspondence  is  quoted  by  S.  J.  Boethius,  Gustaf  IV,  Adolfs 
formyndareregering  och  franska  revolutionen,  in  Svensk  Historisk  Tidskrift 
(1887-8),  VII-VIII,  100  ff. 

6  Ibid.  110. 

7  Ibid.  178. 

8S.  J.  Boethius,  Gustaf  IV  Adolfs  formyndareregering  och  franska 
revolutionen,  in  Svensk  Historisk  Tidskrift  (1*587-8),  VII-VIII,  207;  Hild«- 
brand,  Sveriges  Historia  VIII,  206. 


30        RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

The  mission  of  Baron  Stael  was  so  successful  that  he  already 
in  the  spring  of  1793  sent  home  a  convention  for  the  ratification 
of  his  home  government.  The  French  ambassador  seemed  cer- 
tain that  the  convention  should  be  ratified  by  the  Swedish  Gov- 
ernment instantly,  but  on  July  29,  1793,  he  was  obliged  to  notify 
the  French  Government  that  the  Prince  Regent  had  not  sent  the 
expected  courier  with  his  ratification  but  instead  an  ordinary 
letter  with  some  objections  to  the  convention.  The  following  are 
the  main  objections  as  stated  by  Verninac:  1)  a  few  changes  of 
which  the  principal  one  was  that  the  "King  of  Sweden"  is  not 
mentioned  enough,  but  the  Swedish  nation  was  mentioned  in  his 
place;  2)  if  France  shortly  after  the  signing  of  the  convention 
insisted  on  the  stipulated  assistance,  Sweden  would  be  deprived 
of  an  essential  part  of  her  power,  and  become  powerless  against 
Russia  whose  men-of-war  already  had  entered  the  Baltic  [France 
was  to  assist  Sweden — in  case  she  should  be  forced  into  war  on 
account  of  the  treaty — with  12,000  men  infantry,  15  battleships, 
and  10  frigates;  Sweden  was  to  assist  France  with  8,000  men 
infantry,  10  battleships,  and  6  frigates].  Therefore  the  Prince 
Regent  insisted  as  a  sine  qua  non  upon  a  specific  declaration  that 
the  Swedish  troops  should  not  be  called  farther  away  than  they 
could  come  to  her  defense;  and  3)  the  introduction  did  not  suffi- 
ciently specify  the  fundamental  principles  on  which  the  treaty 
was  based. 9  The  French  Government  neglected  to  take  up  the 
suggestions  of  the  Government  of  Sweden  and  therefore  the  de- 
fensive alliance  of  May  17,  1793,  failed  to  be  ratified,  not  on 
account  of  the  Prince  Regent,  but  on  account  of  "the  abstract 
revolutionary  doctrines ' '  whose  principles  were  essentially  oppos- 
ed to  the  Swedish  alliance.  Robespierre  had  in  the  meantime  re- 
placed Danton  both  in  the  committee  of  public  safety  and  in  the 
committee  on  foreign  affairs. 10 

8  S.  J.  Boethius,  Gustaf  IV,  Adolf s  foimyndareregering  och  franska 
revolutionen,  in  Svensk  Historisk  Tidskrift  (1887-8),  VII-VIII,  210. 
10  Ibid.  215. 


PROPOSED  ALLIANCE  31 

When  this  treaty  failed  the  energetic  Baron  Stael  advised 
that  a  new  treaty  should  be  prepared  on  the  basis  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  armed  neutrality  of  1780.  This  suggestion  was  sec- 
onded by  M.  Verninac  who  was  authorized  to  enter  into  negotia- 
tions in  this  regard.  In  the  introduction  to  this  treaty  it  was 
stated  that  ''The  French  Republic  and  the  King  of  Sweden  de- 
sired to  renew  the  almost  two-century-long  friendship  between 
the  two  peoples  and  energetically  resist  the  domination  of  the 
allied  powers  over  the  neutrals".  The  following  principles  were 
included : 

1.  Sweden  should  resist  all  attempts  of  foreign  powers  to 

hinder  the  exercise  of  its  rights  to  pursue  its  commerce 
in  all  commodities  [Russia  had  already  requested  Swe- 
den to  notify  France  that  no  French  ships  could  enter 
a  Swedish  port]  ; 

2.  Sweden  should  protect  its  commerce  by  battleships ; 

3.  Swedish  merchant  vessels  should  pay  the  same  duty  in 

France  as  French  vessels; 

4.  France  should  remunerate  Sweden  for  every  battleship 

and  frigate  she  armed  for  the  protection  of  her  com- 
merce [Deforgues  suggested  in  a  letter  that  France 
would  pay  500,000  and  300,000  francs  respectively]  ; 

5.  If  the  treaty  should  involve  Sweden  in  war  with  Russia, 

France  promised  financial  aid; 

6.  In  order  to  aid  Sweden  in  the  first  preparations,  France 

promised,  besides  the  subsidies,  to  pay  a  certain  sum 
of  money  when  the  treaty  was  signed,  but  the  amount 
was  not  specified ; 

7.  Sweden  should  not  export  any  foodstuffs  to  enemies  of 

the  Republic  so  long  as  they  persisted  in  taking  neutral 
ships  destined  to  France; 

8.  No  foreign  merchant  should  be  allowed  to  accumulate 

and  store  foodstuffs  to  be  shipped  to  enemies  of  France ; 


32        RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

9.     French  privateers  should  be  allowed  freely  to  sell  their 
prizes  in  Sweden.  " 

Baron  Stael  promised  to  inform  his  government  of  the  treaty, 
but  he  raised  some  objections  to  it :  there  were  expressions  in  the 
introduction,  regarding  the  allied  governments,  which  were  too 
much  of  a  challenge  to  these  powers;  that  article  9,  about  the 
exports  of  foodstuffs,  should  cause  a  great  deal  of  dissatisfaction 
in  Sweden ;  that  the  amounts  for  battleships  and  frigates  be  speci- 
fied at  500,000  and  300,000  1.  respectively ;  that  ten  million  1.  be 
decided  on  to  be  paid  out  when  the  treaty  was  signed,  but  Verni 
nac  succeeded  in  reducing  it  to  six  million ;  finally  Baron  Stael 
requested  that  Sweden  should  be  remunerated  for  convoys  already 
fitted  out. 12 

On  October  9,  the  committee  on  Public  Safety  finally  took 
up  the  remarks  of  Ambasador  Stael  for  consideration  and  decided 
that  no  change  should  be  made  in  the  introduction ;  that  convoys 
should  be  remunerated  by  500,000  and  300,000  respectively ;  that 
six  millions  should  be  paid  when  the  treaty  was  signed.  On 
October  12,  Deforgues  wrote  to  Verninac  that  the  committee  re- 
fused to  change  article  9.  Verninac 's  despatch,  dated  Novem- 
ber 15,  stated  that  the  Prince  Regent  approved  the  treaty  except 
article  9,  "  because  it  would  entirely  destroy  the  commerce  of 
Sweden  and  also  make  him  appear  inconsistent  before  all  Eu- 
rope". 

The  Prince  Regent  was,  in  fact,  very  well  pleased  with  the 
turn  of  events  in  regard  to  France.  Besides,  the  relation  with 
Denmark  had  developed  in  a  manner  that  suited  the  treaty  of  neu- 
trality. During  the  last  days  of  August  or  first  days  of  Septem- 
ber, he  sent  an  envoy  to  Copenhagen  to  continue  the  work  started 


11 S.  J.  Boethius,  Gustaf  IV,  Adolfs  formyndareregering  och  franska 
revolutionen,  in  Svensk  Historisk  Tidskrift  (1887-8),  VII,  VIII,  216. 
12  S.  J.  Boethius,  Op.  Cit.,  VII -VIII,  218. 


PROPOSED  ALLIANCE  33 

by  Baron  Stael  on  his  journey  to  France. 13    But  even  this  alli- 
ance with  France  came  to  naught. 

It  has  been  considered  necessary  to  give  a  discussion  on  the 
relation  of  Sweden  with  certain  European  nations  in  order  to 
obtain  the  proper  angle  from  which  to  view  the  relations  with 
the  United  States.  It  must  further  be  remembered  that  the 
United  States  and  Sweden  had  not  as  yet  exchanged  public  min 
isters  and  therefore  their  relations  were  carried  on  through  rep- 
resentatives of  the  two  countries  who  met  in  some  other  European 
capital,  or  by  similar  indirect  means. 

Neither  Verninac  nor  Stael  could  console  themselves  with 
thp  failure  of  the  treaty  of  1793  and  therefore  they  proceeded 
energetically  each  in  his  own  way  to  discover  some  other  plan. 
Yerninac  proposed  to  the  Committee  on  Public  Safety  that  a 
secret  agreement  should  be  made  between  France  and  Sweden, 
and  that  Sweden  should  be  requested  to  send  out  eight  ships  of 
the  line  and  four  frigates  in  May,  1794,  or  earlier;  and  that  nego- 
tiations should  be  started  with  Sweden,  Denmark,  Turkey,  Po- 
land, Venice,  Genoa,  and  the  United  States  to  form  "a  league 
and  receive  subsidies  or  commercial  advantages"  from  France. 
Sweden  and  Denmark  should  be  considered  as  allies  of  France 
and  they  should  each  receive  6  million  1.  when  the  convention 
would  be  signed  and  500,000  1.  for  every  ship  of  the  line  and 
300,000  1.  for  each  frigate. 14 

Baron  Stael,  on  the  other  hand,  was  recalled  when  he  failed 
to  make  a  satisfactory  treaty  with  France.  On  his  way  to  Swe- 
den he  stopped  at  Copenhagen  where  he  was  preceded  by  another 

Swedish  envoy  Baron  E .    There  he  worked  energetically  to 

obtain  a  new  treaty  of  armed  neutrality  with  Denmark.     The 
Prince  Regent  was  rather  reluctant  in  giving  him  the  necessary 


13  S.  J.  Boethius,  Op.  Cit.,  VII-VIII,  220. 

"Quoted  by  S.  J.  Boethius,  in  Svensk  Historisk  Tidskrift    (1887-8), 
VII-VIII,  224. 


34        RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

authority  but  finally  he  wrote  that  Stael's  arguments  ''weighed 
so  heavily"  that  the  Prince  Regent  through  a  letter  from  Sparre, 
the  chancellor,  dated  March  31,  authorized  Stael,  "if  it  was  con- 
sidered necessary ' '  to  sign  a  convention  without  further  instruc- 
tions. Accordingly  the  convention  was  signed  in  Copenhagen 
on  March  27, 1794. 15  With  this  treaty  Stael  set  out  for  Sweden, 
and  both  countries  shortly  afterward  ratified  it. 

Baron  Stael  did  not,  however,  long  remain  in  Sweden,  but 
returned  to  France,  ostensibly  on  account  of  the  death  of  his 
mother-in-law,  but  really  to  attempt  to  receive  the  French  sub- 
sidies promised  in  reward  for  the  armed  neutrality.  On  his  way 
he  stopped  in  Copenhagen,  partly  because  of  a  temporary  ill- 
ness, and  partly  to  await  authorization  from  the  Prince  Regent 
to  recognize  the  Republic  and  the  appointment  as  ambassador 
to  France,  which  powers  he  proposed  to  use  in  order  to  influence 
the  French  authorities.  On  January  9,  1795,  he  arrived  at  Basel, 
where  he  met  Signeul16  who  brought  good  news  from  Paris.  Sig- 
neul  thought  that  the  authorities  at  Paris  would  be  willing  to 
reward  Sweden  for  her  expenses  in  connection  with  the  armed 
neutrality.  Baron  Stael,  encouraged  by  the  information  he  re- 
ceived concerning  the  general  political  conditions,  hastened  to 
Paris, 17  and  also  urged  his  home  government  to  increase  the 
convoys  in  lieu  of  French  aid. 

The  Prince  Regent  did  not,  however,  authorize  the  recogni- 
tion of  the  French  Republic  until  after  the  subsidy  convention 
had  been  signed ;  but  the  Swedish  Government  did  approach  the 
Government  of  Denmark  with  the  proposal  to  increase  the  con- 
voys. The  Danish  Government  was  not  inclined  to  accept  this 

"See  S.  J.  Boethius,  in  Svensk  Historisk  Tidskrift  (1887-8),  VII-VIII, 
226. 

16  Signeul  was  the  Swedish  courier  who  carried  many  of  these  documents 
from  Stael  to  Sweden. 

"  S.  J.  Boethius  discusses  this  question  fully,  in  Svensk  Historisk  Tid- 
skrift (1889-90),  IX-X,  5  ff. 


PROPOSED  ALLIANCE  35 

proposal.  The  Danish  Prime  Minister  even  went  so  far  as  to 
inform  the  Swedish  envoy  at  his  Court  that  the  propositions  of 
Sweden  were  occasioned  by  the  necessity  to  support  its  recogni- 
tion of  the  French  Republic  and  therefore  of  no  concern  to 
Denmark.  The  result  of  this  interview  was  that  the  Swedish 
chancellor  in  a  letter  to  Stael  "renewed,  but  not  in  any  way 
changed"  his  instructions;  and  the  Prince  Regent  wrote  to  the 
Danish  Crown  Prince  on  April  27,  requesting  a  more  energetic 
participation  in  the  armed  neutrality. 

It  seems  that  this  letter  had  the  desired  effect  for  the  Prince 
Regent,  with  the  Swedish  Crown  Prince  on  May  19,  went  to 
Skane  with  a  view  to  meet  the  Danish  Crown  Prince  to  strength- 
en the  union  by  a  personal  interview.  Shortly  before  the  royal 
party  started  from  Stockholm  a  notice  was  received  that  Den- 
mark had  decided  to  enter  more  energetically  into  the  partici- 
pation in  the  armed  neutrality.  Bernstorif  even  tried  to  ex- 
plain away  his  statement  to  the  Swedish  envoy. 18 

Not  until  September  14,  1795,  did  Baron  Stael  succeed  in 
bringing  his  negotiations  in  Paris  to  a  close.  The  result  was  the 
establishment  of  a  "secret  and  preliminary"  convention  which 
contained  the  following  provisions: 

1.  In  view  of  a  definitive  treaty  of  commerce  and  alliance, 

Sweden  agreed  to  fit  out  10  ships  of  the  line  and  5 
frigates ; 

2.  When  this  fleet  set  out,  Sweden  should  notify  England 

and  other  powers  hostile  to  the  Republic  that  she  had 
decided  to  enforce  her  neutral  rights ; 

3.  Sweden  should  demand  immediate  reparation  or  remun- 

eration from  England  for  vessels  and  cargoes  taken; 

4.  If  Sweden,  on  account  of  this  demand  or  on  account  of 

retaliatory  measures,  should  'be  involved  in  war  with 

18  Quoted  by  S.  J.  Boethius  in  Svensk  Historisk  Tidskrift  ( 1889-90 ), 
TX-X,  14,  23. 


36        RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

England,  Russia,  or  any  other  power,  France  would 
pay  Sweden  400,000  1.  for  every  ship  of  the  line  and 
200,000  1.  for  each  frigate; 

5.  France  should  give  to  Sweden  one-tenth  of  the  value  of 

the  cargoes  which  she  could  retake  for  France ; 

6.  These  cargoes  should  immediately  with  the  deduction 

of  one-tenth  be  given  to  France  or  their  French  own- 
ers; 

7.  Sweden  should  with  all  her  might  and  in  co-operation 

with  France  and  Holland  exert  her  influence  upon 
Denmark  to  participate  in  the  freedom  of  the  seas ; 

8.  On  account  of  the  cost  of  arming  her  convoys  which 

Sweden  ever  since  the  beginning  of  the  war  had  made 
in  order  to  maintain  her  neutrality,  and  to  prove  her 
interest  and  friendship,  France  should  pay  Sweden 
ten  million  1.  namely  four  million  when  the  convention 
was  ratified  and  one  million  every  six  months  from 
January  1,  1796,  until  the  whole  sum  was  paid; 

9.  If  Sweden  and  France  were  drawn  into  a  common  war, 

neither  one  should  have  a  separate  peace. 19 
The  convention  of  September  14,  1795,  was  only  prelim- 
inary and  should  be  exchanged  as  soon  as  possible  for  a  defin- 
itive treaty  of  commerce  and  defensive  alliance  for  which  the 
treaties  of  1741,  1781,  and  1787  should  serve  as  types.  The  con- 
vention between  Sweden,  Denmark  and  France  should  be  en- 
larged to  a  confederation  of  all  the  neutrals  so  as  to  include 
Prussia,  Holland,  Spain,  Portugal,  United  States,  and  Venice. 20 


"Quoted  by  S.'J.  Boethius,  in  Svensk  Historisk  Tidskrift  (1889-90), 
IX-X,  37:  This  time  the  Prince  Eegent  became  fairly  well  satisfied  and  on 
October  2,  the  chancellor.  Sparre,  notified  Baron  Stael  of  the  ratification, 
but  France  never  sent  the  counter  ratification  of  the  convention  of  Sep- 
tember 14  1795.  See  ibid.,  307. 

M  Sparre  to  Stael,  October  2,  9  and  December  15,  1795 ;  also  quoted  by 
S.  J.  Boethius,  in  Svensk  Historisk  Tidskrift  (1889-90),  IX-X,  277. 


PROPOSED  ALLIANCE  37 

In  the  meantime  attempts  had  been  made  to  enlarge  the 
confederation  of  neutrals.  On  April  28,  1794,  the  Swedish 
Minister  in  London,  Lars  Engestrom,  informed  Thomas  Pinck- 
ney,  the  American  Minister  at  that  court,  that  he  had  received 
instructions  to  invite  the  United  States  to  accede  to  it,  and 
communicated  a  copy  of  the  convention. 21  Pinckney  seemed 
greatly  pleased  and  he  communicated  the  message  to  his  home 
Government. 

Whether  the  authorities  in  the  United  States  had  received 
any  official  information  about  the  formation  of  a  league  of 
northern  powers  to  enforce  the  right  of  neutrals  is  doubtful. 
The  fact  is,  however,  that  the  question  received  some  attention 
in  the  instructions  for  John  Jay  when  he  was  sent  to  negotiate 
a  treaty  with  England.  Edmund  Randolph,  who  had  replaced 
Jefferson  as  Secretary  of -State,  wrote:  "You  will  have  no  diffi- 
culty in  gaining  access  to  the  ministers  of  Prussia,  Denmark, 
and  Sweden  at  the  Court  of  London.  The  principles  of  armed 
neutrality  would  abundantly  cover  our  neutral  rights.  If,  there- 
fore, the  situation  of  things  with  respect  to  Great  Britain  should 
dictate  the  necessity  of  taking  the  precaution  of  foreign  co-opera- 
tion upon  this  head;  if  no  prospect  of  accomodation  should  be 
thwarted  by  the  danger  of  such  a  measure  being  known  to  the 
British  Court ;  and  if  an  entire  view  of  all  our  political  relations, 
shall,  in  your  judgment,  permit  the  step,  you  will  sound  those 
ministers  upon  the  probability  of  an  alliance  with  their  nations 
to  support  those  principles". 22 

A  few  days  later  Mr.  Randolph  wrote  to  John  Jay  in  a 
letter :  * '  If  it  were  not  to  demonstrate  our  anxiety  for  the  suc- 
cess of  your  mission,  it  would  be  scarcely  worth  mentioning  a 
circumstance  which  you  will  doubtless  have  ascertained  before 

"Engestrom  to  Sparre,  April  29,  1794;  Engestrom  had  formerly  been 
Minister  to  Poland. 

22  Instructions  to  John  Jay,  May  6,  1794,  Am.  State  Papers,  Foreigi, 
Affairs,  I,  473. 


38         RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

that  part  of  your  instructions  relative  to  Sweden  is  executed . . 

The  President,  reviewing  the  possibilities  which  are  opened 

by  the  prospect  of  what  you  already  know,  and  what  will  now 
be  communicated  to  you,  becomes  daily  more  strenuous  that 
Denmark  and  Sweden  shall  be  well  understood,  as  to  the  point 
to  which  they  will  go  with  us  in  case  we  are  driven  into  a  war 
with  Great  Britain.  He  would  send  a  minister  thither  imme- 
diately to  explore  and  negotiate  eventually ;  but  that  good  faith 
and  the  state  of  things  in  your  hands,  require  the  suspension 
of  this  measure,  and  he  confides  that  you  will,  if  necessary, 
prepare  the  minds  of  those  powers,  through  their  representatives 
in  London,  and  give  us  the  earliest  notice  of  the  fitness  of  making 
a  more  direct  and  formal  application  to  them '  \  23  In  keeping 
with  these  instructions  Mr.  Jay  seems  to  have  been  intimate  with 
the  Danish  and  Swedish  ministers  at  London, 24  but  no  definite 
results  followed. 

In  the  correspondence  of  James  Monroe  who  at  this  time 
was  in  France,  there  is  some  further  information  on  this  sub- 
ject. On  October  16,  1794,  he  wrote:  "Denmark  and  Sweden, 
offended  at  the  unlawful  restraint  imposed  by  her  [England] 

on  their  trade  in  the  arbitrary  rule  of  contraband,  have 

united  their  fleet  to  the  amount  of  about  thirty  sails,  for  the 
purpose  of  vindicating  their  rights ' '. 25  But  it  is  evident  that 
more  direct  suggestions  had  been  made  earlier  for  on  March  8, 
1795,  the  Secretary  of  State  wrote  to  him  in  the  following 
words :  ' '  However,  your  idea  as  to  Denmark  and  Sweden,  though 
it  was  always  attended  to,  grows  of  less  importance.  I  shall  not 


23  Randolph  to  Jay,  May  27,  1794;  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Rel.,  I,  474. 

24  Mr.  S.  M.  Bemis  has  written  a  very  interesting  article  in  the  Am. 
Historical  Review  touching  upon  this  phase  of  the  Jay  Treaty.     (Am.  His 
torical  Review,  October,  1918). 

28  Monroe  to  Randolph,  October  16;  December  2,  1794;  Am.  State  Pa- 
pers, For.  Rel.,  T,  92;  Monroe,  A  View  of  the  Conduct  of  the  Executive  of 
the  United  States,  46. 


PROPOSED  ALLIANCE  39 

now  answer  your  proposition,  or  rather  intimation,  relative  to 
a  certain  concert,  until  a  future  opportunity,  and  after  hearing 
further  from  you  concerning  it.  You  will  have  concluded  from 
my  letter,  that  the  step  is  viewed  here  as  a  very  strong  one ' '. 2tt 
Only  a  month  later  the  Secretary  of  State  wrote  again  to  Mon- 
roe: "The  dispatches  which  you  are  understood  to  have  in- 
trusted to  Mr.  Smith,  of  this  city,  not  having  yet  arrived,  our 
anxiety  continues  to  learn  the  issue  of  the  concert  of  which 
you  have  suggested.  You  will  have  been  informed  by  my  letter 
of  the  8th  ultimo  that  the  step  is  viewed  here  as  a  strong  one; 
and,  notwithstanding  the  rapid  successes  which  have  attended 
the  arms  of  our  ally,  we  steadily  direct  our  course  to  the  char- 
acter of  neutrality  which  we  profess,  and,  therefore,  the  more 
it  is  examined  the  stronger  it  appears.  You  will  hear  from  me 
shortly,  in  a  more  particular  manner,  concerning  it,  and  the 
style  in  which  our  negotiation  at  Paris,  ought,  in  our  judgment, 
to  be  observed.  But  I  must  be  permitted  to  remark,  that  the 
invariable  policy  of  the  President  is,  to  be  as  independent  as 
possible,  of  every  nation  upon  earth;  and  this  policy  is  not  as- 
sumed now  for  the  first  time,  when,  perhaps,  it  may  be  insid- 
iously preached  by  some,  who  lean  to  Great  Britain,  to  prevent 
a  tendency  to  France ;  but  it  is  wise  at  all  times,  and,  if  steadily 
pursued,  will  protect  our  country  from  the  effects  of  the  com- 
motion in  Europe".27 

In  June,  Monroe  renewed  his  proposition  of  alliance  with 
the  Northern  Powers  and  suggested  the  addition  of  Spain  to 
Sweden,  Denmark,  France,  and  Holland.  If  proper  arguments, 
based  on  these  facts,  would  be  used  on  Great  Britain,  they 
ought  to  produce  an  "amicable  policy".  If  the  contrary  should 

20  Randolph  to  Monroe,  March  8,  1795,  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Bel.,  I, 
699 ;  Monroe,  A  View  of  the  Conduct  of  the  Executive  of  the  United  States, 
157. 

27  Randolph  to  Monroe,  April  7,  1795,  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Rel.,  T, 

701. 


40        RELATIONS  OF  x'HE  UNITED  STATES  WIT. I  SWEDEN 

happen,  however,  he  would  deem  it  his  duty  "immediately  to 
advise  you  of  it,  by  a  vessel  (in  case  none  other  offers)  to  be 
dispatched  for  the  purpose". 28  What  part  it  should  become  the 
United  States  to  assume,  if  these  measures  failed,  belonged,  in 
his  opinion,  to  some  one  else  to  determine. 

About  a  week  later  Monroe  reported  a  conversation  he  had 
had  with  the  Swedish  Ambassador  at  Paris  in  the  following 
language :  "In  conversation  a  few  days  past  with  Baron  Stahl 
[Stael],  Ambassador  from  Sweden,  he  informed  me  of  a  com- 
munication formerly  made  by  the  Court  of  Sweden  to  Mr. 
Pinckney  at  London,  for  our  government,  and  upon  which  no 
answer  was  given,  although  it  was  much  wished.  I  desired  his 
communication  in  writing  that  I  might  forward  it  to  you,  and 
which  was  accordingly  given,  and  is  herewith  transmitted.  I 
have  no  dou>bt  that  whatever  he  says  to  me  is  known  to  the 
committee,  as  I  was  informed  by  some  of  its  members  in  the 
beginning  of  the  winter,  and  before  the  Baron  arrived,  that  such 
an  application  had  been  made  to  us  from  that  quarter.  It  be- 
longs to  me  only  to  forward  this  paper,  and  which  I  do,  not 
doubting  that  I  shall  be  instructed,  relative  thereto,  in  the  most 
suitable  manner ' '. 29 

A  few  years  later  John  Q.  Adams  wrote  about  the  same 
question  while  he  was  minister  to  Prussia,  saying  that  "the 
present. Swedish  minister  here  is  the  person  who  in  the  year 
1793  [1794]  delivered  to  Pinckney  certain  propositions  which 
he  then  forwarded  to  our  government,  the  object  of  which  was 
a  certain  concert  for  the  support  of  neutral  rights.  He  has 
mentioned  this  fact  to  me,  and  added  that  no  answer  had  ever 


28  Monroe  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  June  26,  1795,  Am.  State  Papers, 
For.  Eel.,  I,  715;  Monroe,  A  View  of  the  Conduct  of  the  Executive  of  the 
United  States,  178. 

29  Monroe  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  July  6,  1795;   Am.  State  Papers, 
For.  Rel.,  I,  719;  Monroe,  A  View  of  the  Conduct  of  the  Executive  of  the 
United  States,  329. 


PROPOSED  ALLIANCE  41 

been  received  to  his  proposals.  I  have  heard  at  various  times 
the  same  observation  from  other  Swedish  diplomatic  characters, 
and  I  find  the  thing  noticed  in  Mr.  Monroe's  book". 

"The  omission  of  an  answer,  I  am  confident,  was  felt,  and 
I  fear  still  is  felt  by  the  Swedish  government ' '. so 

Monroe  did,  however,  receive  the  notice  that  both  his  com- 
munication as  well  as  that  of  Pinckney  had  been  received,  but 
he  received  no  instructions  to  answer  Baron  Stael  in  any  way. 
Pickering,  who  succeeded  Randolph  as  Secretary  of  State, 

August  20,  sent  the  following  reply  to  Monroe: "This 

serves  merely  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  (on  the  7  instant)  of 
your  letter  of  the  4  (6th)  of  July  with  its  inclosure. 

"The  President  is  at  Mount  Vernon.  This  forbids  me  say- 
ing anything  on  the  subject  of  Baron  Stahl's  [Stael]  applica- 
tion. Besides,  I  do  not  conceive  that  the  Executive  could  even 
attempt  to  negotiate  about  it  until  Congress  should  provide  the 
means  of  rendering  an  agreement  efficient.  The  proposition 
with  a  copy  of  the  convention  between  Sweden  and  Denmark 
I  find  were  transmitted  from  London  by  Mr.  Pinckney  in  his 
letter  of  the  8  of  last  May ;  it  does  not  appear  when  they  were 
received  at  this  office". 31  In  regard  to  the  joining  of  the  con- 
vention between  Denmark  and  Sweden  of  March  27,  1794,  "for 
the  maintenance  of  the  rights  of  neutral  navigation ' ',  President 
Washington  submitted  the  question  to  his  cabinet  in  July  1794. 
Randolph  was  in  favor  of  it,  Hamilton,  Knox,  and  Bradford 
against  it.  Knox  in  his  answer  said  in  part :  ' '  There  may  be  a 
state  of  things  operating  upon  Denmark  and  Sweden,  essentially 
different  from  that  operating  in  America.  States  as  well  as 
individuals  often  have  secret  motives  for  their  conduct.  I  dread 
being  linked  in  with  the  follies  or  vices  of  European  Powers . . 


30  Writings  of  John  Q.  Adams,  (Ford,  ed.),  II,  303. 

31  Writings  of  James  Monroe,  (S.  M.  Hamilton,  ed.)  II,  329. 

32  Quoted  in  Writings  of  James  Monroe,  II,  329. 


42        RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

In  the  main  the  armed  neutrality  of  1794  was  a  failure 
principally  on  account  of  the  diplomacy  of  Great  Britain  which 
resulted  in  the  agreement  with  Russia  for  the  division  of 
Poland,  and  on  account  of  the  Jay  Treaty.  This  left  the  north- 
ern combination  too  feeble  to  enforce  their  rights  and  effectively 
protect  their  commerce. 

The  treaty  between  the  United  States  and  Sweden  as  well 
as  that  with  Prussia,  was  about  to  expire.  In  order  to  under- 
take the  work  of  renewing  these  treaties  John  Quincy  Adams 
was  transferred  to  Berlin. 33  There  he  met  the  Swedish  minister 
and  began  the  work.  The  instructions  which  Adams  received 
from  home  requested  him  to  abandon  the  principle  "that  free 
ships  make  free  goods". 34  In  regard  to  this  omission  Mr.  Pick- 
ering, the  Secretary  of  State,  made  the  following  explanation: 
'  *  The  principle  is  peculiarly  interesting  to  us,  because  our  naval 
concerns  are  mercantile  and  not  war-like;  and  you  will  readily 
perceive  that  the  abandonment  of  that  principle  was  suggested 
by  the  measures  of  the  belligerent  powers,  during  the  present 
war,  in  which  we  have  found  that  neither  its  obligations  by  the 
pretended  law  of  nations,  nor  the  solemn  stipulations  of  treaties, 
secured  its  observation;  on  the  contrary,  it  has  been  made  the 
sport  of  events". 35  The  following  March  the  Secretary  of  State 
again  had  occasion  to  revert  to  this  subject  in  a  letter  to  Mr. 
Adams.  He  said:  "As  the  war  continues  and  it  now  seems 
scarcely  possible  for  the  United  States  not  to  become  a  party 
in  it,  you  will  doubtless  be  determined  by  your  instructions  of 
the  15th  and  17th  of  July  last,  in  renewing  our  treaties  with 
Prussia  and  Sweden,  and  reject  the  article  in  each  which  stipu- 
lates that  free  ships  shall  make  free  goods The  Swedish 

and  Prussian  commerce  will  then  be  only  on  the  footing  of  the 

33  Memoirs  of  John  Q.  Adams   (C.  F.  Adams,  ed.),  I,  199. 
84  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Eel.,  II,  250. 

35  Pickering  to  Adams,  July  17,  1797;  Am.  State  Papers,  For  Eel.,  II. 
250. 


PEOPOSED  ALLIANCE  43 

commerce  of  Denmark,  with  whom  we  have  no  treaty ; *8 

But  Adams  answered  that  although  he  would  be  guided  by  the 
instructions,  he  had  recently  written  that  in  his  opinion  the 
alteration  would  be  inexpedient.  The  reason  he  gave  for  this 
opinion  was  that ' '  Sweden  and  Prussia  are  both  strongly  attached 
to  the  principle  of  making  the  ships  protect  the  cargo.  They 
have  more  than  once  contended  that  such  is  the  rule  even  by 
the  ordinary  laws  of  nations". a7  But  in  November  of  the  same 
year  the  Prussian  Minister  wrote  to  Mr.  Adams  that  the  prin- 
ciple of  free  ships  makes  the  merchandise  free  had  "not  been 
sufficiently  respected  during  the  two  last  wars,  and  especially  in 
that  which  is  now  carried  on ;  and  that  contradictory  dispositions 
of  the  principal  belligerent  Powers  not  permitting,  at  present 
time,  a  satisfactory  adjustment  of  the  litigated  question "  S8 

The  Swedish  minister  at  Berlin  with  whom  John  Q.  Adams 
started  negotiations  for  the  renewal  of  the  treaty  soon  after- 
wards took  ill  with  a  disease  that  caused  his  death,  and  some 
time  elapsed  before  his  successor  was  appointed  wherefore  "the 
treaty  was  suffered  to  expire". 39 

United  States  had  also  agreed  to  the  Jay  treaty  without  any 
provision  as  to  the  freedom  of  cargo  on  free  ships,  wherefore  the 
British  interests  triumphed  over  the  principles  of  international 
law  advocated  by  the -neutral  nations. 

'After  the  close  of  the  war,  Congress,  by  an  act  of  March  3, 
1815,  made  a  proposal  to  all  maritime  nations  to  lay  aside  "the 
system  of  retaliatory  restrictions  and  exclusions",  and  to  place 
the  shipping  of  both  parties  to  the  common  trade,  "on  a  footing 
of  equality,  in  respect  to  the  duties  of  tonnage  and  imports". 
This  offer  was  accepted  only  by  Great  Britain  and  Sweden.  40 

*'  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Eel.,  II,  251. 
87  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Eel.,  II7  252. 
28  Annals  of  Congress,  6  session,  p.  1235. 

39  Memoirs  of  John  Q.  Adams   (C.  F.  Adams,  eel.),  I,  199. 

40  J.  Q.  Adams,  Message  to  Congress,  December  6,  1825;   19  Congress, 
1  sess.,  Senate  Doc.,  2,  p.  4. 


44        RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

Not  until  1856,  at  a  meeting  of  plenipotentiaries  in  Paris, 
was  the  principle  free  ships,  free  goods,  renewed,  together  with 
three  additional  principles: 

1.  Privateering  is,  and  remains  abolished; 

2.  Neutral  flag  covers  enemy 's  goods  with  exception  of  con- 

traband of  war; 

3.  Neutral  goods  with  the  exception  of  contraband  of  war, 

are  not  liable  to  capture  under  enemy 's  flag ; 

4.  "Blockades,  in  order  to  be  binding,  must  be  effective; 

that  is  to  say,  maintained  by  a  force  sufficient  really 
to  prevent  access  to  the  coast  of  the  enemy". 41 
This  proposal  failed  to  be  adopted  by  the  nations  and  although 
the  conference  of  London  in  1909  renewed  the  recommendation, 
the  world  war  came  on  without  these  principles  having  been 
recognized  as  a  part  of  the  law  of  nations. 

41  Senate  Doc.,  104;  34  Congress,  1  sess.,  XVI. 


CHAPTER  III 
THE  STRALSUND  CLAIMS 

At  the  treaty  of  Tilsit  in  1807,  Napoleon  and  Alexander  I 
of  Russia  decided  between  themselves  what  to  do  with  the  rest 
of  the  world,  and  especially  with  Sweden.  Alexander  took  this 
step  without  consulting  Sweden  regardless  of  the  fact  that  he 
had  entered  into  a  military  convention  with  Prussia  that  "they 
should  agree  between  themselves  and  with  the  King  of  Sweden 
regarding  the  steps  ...  to  be  taken  to  obtain  safety".  In  direct 
disregard  of  these  stipulations  Russia  and  Prussia  entered  into 
an  agreement  with  Napoleon  regarding  both  armistice  and  peace 
without  consulting  Sweden. 1  From  a  study  of  the  correspond- 
ence of  the  leading  characters  it  seems  fairly  certain  that  Prussia 
wished  to  keep  the  King  of  Sweden  uninformed  about  the  agree- 
ment in  order  to  assert  her  ambition  of  leadership  in  northern 
Germany,  "which  aroused  the  liveliest  uneasiness  both  in  Lon- 
don and  Vienna ' '. 2  The  plan  of  Alexander  seems  to  have  been 
to  advance  the  interest  of  Russia  by  offering  Napoleon  an  alliance 
against  England.  To  be  sure  Russia  promised  to  become  the 
mediator  between  England  and  France,  but  the  lines  along  which 
this  was  to  be  done  were  clearly  drawn  and  contained  two  mail, 
principles : 

1.  The  flags  of  all  states  were  to  have  similar  and  complete 
freedom  of  the  seas; 


1  Grade,  Sverige  och  Tilsit  Alliansen,  12. 

2  Grade,  Op.  Cit.,  14. 


46        RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

2.  The  French  territory  and  colonies  conquered  since  1805 
should  be  restored.  If  England  should  refuse  to  accept 
this  offer,  all  harbors  in  Germany  were  to  be  closed 
to  the  commerce  of  England. 3 

In  regard  to  Sweden  it  was  stated  that  Russia  ought  to  con- 
quer Finland  in  order  to  relieve  the  "beautiful  ladies  of  Peters- 
burg" from  "hearing  the  Swedish  cannons".  Nothing  specific 
seems  to  have  been  said  regarding  Finland  in  the  negotiations  at 
Tilsit;  only  the  traite  d 'alliance  has  a  direct  reference  to  Sweden, 
and  it  specifies  that  the  contracting  parties  should  together  and 
simultaneously  request  the  three  courts  at  ' '  Copenhagen,  Stock- 
holm, and  Lisbon  to  close  their  ports  to  English  commerce,  recall 
their  envoys  from  London,  and  declare  war  on  England".  If  any 
of  the  three  courts  should  refuse,  that  one  should  be  treated  as 
an  enemy  by  the  contracting  parties ;  and  if  Sweden  should  re- 
fuse, Denmark  should  be  forced  to  declare  war  on  it.4  After 
Tilsit,  therefore,  it  became  impossible  for  Sweden  to  remain 
neutral;  war  was  imperative,  and  the  remaining  question  waft, 
should  the  war  be  waged  against  England  or  against  France. 
Since  Sweden  refused  to  negotiate  for  peace  with  Napoleon, 
Russia  was  bound  by  treaty  to  declare  war  .against  Sweden  on 
land  and  sea. 

It  appears  that  Alexander,  brother-in-law  of  the  King  of 
Sweden,  had  promised  Napoleon  that  he  would  inform  Gustavus 
IV  regarding  the  condition  of  this  relation, 5  but,  although  Alex- 
ander met  the  Swedish  envoy  in  Prussia  at  least  four  times  after 
the  arrangement  had  been  made,  there  seems  to  have  been  no 
attempt  on  his  part  to  inform  his  former  ally  of  the  change. 
Russia  had  even  promised  to  force  the  King  of  Sweden  to  nego- 
tiate for  peace  with  Napoleon, G  which  Sweden  least  of  all  desired. 

3  Grade,  Sverige  och  Tilsit  Alliansen,  29 ;  and  sources  there  cited. 

4  Traite  de  paix,  Art.  5. 

5  Brinehman,  dispatch  to  Meiriel,  July  15,  1807. 

6  Grade,  Op.  Git.,  66  and  sources  cited  there. 


THE   STKALSUND  CLAIMS  47 

But  Napoleon  wished  it  clearly  understood  that  he  had  no  plans 
against  Swedish  Pomerania,  nor  did  he  require  that  the  Swedish 
monarch  should  recognize  him  as  Emperor  of  France. 7 

When  Alexander  notified  Gustavus  IV  about  the  peace,  he 
failed  to  express  the  interest  of  Sweden  in  regard  to  the  peace, 
nor  did  he  make  any  attempt  to  explain  to  the  King  of  Sweden 
whether  he  made  the  views  of  Sweden  known  to  Napoleon  or 
not,  nor  did  he  notify  his  relative  about  the  attempt  to  offer 
England  peace.  These  facts  make  it  appear  as  if  Russia  had  no 
objections  to  the  continuance  of  the  struggle  between  Napoleon 
and  Sweden.  8 

On  September  14,  1807,  Napoleon  dictated  instructions  to 
his  minister  of  foreign  affairs  for  Savary,  his  minister  in  Russia, 
in  which  he  stated  that  Sweden  ought  to  unite  with  France  and 
Russia  to  defend  the  " freedom  of  the  Baltic."  Already  on  Au- 
gust 26  Napoleon  had  mentioned  this  fact  to  Alexander,  asking 
what  he  intended  to  do  in  order  to  aid  Denmark  against  an  Eng- 
lish attack  and  to  force  the  King  of  Sweden  to  join  with  them 
in  "his  truest  interest,  the  freedom  of  the  Baltic". 9  He  added: 
"At  any  rate  your  Majesty  may  count  on  me.  I  have  an  army 
in  Hamburg.  With  interest  I  await  information  from  your  Ma- 
jesty regarding  these  events".  Napoleon  expressed  his  thought 
even  more  clearly  to  his  representative  in  Petrograd,  General 
Savary:  "I  think  that  Russia  ought  to  send  an  army  against 
Sweden  to  force  her  to  unite  with  Denmark.  The  Emperor  need 
only  tell  me  what  is  necessary ;  I  have  a  considerable  army  at 
Hamburg".10 

The  instructions  on  September  14,  1807,  seem  to  have  been 
designed  to  explain  the  secret  Tilsit  alliance.  According  to  this, 
the  action  against  Sweden  should  have  three  parts :  Alexander  I 

70hampagny  to  Savary,  Bambouillet,  September  14,  1807. 
8  Grade,  Op.  Cit.,  68. 

"Saint  Cloud,  August  26,  Corresp.,  XV,  13078. 
10  Saint  Cloud,  August  26,  Ccrresp.,  XV,  13079. 


48        RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

ought  to  try  by  persuasion  to  make  his  brother-in-law  change 
his  policy;  if  this  failed,  Russia  should  occupy  Finland,  and 
France  together  with  Denmark  should  threaten  Sweden  from  the 
west;  should  this  plan  also  fail,  Sweden  must  be  ''forced  to  do 
its  duty",  and  that  work  would  devolve  on  Russia. 11  The  whole 
plan  of  Napoleon  is  permeated  with  a  desire  to  reach  an  under- 
standing with  Sweden  without  dismembering  the  country,  for, 
although  Russia  was  authorized  to  occupy  Finland,  there  was  no 
permission  to  conquer  it.  The  threat  to  occupy  Finland  was  only 
a  means  to  force  Sweden  to  accept  the  continental  system.  Na 
poleon  wrote  with  that  idea  in  view  November  1,  in  the  following 
words:  "If  Russia  declares  war  on  Sweden,  Denmark  will  do 
the  same,  and  a  Danish  army  will  attack  her  at  the  same  time ' '. 12 

On  November  16,  Napoleon  set  out  on  a  trip  to  Italy  and 
while  on  this  trip  he  received  the  information  that  Alexander 
had  declared  war  against  England.  This  was  but  a  step  to  a 
war  with  Sweden.  Napoleon  wrote  to  the  Tsar :  "  I  am  very  much 
pleased  to  see  the  work  of  Tilsit  develop.  Of  all  the  countries  on 
the  continent  Sweden  alone  lives  in  peace  with  England;  Your 
Majesty  will  presumably  adjust  the  matter". 13 

Alexander  adjusted  his  relation  to  Sweden  in  his  own  way. 
On  October  7,  the  envoys  of  Sweden  and  Denmark  received  iden- 
tical notes  in  which  the  Tsar  alluded  to  the  conventions  of  1780 
and  1800  between  the  northern  powers  to  close  the  Baltic,  and 
expressed  a  desire  to  hear  what  attitude  the  courts  of  Sweden 
and  Denmark  had  decided  to  assume  regarding  the  action  of 
Great  Britain  in  bombarding  Copenhagen.  The  Tsar  sympa- 
thized with  Denmark,  but  he  had  seemingly  no  enmity  to  Eng- 
land. As  a  proof  of  the  friendly  attitude  toward  England  it  was 


11  Grade,  Sverige  och  Tilsit  Alliansen,  84,  where  a  full  discussion  of 
these  problems  is  given. 

"Napoleon  to  Champagny,  Fontainbleau,  November  1,  1807. 

"Napoleon  to  Alexander,  Venice,  December  7,  1807,  Corresp.,  XVI, 
13383. 


THE   STEALSUNT)  CLAIMS  49 

mentioned  that  no  Russian  port  had  been  closed  against  English 
commerce  while  those  of  Prussia  had. 

Gustavus  IV  sought  in  vain  for  a  reasonable  ground  of  ex- 
planation of  the  action  of  the  Russian  Government,  and  he  found 
no  other  than  to  place  it  in  connection  with  the  secret  agreement 
which  he  had  every  reason  to  suppose  had  been  adopted  at  Tilsit. 
Gustavus  IV  then  adopted  the  explanation  that  the  Tsar  had 
promised  Napoleon  that  he  would  try  to  force  all  the  powers  of 
the  Baltic  to  close  their  ports  against  England.  Dr.  Grade  asks : 
"  could  the  proposal  to  renew  the  conventions  of  1780  and  1800 
very  well  have  been  a  veiled  scheme  of  which  use  was  made  in 
order  to  have  a  pretext  for  war". 14  He  answers  the  question  in 
the  negative.  But  Russia  broke  with  England  and  besides  pro- 
claimed the  principles  of  the  armed  neutrality. 15 

November  13,  the  Swedish  minister  in  Petrograd  had  an  in- 
terview with  Alexander  I  and  delivered  a  letter  from  his  King. 
At  that  interview  the  ambassador  expressed  a  fear  in  regard  to 
the  movement  of  troops  toward  Finland  and  asked  for  some  posi- 
tive statement  in  regard  to  the  aims  of  the  Emperor.  Alexander 
assured  him  that  it  was  nothing  but  a  safety  measure,  and  that 
he  wished  his  troops  at  hand  in  case  of  need;  that  he  had  no 
tastes  for  territorial  expansion;  and  that  the  rocks  of  Finland 
were  not  in  the  least  tempting  to  him. 16 

The  following  day,  November  14,  the  Emperor  had  a  meeting 
with  the  French  Ambassador  and  at  this  meeting  it  is  reported 
that  Alexander  said:  "I  had  a  long  conversation  with  him  [Swe- 
dish minister],  and  I  demanded  of  him  emphatically  that  he 
should  give  his  court  the  advice  to  approach  France  quickly, 
while  I  showed  the  danger  in  which  a  small  country  like  Sweden 


14  Grade,  Sverige  och  Tilsit  Alliansen,  109. 

15  Grade,  Op.  Cit.,  123. 

16  Quoted  in  Grade,  Sverige  och  Tilsit  Alliansen,  132, 


50        RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

was  placed  'by  not  accepting  the  common  cause".17  But  this 
reference  to  the  conference  with  the  Swedish  minister  was  decid- 
edly erroneous  for  it  gave  the  opposite  point  of  view  from  be- 
ginning to  end.  The  reasons  for  this  duplicity  on  the  part  of 
Russia  are  stated  by  Dr.  Grade  as  a  desire  not  to  impart  any  fear 
into  the  Court  of  Sweden,  and  to  relieve  himself  from  any  fur- 
ther pressure  from  the  French  ambassador. 18 

The  Danish  minister  soon  afterward  reported  a  conference 
he  had  had  with  the  Russian  minister  of  foreign  affairs  at  which 
the  whole  line  of  procedure  was  outlined.  If  the  answer  from 
the  Swedish  monarch  was  unsatisfactory,  Denmark  should  attack 
Skane  and  Russia  should  simultaneously  attack  Finland.  But 
when  the  Swedish  minister  had  a  meeting  with  the  minister  of 
foreign  affairs,  he  was  assured  most  emphatically  that  the  Em- 
peror had  no  hostile  plans  against  Sweden,  but,  on  the  contrar}% 
that  he  wished  that  he  could  prove  his  high  regard  and  friend- 
ship. 10  At  this  meeting  the  Swedish  minister  suggested  the  neu- 
trality of  Sweden  in  view  of  eventual  conflicts  on  the  continent, 
if  England  refrained  from  entering  the  Baltic. 

The  above  analysis  has  been  considered  necessary  in  order 
to  show  that  all  of  northern  Europe  with  the  exception  of  Sweden 
was  included  in  the  continental  system.  The  ports  that  were  not 
closed  by  the  continental  system  were  closed  by  the  English  block- 
ade. Some  of  the  American  merchants  were  also  very  much  in- 
terested in  the  commerce  with  Sweden.  Stephen  Girard  was  one 
of  them  and  he  had  his  agents  everywhere  and  his  vessels  were 
exposed  to  violent  treatment.  His  agents  wrote  that  there  were 
about  one  hundred  American  vessels  at  Gothenburg.  The  super- 
cargoes of  some  of  these  vessels  seeing  the  complication  in  the 


"Sbornik,  Imperatorskago  Russkago  Istcritcheskago   Obstchestva,  vol. 
83,  p.  227  f. 

18  Grade,  Sverige  och  Tilsit  Alliansen,  135. 

19  Stedingk,  Posthumus  Memoirs,  II,  392, 


THE   STRALSUND  CLAIMS  51 

politics  of  Europe,  and  not  knowing  what  to  do,  hastened  to  Ham- 
burg to  investigate  what  could  be  done  there. 20 

About  this  time  the  Rosseau,  a  vessel  belonging  to  Stephen 
Girard,  was  sent  to  Stralsund  in  Swedish  Pomerania,  and  then 
ordered  in  ballast  to  Russia.  One  of  Girard 's  agents,  Mr.  Hutch- 
inson,  wrote  that  he  was  undecided  as  to  what  to  do  when  on 
May  25  he  heard  of  the  decree  of  Rambouillet  and  hurried  to 
Stralsund  "to  accelerate  if  possible  the  sale"  of  the  property 
and  the  departure  of  the  ships  before  "the  French  consul" 
should  be  sent  to  that  place  to  enforce  the  decree  against  the  com- 
merce of  the  United  States. 21  Mr.  Hutchinson,  however,  arrived 
too  late,  and  about  530  bales  of  cotton  on  the  ship  were  seques- 
tered "together  with  all  other  American  property  at  Stral- 
sund".22 

Although  the  American  Government  could  not  offer  effective 
relief  to  its  merchants,  Congress  adopted  a  resolution  on  January 
3,  1810,  requesting  the  President  to  lay  before  the  "House  any 
information  he  may  possess  relative  to  the  blockade  of  the  ports 
of  the  Baltic  by  France,  and  the  exclusion  of  neutral  vessels  by 
Russia,  Sweden  and  Denmark".23  On  January  12  the  answer 
was  reported  "that  no  information"  had  been  received  at  the 
Department  of  State  relative  to  the  blockade  of  the  ports  of  the 
Baltic.  But  this  answer  was  accompanied  by  the  translation  of 
an  "Ukase"  of  the  Russian  Government,  dated  May  14, 1809,  and 
a  translation  of  instruction  given  to  the  privateers  of  Denmark 
on  September  14,  1807,  but  no  documentary  charge  was  made 
against  Sweden. 24  In  view  of  the  fact  that  so  little  information 
was  available  on  the  Baltic  situation  the  House  adopted  a  resolu- 

^McMaster,  Life  and  Times  of  Stephen  Girard,  II.  125. 
21  McMaster,  Life  and  Times  of  Stephen  Girard,  II,  124. 
22McMaster,  Op.  Cit.,  II,  125. 

23  House  Journal,  11  Cong.  1  sess.,  155;  State  Papers  and  Public  Docu- 
ments, VII,  342. 

24  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Bel.,  Ill,  327 j  State  Papers  and  Public  Doc- 
uments, VII,  342. 


52        RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

tion  on  April  9,  1810,  "That  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Kelations 
be  discharged  from  the  consideration  of  the  message  from  the 
President  of  the  United  States  of  the  twelfth  of  January  last, 
communicating  information  relative  to  the  blockade  of  the  Baltic 
by  France,  and  the  exclusion  of  neutral  vessels  by  Russia,  Swe- 
den, and  Denmark".25 

The  facts  were  that  the  British  had  blockaded  the  Sound,  so 
that  all  vessels  must  pass  through  the  Belt  in  order  to  enter  ths 
Baltic ; 26  and  a  French  privateer,  ' '  La  Minute  No.  2 ' ',  was  cruis- 
ing off  Helsingor  just  outside  the  Danish  jurisdiction.  This 
privateer  did  a  great  deal  of  injury  to  the  Swedish  commerce  and 
therefore  the  Swedish  Government  captured  it  and  held  the 
sailors  as  captives. 27  At  first  Napoleon  paid  no  attention  to  this 
act,  but  later  he  sent  his  army  into  Swedish  Pomerania  to  cap- 
ture that  Province  and  gave  as  his  excuse  the  fact  that  Sweden 
had  captured  his  privateer. 

So  far  the  United  States  had  no  diplomatic  representative 
but  only  consular  representation  in  Sweden.  The  Swedish  Gov- 
ernment was,  however,  much  interested  in  having  a  minister  or 
charge  d  'affairs  from  the  United  States  to  ' '  maintain  and  extend 
friendly  relations  and  commercial  intercourse".  The  Swedish 
Government  was  prepared  to  receive  such  a  representative  and 
had  already  designated  a  person  for  that  mission. 28  The  man 
who  was  "designated"  for  the  mission  to  the  United  States  was 
Mr.  Kantzow,  who  had  returned  from  Brazil  a  short  time  before, 
where  he  had  resided  as  charge  d 'affairs  for  several  years.  Before 
Mr.  Kantzow  was  sent  to  Brazil  he  had  served  as  consul  general 
of  Sweden  in  Portugal.  Mr.  Kantzow  refused  to  go  as  charge 
d 'affairs,  but  he  consented  to  go  as  minister.  The  United  States 
consul  in  Sweden,  John  Speyer,  wrote  about  him  in  the  following 

25  House  Journal,  11  Cong.  1  sess.,  (1809-1810),  353. 

26  McMaster.  Life  and  Times  of  Stephen  Girard,  II,  125. 

27  Am.  Slate  Papers,  For.  Eel.,  Ill,  559. 

28  Am.  State  Papers,  For,  Eel.,  Ill,  619, 


THE   STRALSUND  CLAIMS  53 

words:  "From  the  personal  knowledge  I  have  of  Mr.  Kantzow, 
I  think  him  well  calculated  to  contribute  to  the  good  under- 
standing of  our  respective  Governments. "  29  On  the  24  of  March 
following,  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  notified  Mr.  Speyer 
that  Mr.  Kantzow  had  been  appointed,  and  he,  accompanied  by 
his  family,  would  leave  for  England  on  his  way  to  the  United 
States  early  in  May.  But  for  some  reason  Mr.  Kantzow  did  not 
start  on  his  mission  until  August  15, 1812.  When  he  left  Sweden, 
the  Prince  Regent  directed  him  to  represent  to  the  English  Gov- 
ernment the  desire  of  Sweden  "to  see  a  good  understanding 
restored  with  the  United  States".  In  reporting  the  above  fact 
the  consul  said:  "as  this  Government  expects  the  appointment 
of  a  minister  or  a  charge  de 'affairs,  in  return  for  Mr.  Kantzow 's 
mission,  I  have  not  presented  the  commission  as  consul  for  this 
place.  I  am  apprehensive  it  might  be  ungraciously  received  here 
after  their  notification  of  the  appointment  of  a  minister".30 
When  President  Madison,  therefore,  referred  to  foreign  relation 
in  his  message  of  November  4,  1812,  he  could  truthfully  say: 
"Sweden  also  professes  sentiments  favorable  to  the  subsisting 
harmony". 31 

During  those  war-torn  times  it  was  important  for  any  nation 
to  treat  its  friends  with  consideration.  The  Commissioner  of 
prisoners  in  London,  Mr.  Beasley,  reported  to  the  Secretary  of 
State :  ' '  Notwithstanding  the  present  apparent  irrelation  of  the 
Swedish  Government,  I  have  been  assured  by  Mr.  de  Kantzow, 
and  I  learn  from  other  sources  that  it  has  invariably  manifested 
the  most  friendly  disposition  towards  the  United  States.  Those 
American  vessels  which  have  sought  shelter  in  its  ports  have  ex- 
perienced perfect  protection.  British  cruisers  are  not  allowed, 


29  John  Speyer  to  Secretary  of  State,  January  21,  1812,  Am.  State  Pa 
pers,  For.  Bel.,  Ill,  619 ;  Annals  of  Congress,  13  Cong.,  1  sess.,  I.  94. 

30  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Eel.,  Ill,  619 ;  Annals  of  Congress,  13  Cong.. 
1  sess.,  I,  94. 

81  House  Journal,  12  Congress,  2  sess.,  541. 


54        RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

within  its  territories,  to  dispose  of  the  prizes  they  take  from  the 
United  States ;  and,  in  some  instances,  the  protection  of  Swedish 
convoy  has  been  afforded  to  American  vessels  passing  through  the 
Sound".32  This  circumstance  was  mentioned  to  Mr.  Kantzow 
by  Lprd  Castlereagh  "with  no  satisfaction".  Mr.  Beasley  added 
three  reasons  why  a  minister  ought  to  be  appointed  to  Sweden. 
In  the  first  place,  he  feared  that  the  "intrigue  of  our  enemy" 
would,  if  not  speedily  counteracted,  produce  a  state  of  things 
decidedly  unfriendly.  Secondly,  the  jealousy  between  Sweden 
and  Denmark,  long  existing,  had,  it  was  stated,  contributed 
greatly  to  the  feeling  which  had  given  rise  to  this  mission.  Third- 
ly, '  *  the  result  of  all  the  American  property  now  in  the  dominions 
of  Sweden  will  depend  on  the  course  which  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  may  pursue  on  this  critical  and  delicate  emer- 
gency". 33 

It  was,  however,  not  before  May  31,  1813,  that  President 
Madison  nominated  a  minister  to  Sweden.  His  choice  fell  upon 
Jonathan  Russell,  who  was  charge  d 'affairs  at  London  when  he 
was  nominated. 34  Now  followed  an  investigation  of  the  official 
conduct  of  the  minister  nominated  and  the  following  resolution 
was  adopted:  "That  the  President  of  the  United  States  be  re- 
quested to  inform  the  Senate  whether  any  communication  has 
been  received  from  Jonathan  Russell  admitting  or  denying  the 
declaration  of  the  Duke  of  Bassano  to  Mr.  Barlow,  that  he  in- 
formed his  predecessor  of  the  repeal  of  the  Berlin  and  Milan 
decrees  at  the  date  of  that  decree ' '.  In  addition  the  Senate  called 
upon  the  President  for  any  "correspondence  which  may  have 
passed  between  the  United  States  and  the  King  of  Sweden,  re 
specting  the  interchange  of  public  ministers  between  the  two  Gov- 

32  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Eel.,  Ill,  618;  Annals  of  Congress,  13  Cong.. 
1  sess.,  93. 

33  Annals  of  Congress,  13   Cong.,   1  sess.,  93;  Am.   State  Papers,  For. 
Rel.,  Ill,  618. 

34  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Kel.,  Ill,  618. 


THE  STRALSUND  CLAIMS  55 

ernments". 35  Five  days  later,  June  7,  1813,  the  President  sub- 
mitted the  answer  which  was  that  '  *  no  direct  correspondence  has 
taken  place  on  the  subject."  But  several  extracts  of  letters  from 
Mr.  Speyer  together  with  a  letter  from  Mr.  Beasley  regarding 
the  wishes  of  the  Swedish  Government  in  that  regard  were  sub 
mitted. 36 

On  the  same  day  Mr.  Goldsborough  of  the  committee  to  whom 
the  nomination  of  Jonathan  Russell  was  referred,  reported  ' '  That, 
in  pursuance  of  the  orders  of  the  Senate,  the  committee  met  the 
Secretary  of  State  by  appointment  at  the  office  of  the  Depart- 
ment of  State,  when  they  were  informed  by  the  Secretary  that 
there  was  no  official  denial  or  admission  of  Mr.  Jonathan  Rus- 
sell, that  the  allegation  of  the  Duke  of  Bassano  to  Mr.  Barlow, 
referred  to,  was  true ;  but  that  he  [the  Secretary]  had  a  private 
letter  from  Mr.  Russell  subsequent  to  the  allegation  of  the  Duke 
of  Bassano,  in  which  he  understood  the  allegation  to  be  unequivo- 
cally denied". 37  On  motion  it  was  decided  that  further  consid- 
eration of  the  nomination  should  be  postponed.  Then  Mr.  Golds- 
borough  submitted  the  following  resolution :  * '  That  it  is  inex- 
pedient at  this  time  to  send  a  Minister  Plenipoteniary  to  Swe- 
den". 

Four  days  later,  however,  the  Senate  "resumed  the  consid- 
eration of  the  nomination  of  Jonathan  Russell  together  with  the 
motion  of  Mr.  Goldsborough  thereon  of  the  7  instant".38  The 
whole  question  was  again  referred  to  a  committee  "to  enquire 
and  report  thereon".  After  some  debate  it  was  agreed  that  the 
"subject  be  postponed".  On  June  14,  when  the  subject  was 
again  discussed,  it  was  "referred  to  a  committee,  with  the  com- 
munications therein  mentioned",  with  instruction  "respectfully 


35  Annals  of  Congress,  13  Cong.,  1  sess.,  92 

30  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Rel.,  Ill,  618;  Annals  of  Congress,  13  Cong., 
1  sess.,  92. 

37  Annals  of  Congress,  13  Congress,  1  sess.,  I,  94. 
88  Annals  of  Congress,  13  Congress,  1  sess.,  I,  94  ff. 


56        RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

to  confer  with  the  President  of  the  United  States  upon  the  sub- 
ject of  said  nomination,  and  report  thereon".  The  committee 
consisted  of  Messrs.  Wells,  Giles,  and  King. 39  After  the  ex- 
change of  notes  between  the  President  and  the  committee  in 
which  the  President  complained  of  "a  continuance  of  his  indis- 
position", the  Secretary  of  State  notified  the  committee  on  June 
23,  that,  in  order  to  obviate  any  further  delay  in  the  proceedings 
of  the  Senate  on  the  nomination  of  the  Minister  Plenipotentiary 
from  the  United  States  to  Sweden,  he  had  been  authorized  to  con- 
fer with  them  on  that  subject  and  to  communicate  any  informa- 
tion which  they  might  desire  from  the  Executive  in  relation  to 
it.  40  On  the  following  day  the  Senate  agreed  to  the  motion  by 
Mr.  Goldsborough  that  it  was  "inexpedient  at  this  time  to  send 
a  Minister  Plenipotentiary  to  Sweden".  The  vote  recorded  was 
22  yeas  and  14  nays. 41  This  refusal  of  the  Senate  to  ratify  the 
appointment  of  a  Minister  Plenipotentiary  to  Sweden  was  made 
in  full  view  of  the  fact  that  Sweden  was  virtually  the  only  coun- 
try in  Europe  that  admitted  American  merchant  vessels  without 
restrictions. 

In  a  communication  to  the  Senate  on  July  6,  the  President 
further  explained  his  failure  to  meet  the  Senate  committee  in  a 
conference.  The  principal  objection  was  that  the  President  and 
Senate  were  co-ordinate  departments  in  regard  to  appointments 
and  treaties.  If  the  Senate  wished  information  before  their  final 
decision  the  practice  was  to  request  the  Executive  to  furnish  it. 
' '  The  appointment  of  a  committee  of  the  Senate  to  confer  imme- 
diately with  the  Executive  himself,  appears  to  lose  sight  of  the 
co-ordinate  relation  between  the  Executive  and  the  Senate,  which 
the  Constitution  has  established,  and  which  ought  therefore  to  be 
maintained". 42 

89  Annals  of  Congress,  13  Congress,  1  sess.,  I,  95. 
^Annals  of  Congress,  13  Congress,  1  sess.,  I,  97. 

41  Annals  of  Congress,  13  Congress,  1  sess.,  I,  97-8. 

42  Annals  of  Congress,  13  Congress,  1  sess.,  I,  95. 


THE  STRALSUND  CLAIMS  57 

The  principal  reason  for  withholding  the  ratification  of  the 
appointment  of  Mr.  Russell  as  Minister  to  Sweden  seems  to  have 
been  connected  with  his  conduct  while  charge  d 'affairs  to  Paris. 
In  order  to  trace  the  problem  to  its  source  it  is  necessary  to  know 
that  the  House  of  Representatives  called  upon  the  President  on 
June  21,  to  furnish  information  regarding  this  matter.  On  July 
12,  1813,  the  answer  came  in  the  form  of  a  long  and  able  survey 
of  the  whole  relation  with  France  and  Great  Britain.  The  French 
Government  had  evidently  failed  to  make  known  to  Mr.  Russell 
the  supposed  repeal  of  the  Berlin  and  Milan  decrees  by  a  decree 
dated  April  28,  1811.  The  first  knowledge  of  that  decree  which 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  had  was  gained  through 
Mr.  Barlow  in  a  communication  dated  May  12, 1812.  The  decree 
was  entirely  unknown  to  Mr.  Russell,  which  fact  he  communi- 
cated to  Mr.  Barlow  in  a  letter  of  May  11,  1812. 43 

The  advisability  of  appointing  a  Minister  to  Sweden  at  this 
time  has  been  stated  by  a  well  known  historian  who  said :  "  When 
22  senators  including  Jeremiah  Mason,  Christopher  Gore,  Samuel 
Dana,  Rufus  King,  and  William  B.  Giles,  declared  that  a  min- 
ister resident  in  Sweden  was  inexpedient  in  the  summer  of  1813, 
they  declared  what  every  other  well  informed  man  knew  to  be  an 
error.  If  any  American  envoy  was  ever  expedient,  it  was  an 
envoy  to  Sweden  in  1813 ;  for  in  Sweden  at  that  moment  all  that 
was  left  of  American  commerce  centered  after  being  driven  from 
England,  and  the  political  interests  of  Sweden  were  greatly  in- 
volved with  those  of  the  United  States.  The  error  was  less  to 
be  denied,  because,  only  six  months  afterwards,  the  Senate  ad- 
mitted itself  in  the  wrong,  and  approved  the  appointment  of  Mr. 
Russell. 44 

On  January  14,  1814,  the  President  nominated  John  Q. 
Adams,  J.  A.  Bayard,  Henry  Clay,  and  Jonathan  Russell  as 


43  Annals  of  Congress,  13  Congress,  1  sess.,  II,  2074. 

44  Adams,  Henry,  History  of  the  United  States,  VII,  64. 


58        RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

commissioners  to  negotiate  directly  with  Great  Britain  regarding 
peace,  and  the  Senate  confirmed  the  nomination,  January  18, 
without  opposition  except  the  further  nomination  of  Jonathan 
Russell  as  Minister  to  Sweden,  which  was  "confirmed  by  the 
narrow  vote  of  sixteen  to  fourteen ' '.  45 

The  first  duty  that  Mr.  Russell  was  to  perform  in  Sweden 
was  to  make  known  to  the  Swedish  Government  the  arrangement 
which  had  been  made  with  Great  Britain  "to  treat  at  Gothen- 
burg for  peace  with  that  power ' '. 46  But  soon  Messrs.  Bayard 
and  Gallatin  agreed  with  the  representatives  of  the  British  Gov- 
ernment to  transfer  the  negotiations  to  Ghent.  47 

The  second  duty  that  Mr.  Russell  was  called  upon  to  per- 
form was  of  an  entirely  different  nature.  Reference  has  already 
been  made  to  the  fact  that  Sweden  was  forced  to  adopt  the  Con- 
tinental System.  This  system  required  the  capture  of  all  neutral 
vessels  that  entered  Swedish  waters,  and  in  certain  cases  Napo- 
leon's own  agents  sequestered  them.  Sweden  tried  in  every  pos- 
sibly way  to  keep  on  good  terms  with  England  and  still  be  neu- 
tral. Since  all  the  harbors  on  the  continent  and  practically  the 
harbors  of  Great  Britain  were  closed  to  neutral  countries,  Swe- 
dish ports  were  swarming  with  vessels  which  tried  to  trade  with 
the  belligerents  through  Sweden.  This  brought  a  considerable 
number  of  American  vessels  into  Sweden  and  the  Swedish  Prov- 
ince of  Pomerania  in  Northern  Germany.  The  sequestration  of 
cotton  at  Stralsund  in  1810  has  already  been  described.  In 
1814,  an  agent,  Mr.  Curwen,  was  sent  to  Sweden  to  investigate 
some  other  questions  and  also  to  seek  "payment  for  the  cotton 
sequestered  at  Stralsund ' '.  Mr.  Curwen  was  presented  to  Count 
Engestrom,  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  by  Mr.  Speyer,  the 
American  consul.  After  a  long  conversation,  the  Minister  con- 


40  Adams,  Henry,  Op.  Cit.,  VII,  371. 

40  Russell  to  Count  Engestrom,  April  30,  1814. 
47  Russell  to  Monroe,  June  6,  1814. 


THE  STRALSUND  CLAIMS  59 

eluded  by  saying  that  if  Mr.  Curwen  would  make  a  communica- 
tion to  Mr.  Speyer  to  be  sent  to  the  foreign  office,  Count  Enge- 
strom  would  give  him  a  letter  to  Baron  Wetterstedt,  the  chan- 
cellor, who  was  on  the  continent  with  the  Crown  Prince.  The 
final  settlement,  said  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  rested  with 
the  Crown  Prince.  Mr.  Curwen  went  to  Karlskrona  from  Stock- 
holm, and  when  he  reached  that  place  he  decided  to  continue  to 
Gothenburg  rather  than  to  go  to  Stralsund  because  the  Crown 
Prince,  who  was  one  of  the  leaders  in  the  war  against  Napoleon, 
would  be  too  much  taken  up  with  battles  to  pay  any  attention 
to  claims  against  his  Government.  48 

Such  was  the  condition  of  affairs  when  Mr.  Russell  was 
called  upon  to  leave  Sweden  on  the  joint  mission  at  Ghent.  John 
L.  Lawrence  was  appointed  charge  d 'affairs  during  his  absence, 
which  was  from  June  7,  1814,  to  May  19,  1815. 49  The  service 
of  Mr.  Lawrence  in  Sweden  was  of  no  great  importance,  but  it 
was  during  his  stay  at  Stockholm  that  the  American  Government 
requested  the  removal  of  the  Swedish  consul  at  Baltimore,  Mr. 
Aquitow,  who  had  been  found  to  be  communicating  information 
to  the  enemy  of  the  United  States.  In  his  reply  Count  Enge- 
strom  stated  that  "his  Majesty  recognized  the  principle  that  a 
public  functionary  accredited  near  a  foreign  Government,  ought 
to  pay  due  respect  to  its  laws;  and  should  hold  no  communica- 
tion, however  innocent,  with  its  foes,  without  its  previous  knowl- 
edge and  consent ' '.  Therefore,  if  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  wished  the  man  removed,  it  should  be  done. 50 

The  real  work  for  the  American  Minister  came  when  he  was 
authorized  to  take  up  the  work  left  unfinished  by  Mr.  Curwen, 
namely  to  obtain  indemnity  for  American  property  sequestered 
at  Stralsund.  In  keeping  with  his  instruction  Mr.  Russell  pre- 


48  McMaster,  Life  and  Times  of  Stephen  Girard,  II,  270  ff. 
*D  House  Documents,  19  Congress,  2  sess.,  No.  73. 
r'°  Lawrence  to  Monroe,  February  24,  1815. 


60        RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

sented  the  whole  question  to  Count  Engestrom,  Minister  of  State 
for  Foreign  Affairs. 

The  facts  in  the  case,  briefly  stated,  were : 

1.  The  sequestration  was  made  at  the  instance  of  the  French 

authorities  present  in  Stralsund  in  June,  1810 ; 

2.  In  the  beginning  of  August,  1811,  the  sequestration  was 

raised  by  the  permission  of  the  French  authorities, 
but  those  authorities  still  insisted  that  the  money  ob- 
tained from  the  sale  of  the  property  should  be  applied 
to  the  fortification  of  Pomerania  against  the  English 
naval  forces ; 

3.  The  property  was  sold  by  the  Swedish  authorities ; 

4.  Frequent  promises  of  an  indemnity  had  "ever  been 

made  by  the  Swedish  Government  to  the  injured  citi- 
zens of  the  United  States";  51 

5.  The  cost  of  American  property  in  the  United  States  was 

given  as  110,000  Spanish  dollars,  and  the  value  was 
estimated  by  Sweden  at  193,000  "rix  dollar  Pomera- 
nian currency",  and  sold  at  151,000  rix  dollar  of  the 
same  currency. 

During  the  original  sequestration  the  Swedish  Government 
sent  more  than  thirty  despatches  to  France  "in  order  to  obtain 
a  release  of  the  sequestered  property"  or  a  permission  to  sell  it 
either  on  Swedish  account  or  on  the  joint  account  of  Sweden 
and  France,  according  to  a  note  sent  by  Baron  Wetterstedt  to 
Mr.  Speyer.  The  Swedish  Government  never  urged  any  right 
or  justification  for  the  sequestration  except  the  pressure  from 
France,  and  Sweden  always  expressed  the  desire  to  return  the 
property  to  the  American  owners.  The  American  Minister  fur- 
ther supported  his  very  able  note  by  a  reference  to  the  advantages 
Sweden  had  had  from  Pomerania  after  the  Napoleonic  wars;  it 


"Annals  of  Congress,  16  Congress,  1  sess.,  II,  2264  f.  Am.  State  Pa- 
ners,  For.  Rel.,  IV,  636. 


THE  STRALSUND  CLAIMS  61 

had,  he  said,  "  furnished  an  equivalent  at  the  treaty  of  Kiel  for 
the  acquisition  of  Norway,  but  subsequently  a  sufficient  con- 
sideration for  three  million  and  a  half  of  dollars  received  from 
Prussia". 

In  regard  to  the  equivalent  for  Norway,  the  fact  was  that 
at  the  treaty  of  Kiel  Denmark  ceded  Norway  to  Sweden  for 
Swedish  Pomerania.  Sweden  asserted,  however,  that  since  Nor- 
way was  not  turned  over  to  Sweden  without  further  fighting, 
Denmark  had  violated  its  claim  to  the  Swedish  province.  Pom- 
erania was  therefore  sold  to  Prussia  in  connection  with  the 
Congress  of  Vienna. 52  According  to  a  report  from  Mr.  Russell, 
the  proceeds  of  the  sale  of  the  sequestered  property  in  Pomer- 
ania were  appropriated:  1)  "to  pay  the  inheritance  which  has 
fallen  due  to  the  former  Royal  Family  about  300,000  Riks-dol- 
lar";  2)  "for  the  property  in  Sweden  belonging  to  the  said 
family  681,419  Riksdollar  18  shillings  and  3  rundstycks";  3) 
"the  residue  to  discharge  the  debts  contracted  by  the  last 
war".53 

Practically  nothing  was  heard  from  these  claims  for  a  long 
time  mainly  for  two  reasons :  1 )  Mr.  Russell  left  Sweden  tempo- 
rarily November  1,  1816,  and  did  not  return  until  December 
14  of  the  following  year  leaving  Mr.  Christopher  Hughes  as 
charge  d'  affairs  in  Sweden  during  his  absence. 54  Mr.  Hughes 
did  not  feel  inclined  to  take  up  the  matter  since  he  was  filling 
the  position  only  temporarily;  and  2)  the  parties  in  the  United 
States  sent  John  Ecky  of  Philadelphia  to  represent  them. 55 

The  Swedish  Government  admitted  to  Mr.  Ecky,  as  had 
been  done  to  all  other  representatives,  the  justice  of  the  claims, 
and  the  Crown  Prince  offered  him  "a  quantity  of  cannon  and 


"Russell  to  Monroe,  November  15,  1815. 

68  Ibid. 

"House  Documents,  19  Congress,  2  sess.,  No.  73. 

85  Hughes  to  Secretary  of  State,  May  6,  1817. 


62        RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

of  gun  powder,  as  a  part  payment  in  a  reduction  of  the  debt". 68 
This  proposition  had  evidently  been  made  to  Mr.  Speyer  before, 
for  it  is  spoken  of  as  an  old  one.  But  Mr.  Ecky  received  ''in- 
structions from  his  principals  not  to  receive  the  objects  which 
were  offered",57  and  he  left  Sweden  and  went  to  Hamburg  on 
January  23,  1818. 58  On  his  return  to  United  States  Mr.  Ecky 
reported  the  matter  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 59 

Because  Mr.  Hughes  did  not  enter  into  the  sequestration 
claims  as  vigorously  as  Jonathan  Russell,  it  must  not  be  as- 
sumed that  he  let  the  whole  matter  drop.  He  had  frequent 
conferences  with  Count  Engestrom,  and  was  referred  by  him 
to  Baron  Wetterstedt  who  was  more  intimately  familiar  with 
the  business  being  in  charge  of  provincial  affairs  at  the  time 
the  sequestration  occurred.  Baron  Wetterstedt  acknowledged 
that  the  United  States  citizens  had  been  wronged  and  declared 
* '  the  disposition  of  this  Government,  and  especially  of  the  Prince 
Eoyal,  to  indemnify  us  for  it". 60  As  proof  of  this  disposition 
the  Baron  cited  the  fact  that  the  Prince  Eoyal  had  offered  "a 
parcel  of  cannon,  powder,  and  balls  which  was  his  own  private 
property  to-  the  agent  of  the  claiments,  as  a  part  payment,  and 
as  a  commencement  of  restitution".  The  only  reasons  this  offer 
was  not  accepted  were  that  the  objects  "would  not  pay  the  ex- 
penses of  carrying  them  to  America,  and  the  amount  of  which 

would  not  equal  one  tenth  part  of  the  amount  of  the 

claims". 61 

Mr.  Hughes,  nevertheless,  almost  gave  up  all  hopes  of  ob- 
taining anything  from  the  sequestration  claims.  At  one  time 
he  said :  "  If  it  could  be  once  brought  to  the  sense  of  this  Govern- 


5(1  Hughes  to  Secretary  of  State,  May  6,  1817. 
"  Hughes  to  Secretary  of  State,  June  4,  1817. 
58  Russell  to  J.  Q.  Adams,  January  22,  1818. 
50  Memoirs  of  John  Q.  Adams,  IV,  424. 

00  Hughes  to  Secretary  of  State,  June  4,  and  July  10,  1817. 

01  Hughes  to  Secretary  of  State,  June  4,  1817. 


THE  STRALSUND  CLAIMS  63 

ment,  that  it  would  be  for  their  interest  to  pay  our  citizens,  they 
would  settle  the  claims  immediately".  But  a  month  later  he 
wrote:  " There  is  an  undisguised  disposition  here  to  do  some- 
thing for  the  claiments ;  but  so  long  as  it  is  believed  that  our 
government  will  be  satisfied  with  this  apparent  willingness  to 
render  justice  so  long  I  believe  will  nothing  further  be  done 

than  to  profess  that  disposition ". 62 

About  this  time  the  old  King,  Charles  XIII,  died,  and  a 
great  deal  of  extra  business  had  to  be  taken  care  of.  This  was 
also  urged  as  one  reason  why  the  claims  had  not  been  attended 
to  more  regularly.  But  on  March  19,  1818,  Count  Engestrom 
informed  the  American  minister  that  the  affair  had  been  sub- 
mitted to  the  King  with  a  request  for  an  order  to  pay  the 
claims. 63  In  view  of  this  fact  the  American  minister  waited 
for  an  answer,  but  none  seemed  to  come.  Then  Mr.  Russell 
made  one  more  determined  attempt.  On  October  5,  1818,  he 
sent  a  note  to  Count  Engestrom,  in  which  he  briefly  reviewed  the 
affair.  He  said  that  the  representation  which  had  been  made 
to  the  Swedish  Government  had  not  only  remained  without  effect, 
but  had  "not  even  been  noticed  with  the  common  courtesy  of 
an  answer".  True,  there  had  been  an  "interference  of  a  private 
agent  of  the  American  claimant"  and  his  presence  "furnished 
good  cause  for  suspending  all  communication  between  the  two 
Governments  on  the  subject",  but  when  that  interference  "had 

terminated  without  effect the  fitness  of  such  communication 

between  the  two  Governments  was  necessarily  restored".  Mr. 
Russell  added  that  "to  the  value  of  the  merchandise  should  be 
added  the  amount  of  duties  which  were  paid  by  the  proprietors, 
and  the  accumulated  interest  of  more  than  seven  years,  in  order 
to  constitute  an  adequate  indemnity". 64 

62  Hughes  to  Secretary  of  State,  July  26,  and  September  1,  1817. 

63  Eussell  to  J.  Q.  Adams,  April  28,  1818. 

04  Russell  to  Engestrom,  October  5,  1818;  Annals  of  Congress,  16  Cong., 
1  sess.,  II,  2271;  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Eel.,  IV,  638. 


64        EELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

The  effect  of  this  note  was  that  Mr.  Russell  was  asked  to 
meet  Count  Engestrom  at  the  Foreign  Office  on  October  14, 
when  he  received  the  information  that  the  Minister  had  not 
yet  received  the  authorization  to  communicate  any  decision,  but 
he  gave  M?*  Russell  an  invitation  from  the  King  to  dine  with 
him  on  the  following  day.  Count  Engestrom  furthermore  asked 
him  to  withdraw  the  above  note  and  send  him  a  new  one  in 
which  Mr.  Russell  would  remind  the  Minister  of  earlier  comuni- 
cations  on  the  subject.  Mr.  Russell  refused  to  withdraw  the 
note,  but  he  promised  to  send  a  note  in  addition  to  the  earlier 
one  in  which  the  ideas  of  the  Minister  should  be  followed.  The 
reason  for  this  new  note  was  that  the  note  of  October  5,  had 
partly  succeeded  and  partly  failed.  The  belief  that  the  note  had 
succeeded  the  minister  based  on  the  effect  it  had  had  in  bringing 
about  an  invitation  from  the  King  and  the  discussion  that  fol- 
lowed. The  opinion  that  the  note  had  failed  was  based  on  the 
failure  to  obtain  an  indemnity  without  further  discussion  and 
the  fear  that,  if  he  endeavored  to  press  it,  the  Government  would 
be  supplied  with  "a  pretext  for  an  abrupt  termination  of  all 
discussion  and  perhaps  for  a  categorical  rejection  of  the 
claims".  65 

In  answer  to  the  request  of  the  Minister,  Mr.  Russell  sent 
him  a  note  on  October  14,  1818,  in  which  a  simple  statement 
was  made  of  his  duty  to  call  "the  attention  of  the  Swedish 
Government  once  more  to  the  claims  of  American  citizens". 
He  also  said  that  his  confidence  in  the  "justice  and  liberality  of 
His  Majesty"  prevented  him  at  the  time  from  "acting  on  his 
instructions  in  their  full  spirit  and  extent",  requesting  "his 
excellency  to  cause  this  matter  to  be  taken  into  immediate  con- 


^Kussell  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  October  16,  1818;  Annals  of  Con- 
gress, 16  Congress,  1  sess.,  II,  268  ff.  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Eel.,  IV 
637  f. 


THE   STRAL3UND  CLAIMS  65 

sideration,  and  to  obtain  thereon  an  early  and  equitable  de- 
cision". 66 

Mr.  Russell  left  Sweden  October  22,  1818,  and  therefore 
the  answer  to  his  note  of  October  14,  did  not  arrive  before  he 
had  gone,  but  it  reached  him  in  Berlin.  In  this  answer  Count 
Engestrom  briefly  reviewed  the  whole  controversy  and  expressed 
a  regret  that  the  offer  made  to  Mr.  Ecky  had  been  rejected  for 
it  "seemed  to  be  the  only  one  adopted  to  meet  the  views  of  Mr. 
Eckie  [Ecky]  ". 67  The  Minister  also  called  attention  to  the  fact 
that,  about  the  same  period,  "the  Swedish  Government  restored 
to  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  thirty-three  vessels,  with  val- 
uable cargoes,  then  under  detention  in  Sweden,  in  consequence 
of  a  formal  requisition  of  the  mission  of  France  at  Stockholm ". 

The  above  note  was  answered  from  Vienna,  on  December  12, 
1818,  and  the  answer  brought  out  little  that  was  new,  but  pre- 
sented again  in  a  very  forceful  way  the  whole  sequestration 
proceedings.  Mr.  Russell  told  the  Minister  that  the  note  from 
Baron  Alquier  did  not  contain  the  necessary  condition  that  the 
proceeds  from  the  sale  of  the  sequestered  merchandise  must  be 
applied  to  the  naval  defense  of  Pomerania,  but  that  the  note  of 
July  12,  which,  in  his  opinion,  was  the  only  one  applicable,  did 
not  contain  any  such  provision. 68  The  note  of  December  12  was 
further  supported  by  a  memorial  from  merchants  at  Stralsund, 
who  petitioned  the  Government  of  Sweden  not  to  sell  the  proper- 
ty as  already  advertised. 69 

Both  these  notes  were  forwarded,  together  with  the  memo- 
rial from  the  merchants,  to  the  United  States  from  Florence  on 


66  Russell  to  Engestrom,  October  14,  1818;  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Rel., 
IV,  637,  Annals  of  Congress,  16  Congress,  1  sess.,  II,  2273. 

"Engestrom  to  Russell,  October  27,  181S;  Annals  of  Congress,  16  Cor- 
gress,  1  sess.,  IV,  2275. 

68  Russell  to   Engestrom,  December  12,  1818;    Annals   of  Congress,  16 
Congress,  1  sess.,  II,  2275-84 ;  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Rel.,  IV,  640  ff. 

69  Annals  of  Congress,  16  Congress,  1  sess.,  II,  2284. 


66         RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

February  22,  1819.  In  this  report  Mr.  Russell  justified  his  own 
action  in  regard  to  the  note  from  Count  Engestrom.  "To  have 
left  it  without  a  comment",  he  said,  "would,  I  believe,  have 
given  it  a  weight  to  which  it  was  not  entitled,  and  might  have 
been  construed  into  an  admission,  on  my  part,  that  the  facts  and 
arguments  which  it  contained  were  incontrovertible  and  un- 
answerable. 70  To  prevent  such  a  construction ' '  he  sent  an 
answer  complete  and  strong. 

Mr.  Russell  having  been  recalled,  this  was  his  last  communi- 
cation in  regard  to  the  above  claims.  Mr.  Hughes  became  his 
successor  on  October  22,  1818. 71  In  his  first  despatch  to  the 
Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Hughes  stated  that"  the  notes  of  Mr. 
Russell  left  nothing  further  for  him  to  do  in  the  line  of  "dis- 
cussion with  the  Government  of  Sweden  on  this  affair ;  and  what 
he  has  said  to  you  without  doubt  leaves  me  in  the  same  situation, 
with  respect  to  my  notice  of  it  in  this  despatch". 72  On  Decem- 
ber 1,-he  also  forwarded  a  copy  of  Count  Engestrom 's  last  note 
to  Mr.  Russell  for  the  information  of  his  Government. 73 

So  far  the  claims  against  Sweden  seem  to  have  received 
little  attention  of  Congress,  but  on  February  7,  1820,  "Mr. 
Burrell  presented  the  petition  of  Hugh  Calhoun  and  others,  pro 
prietors  of  certain  vessels  and  their  cargoes  unjustly  sequester- 
ed and  sold  by  the  Swedish  Government,  praying  the  interposi- 
tion of  the  Government  of  the  United  States".  The  petition  was 
referred  to  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  "to  consider 
and  report  thereon".74  About  a  month  later,  March  11,  Mr. 
Burrell  came  to  the  Secretary  of  State  says  John  Q.  Adams 
"to  press  what  are  called  the  Stralsund  Claims  upon  the  Swedish 


T0  Russell  to  J.  Q.  Adams,  February  22,  1819;  Annals  of  Congress,  16 
Congress,  1  sess.,  II,  2273. 

"House  Documents,  19  Congress,  2  sess.,  No.  73. 
"  Hughes  to  J.  Q.  Adams,  October  23,  1818. 
"Hughes  to  Secretary  of  State,  December  1,  1818. 
T4  Senate  Journal,  16  Congress,  1  sess.,  140  f. 


THE  STRALSUND  CLAIMS  67 

Government.  I  gave  him  a  particular  account  of  what  had 
been  done,  and  read  to  him  Mr.  Russell 's  last  note  to  the  Swedish 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Count  Engestrom,  concerning  these 
claims,  and  the  subsequent  correspondence  of  C.  Hughes  relating 
to  them".75  On  March  25,  the  Senate  passed  a  resolution  re- 
questing the  President  to  submit  to  it  information  relating  to 
the  Stralsund  Claims.  In  response  to  this  resolution  the  above 
correspondence  was  submitted, 76  but  nothing  was  accomplished. 

For  some  time  very  little  was  done  in  regard  to  the  Stral- 
sund claims,  but  on  December  14,  1822,  Count  Engestrom  re- 
viewed the  whole  affair  in  a  note  to  Mr.  Hughes ;  and  he  blamed 
the  "Continental  System"  and  its  author  for  the  whole  inci- 
dent. 77  That  communication  appears  to  be  the  last  one  from 
Count  Engestrom  on  the  subject,  for  he  retired  to  private  life 
June  10,  1824,  and  was  succeeded  by  Baron  Wetterstedt. 78 

Since  nothing  could  be  accomplished  through  diplomatic 
channels  Mr.  John  Connell  was  sent  to  Sweden  as  the  agent 
"of  Stephen  Girard  and  others".  The  King  being  absent  from 
the  Capital,  Mr.  Connell  had  to  wait  about  three  months  before 
he  could  present  his  memorial,  which  he  did  October  18,  1824. 79 
This  representation  was  made  with  the  knowledge  and  approba- 
tion of  the  President  of  the  United  States.  Baron  Wetterstedt 
answered  that  he  did  not  know  how  soon  he  could  find  the 
money  to  repay  the  damage  to  the  United  States.  The  Swedish 
Government  recognized  the  justice  of  the  claims  and  admitted 
"the  fairness  of  the  terms,  but  the  King  was  incapacitated  by 
the  Constitution  to  act  except  by  and  with  the  consent  of  the 
Diet,"  and  that  body  would  not  meet,  unless  called  into  special 
session,  before  1828.  Mr.  Connell's  papers  were  returned  to  him 


75  Memoirs  of  John  Q.  Adams,  V,  17. 

76  On  April  21,  1820;  Annals  of  Congress,  16  Congress,  1  sess.,  II,  2264. 

77  Engestrom  to  Hughes,  December  14,  1822. 
"  Wetterstedt  to  Hughes,  June  30,  1824. 

79  Inclosure  from  Hughes  to  Secretary  of  State,  November  24,  1824. 


68        RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

and  the  business  was  left  on  the  old  footing.  But  on  January 
31,  Mr.  Hughes  received  a  note  from  Baron  Wetterstedt  re- 
questing him  not  to  press  the  matter  for  he  was  gaining  ground 
in  the  cabinet.  It  was  expected,  he  said,  "that  if  the  matter 
was  reported  favorably,  the  Diet  would  act  favorably ' '. 80 

On  February  7,  1825,  Mr.  Hughes  notified  his  Government 
that  Baron  Wetterstedt  offered  to  cede  and  sell  the  island  of 
St.  Bartholomew  to  the  United  States  and  that  the  indemnities 
of  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  might  then  be  settled  from 
the  proceeds  of  the  sale.  That  proposition  had,  in  fact,  been 
made  in  1818-19,  but  one  reason  why  the  United  States  did  not 
buy  the  island  was  that  the  price  200,000  pounds  sterling  was 
considered  "wild  and  extravagant".  Baron  Wetterstedt  ad- 
mitted that  the  sum  was  rather  large  and  intimated  that  about 
500,000  dollars  would  be  asked  at  this  time.  He  added  that  the 
nearness  of  the  island  might  make  it  important  as  a  naval  station 
for  the  United  States. 81 

Two  months  later  the  envoy  reported  that  he  had  had  a 
conference  with  Baron  Wetterstedt  at  which  the  latter  made 
alternate  proposals : 

l)that  an  unofficial  engagement  in  form  of  a  note  be  ad- 
dressed to  Mr.  Hughes,  recommending  the  liquidation  at 
the  next  Diet,  which  the  Count  considered  as  a  virtual, 
though  a  dilatory,  settlement;  or, 

2)  by  an  offer  of  a  round  sum  to  Mr.  Connell  against  a 
full  and  final  discharge.  The  Count,  in  fact,  preferred 
the  latter  plan  for  settlement. 

Mr.  Hughes  reported  that  "No  attempt  is  made  to  deny  the 
justice  of  the  claims;  on  the  contrary,  it  is  admitted  in  every 
conference  in  the  broadest  and  most  unqualified  terms". 

If  the  first  alternative  should  be  decided  upon  Mr.  Hughes 

M  Hughes  to  Secretary  of  State,  February  3,  1825. 
n  Hughes  to  Secretary  of  State,  February  7,  1825. 


THE   STRALSUND  CLAIMS  69 

felt  satisfied  by  having  the  assurance  that  the  matter  would  be 
recommended  to  the  Diet.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  latter 
alternative  should  be  agreed  upon,  Mr.  Hughes  would  leave 
the  settlement  entirely  to  Mr.  Connell,  who  had  been  supplied 
with  full  powers  and  "on  whom  will  rest  the  responsibility  for 
the  settlement". 

At  the  same  conference  Count  Wetterstedt  said  that  if  the 
United  States  would  buy  St.  Bartholomew,  he  would  settle  the 
whole  affair  at  once;  for  as  a  colony  the  King  had  uncontrolled 
right  to  dispose  of  it. 82 

Count  Wetterstedt  requested  a  copy  of  all  the  correspon- 
dence concerning  the  Stralsund  claims,  and  Mr.  Hughes  sent 
them  on  Sunday  evening,  April  24,  1825.  In  addition  he  stated 
that  it  took  the  Swedish  Government  only  twenty-one  days  to 
sell  and  apply  the  property,  but  it  took  fifteen  years  of  nego- 
tiations for  an  indemnification. 83  Now  Mr.  Connell  might  make 
any  compromise  he  pleased. 

About  two  weeks  later  the  envoy  again  wrote  to  Count 
Wetterstedt  regarding  a  conference  they  had  had  with  regard 
to  the  claims.  Mr.  Hughes  was  to  confer  with  Mr.  Connell  and 
report  the  result,  which  he  did  in  the  following  manner:  "I 
have  seen  Connell,  and  his  answer  to  the  questions  your  excellency 
mentioned  to  me  an  hour  ago  [in  conference]  follow. 

1.  "No  insurance  company  is  interested  in  the  claims; 

2.  "The  property  belongs  to  citizens  of  the  United  States 

and  no  other  description  of  persons"; 

3.  The  claimants  are  the  original  proprietors  of  the  prop- 

erty; the  identical  persons  from  whom  the  property 
was  taken  in  1810 ; 

4.  "The  sufferers  have  never  received  the  smallest  indem- 

nity from  the  Insurance  companies;  the  property  was 


81  Hughes  to  Secretary  of  State,  April  7,  1825. 
88  Hughes  to  Secretary  of  State,  April  24,  1825. 


70        RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

safe  in  port,  and  had  paid  duties ;  it  was  in  warehouses 
and  therefore  the  duties  of  the  insurance  companies 
ceased". 

Mr.  Connell  also  stated  that  "his  principals  have  engaged 
to  ratify  all  his  acts".84 

In  a  letter  to  Henry  Clay,  Mr.  Hughes  wrote,  June  21,  1825, 
"It  cannot  go  many  days  more  until  a  final  settlement  of  the 
Stralsund  claims  are  made,  for  the  offer  of  a  round  sum  in 
cash  has  been  made  to  Mr.  Connell,  but  Connell  is  trying  to  get 
10,000  dollars  more  than  the  sum  offered.  It  will  be  decided 
one  way  or  the  other  in  a  few  days". 85  On  July  16,  the  agree- 
ment was  reached  and  the  necessary  documents  signed.  The 
following  is  the  wording  of  the  original  document:  "Whereas, 
during  the  year  One  thousand  eight  hundred  and  ten,  sundry 
goods,  wares  and  merchandize  belonging  to  citizens  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  were  put  under  sequestration  at  Stral- 
sund in  Pomerania,  then  a  dependency  of  the  Crown  of  Sweden ; 
and  whereas,  said  property  was  disposed  of  at  Stralsund  during 
the  year  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  eleven,  and  the  pro- 
ceeds thereof  paid  into  the  Royal  Treasury  of  Pomerania ;  and 
whereas  the  subscriber  is  legally  authorized  by  the  full  power 
of  attorney,  to  settle,  compromise  and  adjust  said  claims,  in 
such  manner  as  he  may  judge  expedient  and  fit  and  also  to  re- 
ceive payment  to  give  a  full  and  satisfactory  discharge  for  the 
same  therefore  by  virtue  of  the  aforesaid  authority,  and  in  con- 
sideration of  the  fund  of  Sixty  thousand  dollars  Hamburg  Banes 
paid  in  hand,  in  a  Bill  of  Exchange  at  90  days  date,  upon 
Hamburg,  drawn  by  C.  D.  Shogman  Esq.  His  Swedish  and 
Norwegian  Majesty's  Secretary  of  State  and  for  the  Department 
of  Finance  and  Commerce,  do  hereby  declare,  that  I  accept  of 
the  said  Sixty  thousand  Dollars  Hamburg  Banes,  as  a  full  and 


"Hughes  to  Wetterstedt,  May  9,  1825. 
86  Hughes  to  Clay,  June  21,  1825. 


THE  STRALSUND  CLAIMS  71 

complete  indemnity  to  the  claimants  aforesaid  and  I  forever 
release  the  Government  of  Sweden  from  any  further  claims,  for 
or  on  the  acount  of  any  losses  or  damages  which  may  have  ac- 
crued in  consequence  of  the  sequestration  and  sale  of  the  said 
American  property  at  Stralsund ' '. 86 

The  Swedish  Government  also  required  a  release  from  the 
American  envoy,  which  was  given  with  the  assurance  that  he 

would  '  *  communicate  the  above  pleasant  intelligence to  his 

government,  and  he  is  convinced  that  it  will  be  a  source  of 
sincere  satisfaction  to  the  President,  to  learn  that  the  long 
pending  and  single  difficulty,  in  the  diplomatic  relations  of  the 
two  Governments  is  settled  and  forever  put  to  rest ' '. 87 

These  documents  were  later  forwarded  by  Mr.  Hughes  to 
the  Secretary  of  State,  August  8,  1825.  The  part  played  by 
the  envoy  in  the  negotiations  was  limited  to  giving  the  formal 
discharge  after  the  other  parties  had  agreed  on  a  settlement. 
But  since  the  Swedish  Government  asked  for  it,  the  business 
could  not  be  concluded  without  his  participation. 88  The  Presi- 
dent could,  therefore,  announce  to  Congress  that  the  claims  on 
"Sweden  have  been  lately  compromised  by  a  private  settle- 
ment, in  which  the  claimants  themselves  have  acquiesced '  '.89 

8(1  State  Department  Archives. 

87  Stockholm,  July  16,  1825. 

88  Russell  to  Secretary  of  State,  August  8,  1825. 

89  Message  to  Congress,  December  6,  1825 ;  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Bel., 
V,  760;  Senate  Documents,  19  Congress,  1  sess.,  I,  Doc.  2,  p.  5;  Messages 
and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  II,  867. 


CHAPTER  IV 

COMMERCIAL  RELATIONS 

"The  two  contracting  parties  grant  mutually  the  liberty 
of  having  each  in  the  ports  of  the  other,  consuls,  vice  consuls, 
agents,  and  commissaries,  whose  functions  shall  be  regulated  by 
a  particular  agreement". *  Such  is  the  basis  for  commercial  re- 
lations laid  down  in  the  treaty  of  1783.  In  keeping  with  these 
previsions,  Swedish  consuls  were  early  admitted  to  Philadelphia 
and  Boston.  A^eady  on  December  3,  1784,  a  committee  of  Con- 
gress, composed  of  Messrs.  Monroe,  Houston,  and  Howell,  to 
whom  had  been  referred  a  "commission  of  consul  from  his 
majesty  the  King  of  Sweden,  to  Charles  Hellstedt,"  dated  Sep- 
tember 22,  1783,  reported  in  favor  of  receiving  him  as  consul 
to  reside  in  Philadelphia  in  the  following  resolution :  ' '  Resolved, 
That  the  said  commision  be  registered  in  the  Secretary's  office; 
and  that  thereupon  acts  of  recognition  in  due  form  be  imme- 
diately issued  to  the  several  states,  in  order  that  they  may 
respectively  furnish  him  with  an  exequatur  or  notification  of 
his  quality,  that  the  same  may  be  known  and  published ' '. 2 
In  May  of  the  following  year  a  similar  resolution  was  adopted 
to  register  the  commission  of  Richard  Soderstrom  "as  consul  of 
the  Swedish  nation  at  Boston"  Massachusetts,  "and  that  there- 
upon an  act  of  recognition  in  due  form  be  immediately  issued 
to  the  commonwealth  of  Massachuetts,  in  order  that  they  may 
furnish  the  said  Richard  Soderstrom  with  their  exequatur  or  no- 
tification of  his  quality,  that  the  same  may  be  made  known  and 


'Journal  of  the  American  Congress   (1774-88),  IV,  246. 
8  Journal  of  the  American  Congress   (1774-88),  IV,  449. 


COMMERCIAL  NEGOTIATIONS  73 

published".3  On  May  3,  1797,  Richard  Soderstrom  was  made 
Consul  General  for  the  United  States,  with  Joseph  Winthrop  as 
vice-consul  for  South  Carolina  and  Georgia.  The  Vice  Consul 
arrived  on  May  26,  1797. 

Sending  consuls  to  reside  at  the  ports  of  another  country 
is  but  one  way  of  commercial  assistance,  there  being  other  ways 
which  may  become  just  as  effective.  In  1786,  while  Thomas 
Jefferson  was  in  France,  he  was  approached  by  Baron  Stael  von 
Holstein,  the  Swedish  Ambassador  at  Paris,  on  the  question  as 
to  how  the  Swedi'Ji  Island  of  St.  Bartholomew  could  be  made 
most  useful  to  the  commerce  of  the  United  States.  In  his 
answer  to  this  inquiry,  Mr.  Jefferson  gave  an  analysis  of  the 
whole  subject.  He  said  that  the  island  in  itself  would  furnish 
little  of  its  own  production  that  would  be  of  interest.  * '  It  remains 
then  to  make  it  the  instrument  for  obtaining  through  its  inter- 
mediation such  American  productions  as  Sweden  can  consume 
or  dispose  of,  and  for  finding  in  return  a  vent  for  the  native 
productions  of  Sweden".  If  the  island  therefore  would  be  made 
a  free  port  without  a  single  restriction  the  following  conse- 
quences would  follow: 

1.  It  would  draw  to  itself  that  tide  of  commerce  "which 

at  present  sets  towards  the  Dutch  and  Danish ' '  islands, 
because  vessels  going  to  those  islands  were  often  ob- 
liged to  negotiate  a  part  of  their  cargoes  at  St.  Eusta- 
ticus,  and  to  go  to  St.  Thomas  to  negotiate  the  residue, 
whereas  when  they  would  know  that  there  was  a  port 
where  all  articles  are  free  both  for  importation  and 
exportation,  they  would  go  to  that  port  which  enabled 
them  to  perform  by  one  voyage  the  exchanges  which 
hitherto  they  could  only  effect  by  two; 

2.  Every  species  of  American  produce  whether  precious 

3  Journals  of  Congress,  X,  130 ;  Secret  Journal  of  the  Congress  of  Con- 
federation, Foreign  Affairs,  III,  555. 


74        RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

metals  or  commodities,  which  Sweden  may  want  for  its 
own  consumption  or  "as  aliment  for  its  own  commerce 
with  other  nations,  will  be  collected  either  fairly  or 
by  contraband  into  the  magazines  of  Saint  Bartholo- 
mew ' ' ; 

3.  All  the  production  which  Sweden  can  furnish  within 
itself  or  obtain  to  advantage  from  other  nations,  will 
in  like  manner  be  deposited  in  the  magazines  of  St. 
Bartholomew,  and  will  be  carried  to  the  several  ports 
of  America  in  payment  for  what  shall  be  taken  from 
them. 

Mr.  Jefferson  also  saw  that  this  plan  might  meet  with  ob- 
jections and  he  therefore  met  the  objections  from  the  start. 
''If  it  be  objected",  he  said,  "that  this  unrestrained  license 
will  give  opportunity  to  the  subjects  of  other  nations  on  ex- 
changes there  in  which  Sweden  will  be  in  no  ways  interested ; 
I  say,  1.  That  there  will  be  a  few  of  these  operations  into  which 
the  Swedish  merchants  will  not  be  taken  in  the  beginning  or  in 
the  long  run ;  2.  There  will  be  a  few  of  these  exchanges  into  which 
Swedish  productions  will  not  enter,  when  productions  of  that 
nature  are  wanted  in  return;  3.  But  suppose  neither  Swedish 
merchants  nor  productions  enter  into  the  operations,  what  ob- 
jections can  Sweden  have  to  other  peoples'  meeting  in  one  of 
her  ports  to  carry  on  commercial  exchanges "  ? 4 

Baron  Stael  must  have  been  under  instructions  from  his 
home  Government  and  given  the  plan  his  hearty  approval,  for 
when  the  King  of  Sweden  in  1786  reported  to  the  Riksdag  what 
had  taken  place  since  their  former  meeting  he  said  that  "a 

treaty  of  commerce had  been  concluded  with  the  United 

States";  the  island  of  St.  Bartholomew  had  been  acquired  and 
''now  declared  a  free  port"  which  had  given  Sweden  a  footing 
in  the  West  Indies. 8 

4  Writings  of  Thomas  Jefferson  (Ford,  ed.),  IV,  238  f. 

6  Quoted  by  Bain,  Gustavus  III  and  his  Contemporaries,  I,  286. 


COMMERCIAL  NEGOTIATIONS  75 

The  opening  of  St.  Bartholomew  as  a  free  port  was  made 
in  the  interest  of  the  mutual  trade  while  Spain  and  Portugal 
refused  "to  all  those  parts  of  America  which  they  govern,  all 
direct  intercourse  with  any  people  but  themselves".6 

During  the  early  days  of  independence,  the  commerce  of  the 
United  States  suffered  greatly  from  the  activity  of  the  Barbary 
pirates.  In  order  to  obtain  some  light  as  to  the  action  of  other 
nations  in  this  regard,  John  Adams  inquired  from  Baron  Stael 
von  Holstein,  "concerning  the  presents  given  by  their  courts  to 
the  Barbary  powers".  The  Swedish  Ambassador  promised  to 
write  to  Stockholm"  for  full  information  upon  this  subject".7 
Whether  any  information  was  obtained  from  this  inquiry  or 
the  information  was  not  acted  upon,  the  usual  sources  do  not 
state.  But  in  a  short  time  there  came  an  opportunity  for  Sweden 
to  assist  the  United  States  in  Algiers  in  another  way.  Captain 
0 'Brian  wrote  to  the  President  of  the  United  States,  on  Novem- 
ber 5,  1793,  that  the  Swedish  consul  in  Algiers,  Mathias  Skjol- 
debrand,  had  befriended  ten  American  vessels  with  105  men 
and  given  them  "money  to  relieve  their  greatest  necessities". 
The  Captain  expressed  the  hope  that  "you  will  order  him  to  be 
reimbursed,  and  also  paid  for  his  generous  advance  in  the 
ransoming  of  George  Smith,  one  of  the  subjects  of  the, United 
States". 8  The  following  week,  November  1793,  Captain  0 'Brian 
wrote  at  length  to  Mr.  D.  Humphreys  about  the  same  question 
in  these  words :  * '  The  Swedish  consul  depend,  would  do  all  pos- 
sible in  his  power  to  serve  the  Americans;  but,  Sir,  you  will 
consider  that  for  him  to  interfere  publicly  in  the  American 
business,  that  he  should  first  have  the  order  of  his  court;  but 
you  may  depend  on  his  interest  in  all  that  can  be  done  with 
propriety". 

The  brother  of  the  Swedish  consul  was  also  present  in  Al- 

0  Writings  of  Thomas  Jefferson  (Ford,  ed.),  VI,  476,  477. 
7  Works  of  John  Adams  (C.  F.  Adams,  ed.),  VIII,  227. 
8  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  ReL,  I,  418. 


76        RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

giers.  On  request,  he  took  a  letter  from  the  President  to  the 
Dey,  li  and  made  use  of  every  winning  and  requisite  argument, 
for  the  Dey  to  consider  favorably  of  a  peace  with  the  United 
States,  and  permit  the  American  Ambassador  to  come  to  Algiers ; 
but  the  Dey  has  not  seemed  inclinable,  but  gave  Mr.  Skjolde- 
brand  Jr.  nearly  the  same  answer  as  he  gave  Bassara".  Captain 
0 'Brian  thought  the  Dey  was  ''prepossessed  against  the  Ameri- 
cans by  the  British  consul,  who  had  information  of  your  [Mr. 
Humphrey's]  destination  by  the  captain  of  the  Portuguese  fri- 
gate, and  by  Mr.  Walpole,  British  resident  at  Lisbon".  Since 
the  Minister,  Mr.  Humphreys,  was  fully  empowered  and  there 
was  great  necessity  of  " something  decisive  being  done",  Cap- 
tain 0 'Brian  suggested  that  Mr.  Skjoldebrand  Jr.  ought  to  be 
empowered  by  the  minister  "to  adopt  such  plans  as  will  be  most 
effectual,  and  be  most  conducive  in  bringing  about  peace".  w 

The  following  day  the  Swedish  consul  general  of  Algiers 
wrote  to  Mr.  Humphreys  and  explained  his  position  in  regard  to 
any  negotiations  between  the  United  States  and  Algiers.  He 
said  that  his  steps  would  be  very  carefully  guarded  in  every 
particular  and  if  he  should  do  anything  in  favor  of  the  Ameri- 
cans, that  would  instantly  be  reported  to  every  "court  of  Europe, 
who  would  complain  to  the  court  of  Sweden".  In  view  of  this 

fact  he  might  be  censured  ' '  for  having  acted without  order 

or  permission"  of  his  court.  For  that  reason  he  determined  to 
use  his  brother  who  was  in  Algiers  in  an  unofficial  capacity  to 
deliver  the  letter  of  credence  for  the  American  Minister  and  th<^ 
memorial  to  the  Dey.  The  Swedish  consul  also  suggested  to  Mr. 
Humphreys  that  if  he  wished  to  use  his  brother  for  communi- 
cating with  the  Dey,  that  procedure  was  easily  available  and  he 
would  be  glad  to  serve. 10  The  same  day  Pierre  Eric  Skjolde- 
brand also  wrote  to  Mr.  Humphreys  and  told  him  that  the  Swed 


9  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Rel.,  I,  416. 

10  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Rel.,  I,  414. 


COMMERCIAL  NEGOTIATIONS  77 

ish  consul  had  been  refused  admission  to  Algiers  just  as  the 
American  minister  had,  but  that  they  demanded  permission  to 
come  and  he  advised  Mr.  Humphreys  to  do  the  same.  "  He 
promised  to  aid  the  United  States  in  every  way  possible  if  Mr. 
Humphreys  should  desire  to  use  him;  but  if  "you  be  pleased 
to  honor  me  with  your  confidence,  I  request  you,  sir,  to  be  so 
good  as  to  remember  to  give  me  also  a  power  to  make  use  of 
it."12 

Mr.  Humphreys  reported  all  these  things  to  the  Secretary 
of  State  on  November  23,  1793,  adding  that  by  the  tenor  of 
these  letters  "you  will  clearly  comprehend  the  actual  disposition 
of  the  Dey,  and  the  real  state  of  affairs  in  the  regency". 13  In 
his  report  a  month  later,  December  25,  1793,  he  said  that  there 
were  reasons  "to  apprehend  that  some  of  the  combined  Powers 
may  have  an  agency  in  this  business".  Mr.  Humphreys  also  la- 
mented the  departure  of  Mr.  Pierre  Eric  Skjoldebrand  as  an 
"extremely  disagreeable  and  inconvenient  circumstance  for 


us 


14 


The  departure  of  Mr.  Skjoldebrand  must,  however,  have 
been  only  temporary,  for  he  was  appointed  United  States  consul 
to  Algiers  after  the  death  of  John  Paul  Jones,  on  March  28, 
1795. 15  Again,  when  Joseph  Donaldson  Jr.  was  appointed  con- 
sul for  the  two  States  Tunis  and  Tripoli,  it  was  suggested  that 
he  should  "be  employed  in  an  agency  with  Pierre  Eric  Skjolde- 
brand [now  named  as  consul  of  the  United  States  to  Algiers] 
in  ascertaining  and  agreeing  upon  the  provisional  or  preliminary 
terms  of  a  treaty  with  Algiers". 16 

Nothing  further  has  been  recorded  about  the  work  of  Swo- 

11  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Eel.,  I,  415. 

12  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Eel.,  I,  415. 

13  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Eel.,  I,  413. 

14  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Eel.,  I,  418. 

15  Annals  of  Congress,  13  Cong.,  II,  2669 ;  Paullin,  C.  O.  Diplomatic  Ne 
gotiations  of  American  Naval  Officers,  42. 

16  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Eel.,  I,  529. 


78        RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

dish  consuls  in  Algiers  in  the  behalf  of  the  United  States  until 
the  peace  commissioners  were  sent  to  Algiers.  Then  Monroe 
suggested  in  the  instructions  dated  April  10,  1815,  that  the 
Peace  Commissioners,  " before  proceeding  to  extremities"  should 
make  use  of  the  Swedish  consul,  Mr.  Norderling,  who  "has  been 
friendly  to  the  United  States ' '.  Mr.  Norderling  could  be  author- 
ized to  carry  a  letter  from  the  President  of  the  United  States 
to  the  Dey  of  Algiers  and  ' '  be  authorized  and  instructed  to  give 
such  answers  to  the  inquiries  of  the  Dey  and  to  make  such  com- 
munications to  him  as  you  may  deem  most  likely  to  accomplish 
the  objects  in  view".17 

The  first  consul  from  the  United  States  to  Sweden  was  Elias 
Backman,  whose  appointment  was  dated  on  February  27,  1797. 
On  April  27,  1810,  Robert  G.  Gardiner  was  reported  as  consul  at 
Gothenburg,  Sweden. 18 

The  activity  of  some  of  these  consuls  was  not  always  in  the 
interest  of  friendship  between  the  two  nations.  Thus  the  Ameri- 
can Charge  'd  affairs,  Christopher  Hughes,  received  a  letter  of 
complaint  from  Count  Axel  Rosen,  the  governor  of  the  district 
in  which  Gothenburg  is  located.  The  governor  requested  "an 
immediate  examination"  of  the  case  of  the  man,  Joseph  Hall, 
who  "no  longer  merits  the  honorable  confidence  to  be  consul 
of  the  United  States". 19  About  a  week  later,  Mr.  Hughes  re- 
ported to  the  Secretary  of  State  that  Joseph  Hall  "is  now  in 
prison  for  custom  house  dues  to  a  great  amount".  The  charge 
d'  affairs  asked  instructions  from  his  Government  in  regard  to 
what  course  to  pursue. 20  On  June  5th,  Mr.  Hughes  reported 
that  the  former  consul  had  ' '  escaped  from  his  prison  and  abscond- 
ed", and  no  further  information  has  been  obtained  regarding 


17  Writings  of  James  Monroe  (S.  M.  Hamilton,  ed.),  V,  373. 

18  Annals  of  Congress,  II  Cong.,  2  sess.,  1998. 
10  Rosen  to  Hughes,  May  18,  1817. 

20  Hughes  to  Secretary  of  State,  May  28,  1817. 


COMMERCIAL  NEGOTIATIONS  79 

his  case. 21  In  the  same  despatch  Mr.  Hughes  notified  his  Gov- 
ernment that  he  had  "  authorized  Mr.  C.  A.  Murry  of  Gothen- 
burg" to  assume  his  duties  of  consul  "  until  the  pleasure  of  the 
President  shall  be  known  on  the  subject". 22 

A  year  later,  when  Mr.  Russell  had  returned  to  his  duty,  he 
wrote  to  John  Q.  Adams  that  "the  interest  of  our  commerce  and 
particularly  the  protection  of  our  seamen  require"  the  appoint- 
ment of  some  one  to  perform  the  duties  of  consul  in  Stockholm. 
It  had  been  suggested  that  the  secretary  of  the  legation  or  the 
charge  d'  affairs  should  be  authorized  to  perform  the  duties  of 
consul.  Mr.  Russell  very  strongly  advised  against  that  course,  *s 
but  the  Government  had  already  on  May  28,  1818,  appointed 
David  Erskine. 

The  commercial  treaty  of  1783  with  Sweden  came  to  an  end 
in  1798.  Although  John  Q.  Adams  was  authorized  to  renew  the 
treaty  and  was  removed  from  Spain  to  Prussia  partly  for  that 
purpose,  the  treaty  was  allowed  to  come  to  an  end  without  a  new 
one  being  undertaken.  It  was  not  before  Mr.  Russell  had  become 
Minister  to  Sweden  that  a  new  treaty  was  finally  concluded, 
September  4,  1816.  The  treaty  was  submitted  to  the  Senate  for 
consideration  on  Decmber  13,  1816. 24  The  Senate  discussed  the 
treaty  and  advised  its  ratification  except  articles  III,  IV  and  VI. 
Those  articles  referred  to  the  carrying  trade  between  the  two 
countries.  Article  three  provided  that  all  articles  produced  or 
manufactured  in  the  West  Indies,  which  could  be  imported  into 
Sweden  and  Norway  in  their  own  vessels,  might  likewise  be  im- 
ported into  those  countries  in  the  vessels  of  the  United  States 
with  no  extra  duties  except  only  ten  per  cent  of  the  regular 


21  Hughes  to  Secretary  of  State,  June  5,  1817. 

22  Hughes  to  Secretary  of  State,  June  5,  1817. 
"Kussell  to  John  Q.  Adams,  Jan.  20,  1818. 

"Annals  of  Congress,  14  Cong.,  P.  1973;  Messages  and  Papers,  I,  566; 
ratification  was  advised  with  amendments,  February  19,  1817;  Am.  State 
Papers,  For.  Eel.,  IV,  98  ff;  Malloy,  Treaties  and  Conventions,  II,  1742. 


80        RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

duties  on  vessels  and  cargoes.  Article  four  contained  the  same 
provision  in  regard  to  articles  produced  or  manufactured  in  "the 
countries  surrounding  the  Baltic  Sea ' ',  imported  into  the  United 
States.  Article  six  specified  that  whatever  the  chief  custom 
officer  should  designate  and  specify  as  products  of  a  country 
in  the  clearance  papers  delivered  to  the  vessel  on  its  departure 
from  port  that  should  be  acknowledged  and  admitted  as  such 
in  the  country  of  destination. 25 

The  discussion  of  the  amendments  consumed  a  considerable 
amount  of  time,  so  that  the  Swedish  Government  became  uneasy 
as  to  the  fate  of  the  treaty.  The  charge  d '  affairs  wrote  to  the 
Secretary  of  State  in  September  1817,  that  "It  may  be  proper 
to  mention  the  very  great  fear  entertained  and  expressed  here 
that  Mr.  Russell's  treaty  should  be  put  into  practical  operation". 
Mr.  Hughes  explained  that  he  had  received  no  instruction  "on 
the  supposition  that  no  subject  of  that  nature  would  be  taken 
up  at  Washington,  until  the  return  of  Adams  from  London". 
There  was  also  an  uncertainty  in  regard  to  Mr.  Russell's  return 
to  Stockholm. 2R  But  when  Mr.  Russell  returned  he  had  received 
instructions  that  the  Senate  had  rejected  the  third,  fourth  and 
sixth  articles  of  the  treaty  of  commerce.  He  had  several  subse- 
quent conferences  with  Count  Engestrom  in  order  to  ascertain 
the  views  of  the  Swedish  Government  relative  to  the  treaty,  and 
he  expressed  his  belief  that  the  treaty  would  eventually  '  *  be  ac- 
cepted with  the  retrenchment  made  by  the  Senate ' '. 27 

On  January  24,  1818,  Count  Engestrom  notified  Mr.  Russell 
"that  he  was  authorized  to  state  that  Sweden"  would  not  insist 
on  these  articles,  since  they  "were  not  of  particular  interest 
to  Sweden".  He  was  therefore  ready  to  exchange  the  ratifica- 
tions as  soon  as  "Mr.  Russell  should  receive  the  treaty  properly 


18  See  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Rel.,  IV,  98  ff. 

M  Hughes  to  Secretary  of  State,  September  1,  1817. 

"Russell  to  Secretary  of  State,  December  29,  1817. 


COMMERCIAL  NEGOTIATIONS  81 

signed".28  The  ratifications  were  exchanged  on  September  25, 
1818. 

For  some  reason  the  Swedish  Government  delayed  to  put  the 
provisions  of  the  treaty  into  operation  and  therefore  Mr.  Hughes 
who,  on  the  departure  of  Mr.  Russell,  was  made  charge  d'  affairs 
in  October  1818,  sent  a  note  to  Count  Engestrom  requesting  "that 
the  requisite  orders"  be  issued  by  the  Swedish  Government  put- 
ting the  treaty  into  operation  and  that  the  proper  authorities 
should  be  required  to  "refund  to  the  American  citizens,  or  to 
their  agents,  the  duties  which  have  been  erroneously  paid  by 
them,  subsequent  to  the  exchange  of  the  respective  ratifications" 
of  the  treaty. 29  The  effects  of  this  note  could  not  have  appeared 
when  the  American  Consul  in  Gothenburg  wrote  to  Mr.  Hughes 
about  the  same  question  30  on  November  7,  and  on  the  tenth  Mr. 
Hughes  received  a  note  from  Count  Engestrom  in  which  he  in- 
formed the  charge  d'  affairs  that  the  obligations  in  regard  to  the 
treaty  were  being  discharged  and  that  "measures  were  taken  to 
reimburse  American  citizens  who  had  suffered  on  this  ac- 
count". 31  The  minister  of  foreign  affairs  explained  to  Mr.  Rus- 
sell that  the  reason  for  the  delay  in  putting  the  treaty  into  oper- 
ation was  that  this  duty  ' '  came  under  the  department  of  State 
and  Commerce  and  therefore  outside  of  his  field,  but  that  he 
issued  a  request  to  that  department  to  hurry  matters  and  he  be- 
lieved it  was  now  in  force ' '. 32 

On  January  25, 1819,  John  Norderling,  former  Swedish  Con- 
sul General  at  Algiers,  called  on  Mr.  Hughes  to  inform  him  that 
he  had  been  officially  notified  by  Count  Engestrom  of  his  ap- 
pointment as  charge  d '  affairs  in  Washington.  Mr.  Hughes  add- 


28  Count  Engestrom  to  Russell,  January  24,  1818. 

29  Hughes  to  Count  Engestrom,  November  3,  1818. 

30  C.  A.   Murry  to  Hughes,  November   7,   1818;    House  Documents,   19 
Cong.,  2  sess.,  No.  73. 

31  Engestrom  to  Russell,  November  10,  1818. 

32  Hughes  to  Secretary  of  State,  December  4,  1818. 


82         RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

ed  to  the  above  notice  to  his  Government  that  Mr.  Norderling 
1 '  has  already  a  knowledge  of  our  constitution  and  form  of  Gov- 
ernment which  is  rarely  met  with  in  Europe ". 33  In  Feb- 
ruary Mr.  Hughes,  at  the  request  of  Count  Engestrom,  informed 
his  Government  that  Mr.  Norderling  had  been  appointed  as 
charge  d'  affairs  at  Washington.  A  few  days  after  the  date  of 
this  despatch  "the  news  was  received  of  the  death  of  the  Gov- 
ernor of  St.  Bartholomew ' '.  Mr.  Norderling  was  then  appointed 
to  fill  the  office  of  Governor  for  St.  Bartholomew,  and  in  his 
place  Baron  Stackelberg  was  appointed  to  Washington. 34 

Count  Engestrom  informed  Mr.  Hughes  that  Mr.  Norderling 
reluctantly  yielded  to  this  change  for  though  the  remuneration 
of  Governor  was  ' '  double  those  of  the  charge  d '  affairs,  Mr.  Nord- 
erling preferred  very  much  the  latter  place ' '.  The  Count  also  ex- 
pressed his  belief  and  hope  that  the  functions  and  residence  at 
St.  Bartholomew  would  only  be  temporary  and  that  on  their 
expiration  he  would  change  posts  with  Baron  Stackelberg. 35 
The  appointment  of  Baron  Stackelberg  was  dated  January  1, 
1819,  "at  which  period  Mr.  Kantzow  vacated  the  place",  but 
Baron  Stackelberg  did  not  leave  Sweden  before  May  28,  1819. 36 

So  far  there  had  been  a  considerable  distinction  between  the 
vessels  of  the  country  and  those  belonging  to  the  United  States. 
The  Swedish  Government  must  have  realized  that  such  a  con- 
dition of  affairs  was  unfavorable  to  its  commerce,  for  on  Janu- 
ary 25,  1821,  Count  Engestrom  sent  a  note  to  the  American 
charge  d'  affairs  in  which  he  informed  him  that  the  King  had 
given  "express  orders"  to  notify  Mr.  Hughes  that  "vessels  be- 
longing to  citizens  of  the  United  States,  as  well  as  their  cargoes" 
would  be  subject,  "in  the  ports  of  the  Kingdom  of  Norway,  to  no 
higher  duties  of  entry  or  clearance,  than  those  payable  by  the 

88  Hughes  to  John  Q.  Adams,  January  26,  1819. 
84  Hughes  to  Secretary  of  State,  February  25,  1819. 
88  Ibid. 
88  Hughes  to  Secretary  of  State,  May  27,  1839. 


COMMERCIAL  NEGOTIATIONS  83 

national  vessels  and  their  cargoes ' '.  This  action  removed  * '  every 
sort  of  distinction  between  Norwegian  and  American  vessels". 
Neither  the  place  from  which  a  vessel  came  nor  the  destination 
of  a  vessel  should  be  any  cause  for  exception  from  this  general 
rule.  The  nature  of  the  cargo  should  not  be  the  cause  for  any 
exception  for  the  "cargo  may  consist  of  the  production  of  the 
soil,  or  of  the  industry  of  such  country,  whatever  it  may  be". 
Mr.  Hughes  was  requested  to  forward  this  information  to  his 
Government. 37 

The  following  July  the  Swedish  charge  d'  affairs  in  Wash- 
ington addressed  a  note  to  the  Secretary  of  State  "to  inquire 
if,  in  virtue  of  the  commercial  regulations  in  the  United  States, 
the  Norwegian  commerce"  would  enjoy  in  the  ports  of  the 
United  States, ' '  the  same  advantages  and  immunities  which  have 
been  lately  granted  in  the  ports  of  Norway  to  the  American 
commerce ' '. 38  In  a  few  days  the  Secretary  of  State  answered 
the  above  note,  but  in  doing  so  he  pointed  out  that  the  act  of 
March  3,  1815,  which  served  as  a  basis  for  reciprocal  action  on 
the  part  of  the  United  States,  was  not  so  extensive  as  that  of 
Sweden  and  Norway  in  that  the  act  of  the  United  States  strictly 
limited  its  application  to  "the  produce  or  manufacture  of  the 
nation".  The  above  act  was  subsequently  amended  by  an  act 
of  March  3,  1819,  limiting  the  application  of  the  act  to  January 
1, 1824.  The  United  States  could  not,  therefore,  offer  as  compre- 
hensive freedom  to  trade  as  the  Swedish  and  Norwegian  Govern- 
ment had  done.  But,  if  it  was  desired,  the  President  of  the 
United  States  would  issue  a  proclamation  granting  to  the  Nor- 
wegian vessels  all  the  freedom  of  commerce  which  the  laws  of  the 
United  States  permitted. 39  Stackelberg  requested,  in  an  answer 

"Engestrom  to  Hughes,  January  25,  1821;  House  Documents,  17  Cong., 
1  sess.,  No.  123. 

38  Stackelberg  to  Secretary  of  State,  July  11,  1821 ;  House  Documents, 
17  Cong.,  1  sess.,  No.  123. 

38  John  Q.  Adams  to  Stackelberg,  July  23,  1821,  House  Documents,  17 
Cong.,  1  sess.,  No.  123. 


84        RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

to  the  above  note,  that  all  the  advantages  which  could  be  granted 
to  Norwegian  vessels  under  existing  laws  should  be  granted.  He 
also  suggested  that  a  law  ought  to  be  passed  in  the  United 
States  according  to  which  the  commerce  of  the  two  countries 
could  be  established  on  "perfect  reciprocity". 40  In  accordance 
with  the  above  note,  the  President  issued  a  proclamation  that 
since  ' '  satisfactory  proof ' '  had  been  received  ' '  under  date  of  the 
30  day  of  January  1821,  that  henceforward  all  discriminating  or 
countervailing  duties  in  the  Kingdom  of  Norway,  so  far  as  they 
operated  to  the  disadvantages  of  the  United  States  had  been  and 
were  abolished".41  A  copy  of  the  proclamation  was  sent  to 
Baron  Stackelberg  on  the  following  day. 42 

At  the  opening  of  Congress  the  following  December,  Presi- 
dent Monroe  called  attention  to  this  commercial  arrangement 
with  the  King  of  Sweden  and  Norway  regarding  Norway.  He 
called  the  attention  of  Congress  to  the  fact  that  the  charge  d' 
affairs  had  "requested  the  reciprocal  allowance  for  the  vessels 
of  Norway  in  the  ports  of  the  United  States"  as  were  allowed 
vessels  of  the  United  States  in  that  country.  Since  the  act  of 
March  3,  1815,  was  insufficient  for  the  purpose  and  Congress  was 
the  only  part  of  the  Government  which  could  grant  the  privilege, 
the  President  submitted  the  subject  "to  the  wisdom  of  Con- 
gress".43 It  seems,  however,  that  Congress  must  have  taken  a 
rather  liberal  amount  of  time  for  considering  the  subject,  for 
on  May  1,  the  following  year,  the  President  sent  a  special  mess- 
age to  Congress  suggesting  again  the  advisability  of  such  legisla- 


40  Stackelberg  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  August  16,  1821,  17  Cong.,  1 
.,  No.  123. 

41  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  1,  665. 

43  John  Q.  Adams  to  Shackelberg,  August  21,  1821,  House  Documents, 
17  Cong.,  1  sess.,  No.  123. 

43  Annual  Message  on  December  3,  1821,  Messages  and  Papers,  1,  671; 
House  Journal,  17  Cong.,  1  sess.,  pp.  15,  544. 


COMMERCIAL  NEGOTIATIONS  85 

tion.  The  message  was  accompanied  with  all  the  correspondence 
on  the  subject.  44 

The  ports  of  Sweden  were  not  included  in  the  above  ar- 
rangement, but  the  question  of  admitting  American  ships  with 
products  from  West  Indies  into  Sweden  on  the  same  condition 
as  Swedish  vessels  was  submitted  to  the  Diet,  and  that  body 
decided  to  leave  the  whole  question  "to  the  discretion  of  the 
King". 45  The  King  decided  in  favor  of  this  extension  of  com- 
mercial privileges  and  therefore  instructed  Count  Engestrom  to 
notify  Mr.  Hughes  to  that  effect,  which  was  done  on  April  3, 
1824. 46  The  King  did  not  demand  reciprocal  action  on  the  part 
of  the  United  States,  but  Mr.  Hughes,  in  reporting  this  informa- 
tion to  the  Department  of  State,  observed  that  it  was  '  *  confident- 
ly hoped  and  expected  that  some  analogous  favor  and  facility 
would  be  accorded  on  the  part  of  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  to  Swedish  ships  and  their  trade  in  the  United  States 
Ports".47  In  view  of  this  arrangement  Mr.  Monroe  could  an- 
nounce at  the  opening  of  Congress  that  "our  commerce  with 
Sweden  has  been  placed  on  perfect  reciprocity ' '. 48  In  this  way, 
therefore,  the  provisions  of  the  treaty  of  1816,  which  were  reject- 
ed by  the  Senate,  were  obtained  and  secured. 

The  removal  of  commercial  restrictions  in  St.  Bartholomew 
no  doubt  was  of  considerable  importance  and  seemed  to  extend 
the  commerce.  In  October  1820,  Richard  Bush  wrote  from  that 
island  that  "the  Swedes  and  the  Danes  will,  in  some  measure, 
become  the  carriers  of  provisions,  etc.,  for  the  supply  of  the 
aforesaid  colonies;  for  since  my  arrival  here  more  than  thirty 
British  vessels  have  assumed  the  Swedish  flag,  and,  no  doubt, 


"Messages  and  Papers,  1,  707;   House  Documents,   17   Cong.,  1  sesa., 
No.  123. 

45  Hughes  Memorandum  to  the  Department  of  State. 

46  Engestrom  to  Hughes,  April  3,  1824. 

47  Hughes  to  Secretary  of  State,  April  3,  1824. 

48  Eight  Annual  Message,  Messages  and  Papers,  II,  820. 


86        BELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

in  St.  Thomas  to  a  greater  extent".49  But  the  regulations  in 
regard  to  the  admission  of  consuls  to  the  colony  was  somewhat 
restricted.  There  may  have  been  several  reasons  for  this  re- 
striction. The  two  principal  reasons  for  this  limitation  were  that, 
"it  was  a  colony,  and  because  during  the  French  Revolution 
a  consul  from  France  had  been  admitted  there",  and  he  "had 
proved  very  troublesome  by  his  tutfbulance ".  These  objections 
were  answered  completely  and  convincingly  by  John  Q.  Adams. 
He  observed  that  neither  of  these  reasons  could  "justify  the 
refusal  to  receive  an  American  consul  at  St.  Bartholomew". 
European  Governments  excluded  consuls  from  their  colonies  be- 
cause foreign  commerce  with  those  colonies  "was  interdicted". 
If  the  commerce  was  interdicted  there  could  be  no  need  of  con- 
suls, but  if  commerce  was  allowed  the  consul  followed  as  a  matter 
of  * '  course — as  much  as  an  army  implied  a  general ' '.  The  Swed- 
ish Government  had  allowed  foreign  commerce  with  St.  Barthol- 
omew, and  also  specifically  named  the  island  in  the  treaty  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  Sweden. 50  The  inhabitants  of  the 
island,  "their  vessels  and  their  merchandise",  were  entitled  to 
the  same  advantages  in  the  United  States  as  those  of  Sweden, 
"and  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  were  entitled  to  the  same 
in  the  island  as  Sweden.  The  province  of  a  consul  was  to  secure 
in  effect  to  the  people  of  his  nation  the  real  enjoyment  in  foreign 
ports  of  the  commercial  advantages  to  which  they  are  entitled 
by  treaty,  or  by  the  laws  of  nations ' '. 51 

If  these  arguments  influenced  the  Swedish  Government  or 
not  is  difficult  to  state,  but  the  following  March  Count  Engestrom 
notified  Mr.  Hughes  that  the  Swedish  Government  would  issue 
an  exequatur  to  a  United  States  "consul  at  St.  Bartholomew". 52 

48  Bush  to  John  Q.  Adams,  October  4,  1820;  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Eel., 
V,  89. 

60  Treaty  of  September  4,  1816;  see  also  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Bel., 
V,  892. 

61  Memoirs  of  John  Q.  Adams,  VI,  32. 
"Engestrom  to  Hughes,  March  18,  1823. 


GOMMEECIAL  NEGOTIATIONS  87 

In  the  following  December,  therefore,  Mr.  Hughes  demanded  the 
recognition  of  the  United  States  consul  at  St.  Bartholomew  in 
accordance  with  the  treaty  with  the  United  States.  Count  Enge- 
strom  admitted  in  unqualified  terms  the  high  character  of  the 
consul  and  that  "no  objection  existed  to  him  on  personal 
grounds".53 

The  so  called  "Russell  Treaty"  expired  by  its  own  limita- 
tions eight  years  after  ratifications  were  exchanged.  The  ex- 
change of  ratifications  took  place  on  September  25,  1818,  where- 
fore the  treaty  expired  on  September  25,  1826. 54  This  treaty 
was  also  allowed  to  expire  before  a  new  one  was  agreed  upon. 
The  reason  for  this  fact  was  that  Mr.  Somerville,  who  was  ap- 
pointed to  act  as  envoy,  in  that  capacity  Ibecame  sick  and  diea. 
In  order  to  continue  the  commercial  relations  provided  for  in 
the  treaty  the  Swedish  charge  d'  affairs  in  Washington  addressed 
a  note  to  the  Secretary  of  State  on  September  26,  announcing 
that  the  Government  of  Sweden  had  decided  to  consider  the 
provisions  of  the  old  treaty  in  force  until  a  new  one  should  be 
agreed  upon.  He  was  also  * '  authorized  to  propose  to  the  Ameri- 
can Government  to  give  similar  orders  in  the  ports  of  the  United 
States  in  regard  to  the  Swedish  and  Norwegian  Commerce ' '.  In 
addition  Baron  Stackelberg  stated  that  the  King  desired  that  the 
new  treaty  should  be  signed  at  Stockholm,  and  he  expressed  the 
wish  of  the  King  that  the  President  would  "send  some  one  as 
soon  as  possible  to  treat  in  this  affair".  The  Swedish  charge  d' 
affairs  also  stated  that  Mr.  Hughes,  the  American  charge  d' 
affairs,  in  Stockholm,  would  be  acceptible  to  the  Swedish  Govern- 
ment to  act  in  that  capacity. 55  Mr.  Hughes,  however,  was  not 
appointed,  but  Mr.  John  J.  Appleton,  charge  d'  affairs  in  Spain. 

At  the  opening  of  Congress  the  President  submitted  the 
question  as  to  the  continuation  of  the  provisions  of  the  treaty 

"Hughes  to  John  Q.  Adams,  December  7,  1823. 
"Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Eel.,  VI,  367. 
55  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Eel.,  VI,  367. 


88        RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

with  Sweden  to  Congress  for  its  consideration. 56  The  chairman 
on  the  committee  on  Commerce,  Mr.  Tomlinson,  introduced  a  bill 
containing  the  above  provisions.  An  opinion  was  expressed  that 
the  act  of  1824  regarding  the  commerce  with  Sweden  covered 
the  case,  but  members  of  the  committee  held  the  opposite  view. 57 
In  the  meantime,  Swedish  vessels  had  arrived  in  the  United 
States,  and  had  been  required  to  pay  the  "foreign  duties".58 
The  new  act  authorized  the  return  of  such  duties  charged  during 
the  interim.  Baron  Stackelberg  was  informed,  March  16,  1827, 
that  Congress  passed  a  bill  to  "except  Swedish  and  Norwegian 
vessels  from  the  payment  of  descriminating  duties  of  import  and 
tonnage  for  a  limited  time ' '. 59 

The  instructions  to  Mr.  Appleton  were  dated  on  January  12, 
1827.  According  to  those  instructions  the  charge  d'  affairs  was 
authorized  to  renew  the  treaty  with  the  exception  of  those  ar- 
ticles which  the  Senate  rejected  in  advising  its  ratification.  He 
was  further  instructed  that  the  United  States  desired  to  see  the 
provisions  in  the  treaty  that  vessels  of  both  parties  should  be 
"entitled  to  navigate  between  the  ports  of  Sweden  and  Norway 
and  the  Swedish  colony  of  St.  Bartholomew,  as  well  as  between 
those  ports  and  all  other  foreign  countries  and  places;  but  the 
vessels  of  neither  party  will  be  entitled  to  share  in  the  coasting 
trade  of  the  other".  Mr.  Clay  said  that  the  "President  was 
anxious  to  secure  the  adoption  of  the  general  principle  without 
qualifications".  If  the  variations  made  in  order  to  secure  the 
adoption  of  this  principle  should  be  rejected,  Mr.  Appleton  was 
authorized  to  renew  the  old  treaty  with  the  exception  of  articles 
third,  fourth,  and  sixth. 80 


"Messages  and  Papers,  II,  919;   Senate  Documents,  19  Cong.,  2  sess., 
No.  1,  p.  6;  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Bel.,  VI.  208. 

67  Abridgement  of  Debates,  IX,  428-9. 

68  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Eel.,  VI,  368,  719. 
68  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Rel.,  VI,  719. 

60  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Rel.,  VI,  720. 


COMMERCIAL  NEGOTIATIONS  89 

It  had  been  reported  to  Washington  that  a  treaty  had  been 
concluded  between  the  Governments  of  Sweden  and  Great  Brit- 
ain, which  gave  a  considerable  advantage  to  British  vessels.  Mr. 
Appleton  investigated  and  found  that  the  alleged  advantage 
consisted  in  certain  port  dues.  From  the  report  submitted  it  is 
gathered  that  on  100  vessels  the  total  charges  for  Swedish  ves- 
sels were  $101.07,  for  American  vessels  $112.34,  and  for  British 
vessels  $110.57.  Those  figures  show  that  the  difference  in  port 
dues  between  the  vessels  of  the  United  States  and  Sweden  in 
Swedish  ports  was  $11.27,  and  between  the  vessels  of  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain  was  less  than  two  dollars. 61 

The  negotiations  proceeded  from  April  5,  when  Mr.  Apple- 
ton  announced  that  he  was  authorized  and  ready  to  negotiate, 
till  July  11,  when  he  notified  his  Government  that  the  new  treaty 
had  been  signed. 62 

The  new  treaty  placed  the  vessels  of  the  United  States  in 
the  ports  of  Sweden,  Norway,  and  the  Island  of  St.  Bartholomew 
on  a  footing  of  ' '  perfect  equality  with  vessels  of  those  countries ' ' 
in  regard  to  the  general  import  and  export  trade.  The  duties 
and  "charges  of  all  kinds  were  the  same  for  vessels  of  both 
parties".  The  products  of  the  United  States  were  admitted 
into  Sweden,  Norway,  and  St.  Bartholomew  on  the  same  terms  as 
similar  products  from  any  other  foreign  country;  into  Sweden 
and  Norway  on  "the  same  terms  as  similar  products  from  their 
West  India  colony,  and  into  the  colony  as  similar  products  from 
the  mother  country". 

The  only  exception  to  these  principles  were  the  following : 

1.  In  regard  to  vessels,  the  reserve  was  "made  by  each 
State  of  its  own  coasting  trade ' ' ; 

2.  In  regard  to  both  vessels  and  products  a  reserve  was 
made  by  Sweden  and  Norway  of  their  trade  with  Fin- 
land; 

61  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Eel.,  VI,  721. 

82  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Rel.,  VI,  720,  725. 


90        RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  SWEDEN 

3.  In  regard  to  products  alone,  a  reserve  was  made  by 
Sweden  and  Norway  "of  particular  advantage  to  the 
tallow  and  tallow  candles  from  Russia ' '. 63 

The  treaty  was  submitted  to  the  Senate  for  advice  with 
regard  to  its  ratification  on  December  12,  1827, 64  and  this  body 
practically  without  discussion  advised  its  ratification  January  7, 
1828,  and  the  ratifications  were  exchanged  January  18,  1828. 
On  the  following  day  the  President  issued  a  proclamation  de- 
claring the  treaty  in  force. 65 

This  then  may  for  all  practical  purposes  be  considered  the 
close  of  the  early  negotiations.  In  1830,  the  two  countries  had 
exchanged  pulblic  ministers,  settled  the  claims  which  grew  out 
of  an  application  of  the  continental  system,  established  a  firm 
relation  based  on  treaties,  and  had  consular  representatives  each 
in  the  more  important  ports  of  the  other.  All  regular  relations 
had  therefore  been  established  at  that  time  and  the  Presidents 
have  announced  to  succeeding  sessions  of  Congress  that  * '  with  the 

Government  of Sweden the  best  understanding  exists. 

Commerce is  fostered  and  protected  by  reciprocal  good  will, 

under  the  sanction  of  liberal  conventional  and  legal  provi- 
sions".66 


68  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Eel.,  VI,  726. 

"Messages  and  Proclamations,  II,  959;  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Bel., 
VI,  707. 

MMalloy,  Treaties  and  Conventions,  II,  1748. 

06  Journal  of  the  Senate  (1834-5),  6;  Messages  and  Papers,  II,  1316; 
Senate  Documnts,  24  Congress,  1  sess.,  I,  5. 


SELECT  BIBLIOGRAPHY 
A.     CONTEMPORARY  MATERIAL. 

Official  and  Semi-official  Documents. 

Abridgement  of  Debates  (1789-1856),  New  York,  1860;  16  vols. 
Adlersparre,  G.  (ed.),  Handlingar  rb'rande  Sveriges  aldre,  nyare 

och  nyaste  Historia,  Stockholm,  1832;  7  vols. 
Alin,  0.  (ed.),  Historiska  Handlingar,  XVII,  Stockholm,  1899. 
American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  Washington,  1832- 

1859 ;  6  vols. 
American  State  Papers,  Commerce  and  Navigation,  Washington, 

1832-1834;  2  vols. 

Annals  of  Congress,  Washington,  1834-1856 ;  42  vols. 
Journals  of  the  American  Congress,  Washington,  1823 ;  4  vols. 
Journals  of  the  Continental  Congress  (Ford,  ed.),  Washington, 

1904-1914;  23  vols. 
Journals  of  House  of  Representatives  (1789-1815),  Washington, 

1826;  9  vols. 
House  Documents,  15   Congress  to  24  Congress,  Washington, 

1817-1837. 

Manuscripts  in  the  Department  of  State,  Index  and  Archives. 
Register  of  Debates  in  Congress,  Washington,   1825-1837;   29 

vols. 
Richardson,  J.  D.  (ed.),  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents, 

Washington,  1896-1899 ;  10  vols. 
Senate  Documents,  15  Congress  to  24  Congress,  Washington, 

1817-1837. 
Senate  Journal,  15  Congress  to  24  Congress,  Washington,  1817- 

1837. 


92  SELECT  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Sbornik  Imperatorskago  Russkago  Istoritcheskago  Obstchestva, 
St.  Petersburg,  1867-1913 ;  142  vols. 

Sparks,  J.  (ed.),  Diplomatic  Correspondence  of  the  American 
Revolution,  Boston,  1829;  6  vols. 

Silverstolpe,  C.  (ed.),  Historiskt  Bibliotek,  Stockholm,  1875- 
1880;  7  vols. 

Wharton,  F.  (ed.),  The  Revolutionary  Diplomatic  Correspon- 
dence of  the  United  States,  Washington,  1889;  6  vols. 

Works  of  Contemporary  Authors. 

Adams,  C.  F,  (ed.),  The  Works  of  John  Adams,  Boston,  1856; 

12  vols. 
Ford,  N.  C.  (ed.),  Writings  of  John  Quincy  Adams,  New  York, 

1913-1917;  7  vols. 

Ford,  P.  L.    (ed.),  Writings  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  New   York, 
1892 ;  10  vols. 
Hamilton,  S.  M.   (ed.),  The  Writings  of  James  Monroe,  New 

York,  1903 ;  7  vols. 
Hunt,  G.    (ed.),  The  Writings  of  James  Madison,  New  York, 

1900;  9  vols. 
Smyth,  S.  M.   (ed.),  The  Writings  of  Benjamin  Franklin,  New 

York,  1905 ;  10  vols. 

Diaries  and  Memoirs. 

Adams,  C.  F.,  Memoirs  of  John  Quincy  Adams,  Philadelphia, 

1874-1877;  12  vols. 
Albedyhll,  Baron,  Recueil  de  memoires  et  autres  pieces  authen- 

tique,  relative  aux  affaires  de  1'Europe,  ct  particulierement 

celles  du  Nord,  pendant  la  demiere  partie  du  18 :  me  siecle, 

1798. 
Harris,  J.  H.,  Diaries  and   Correspondence  of  James   Harris, 

First  Earl  of  Malmesbury,  London,  1844;  4  vols. 
Meredith,  W.  G.,  Memorials  of  Charles  John,  King  of  Sweden, 

London,  1829. 


SELECT  BIBLIOGRAPHY  93 

Murry,  W.  V.,  Diary,  in  manuscript  in  the  Library  of  Congress, 

Washington,  D.  C. 

Skjoldebrand,  A.  F.,  Memoarer,  Stockholm,  1903 ;  2  vols. 
Stedingk,  Count,  Memoires  posthumes,  Paris,  1844 ;  3  vols. 


B.    NON-CONTEMPORARY  MATERIAL. 

Adams,  Henry,  History  of  the  United  States,  New  York,  1898- 

1901 ;  9  vols. 
Alin,   0.,    Carl  Johan   och   Sveriges  yttre   Politik,    1810-1815, 

Stockholm,  1899. 
Bain,  R.  N.,  Gustavus  III  and  his  Contemporaries,  1746-1792, 

London,  1894 ;  2  vols. 

Bancroft,  G.,  History  of  the  United  States,  Boston,  1874 ;  10  vols. 
Bergbohm,  C.,  Die  Bewaffvete  Neutralitet,  1780-1783,  Dorpat, 

1883. 

Feuk,  J.,  Sverige  pa  Kongressen  i  Wien,  1814-1815,  Lund,  1915. 
Generalstabens  Krigshistoriska  Afdelning,  Sveriges  Krig,  1808 

och  1809,  Stockholm,  1890 ;  2  vols. 

Grade,  A.,  Sverige  och  Tilsit  Alliansen,  1807-1810,  Lund,  1913. 
Granberg,  P.  A.,  Last  Years  of  Gustavus  IV  Adolphus,  London, 

1812. 
Hildebrand,  E.  (ed.),  Historisk  Tidskrift,  Stockholm,  1881-1917; 

37  vols. 
Hildebrand,  E.,  Sveriges  Historia,  Stockholm,  1905-1910,  vols. 

VIII-X. 

Hjarne,  H.,  Historiska  Studier,  Stockholm,  1908. 
Lyman,  T.,  The  Diplomacy  of  the  United  States,  Boston,  1826. 
McMaster,  J.  B.  Life  and  Times  of  Stephen  Girard,  Philadel- 
phia, 1918 ;  2  vols. 
Nilsson,  J.  W.,  De  Diplomatiska  forbindelserna  mellan  Sverige 

och  Frankrike  under  Gustaf  IV  Adolf,  Upsala,  1899. 
Save,  T.,  Sveriges  Historia,  Stockholm,  1881 ;  vol.  VI. 


94  SELECT  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Tengberg,  R.,  and  Boethius,  S.,  Sveriges  Historia,  Stockholm, 

1879;  vol.  V. 

Trescot,  W.  H.,  Diplomacy  of  the  Revolution,  New  York,  1852. 
Trescot,  W.  H.,  The  Diplomatic  History  of  the  Administration 

of  Washington  and  Adams,  1789-1801,  Boston,  1857. 


GENERAL  LIBRARY 
UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA— BERKELEY 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or  on  the 

date  to  which  renewed. 
Renewed  books  are  subject  to  immediate  recall. 


APR  19  1954  tl 


t»  - 


REC'D 


INTER  LIBRARY 


ONE  MONTH  AFTER  REC- 
NON-RENEWAB' 


SANTA  BARBARA 
,NTERL,BRARY  LOAN 


WSR  U8RARV 

LOAN 

t  MONTH  AFTER  RECEIPT 
'ON-RENEWABIE 

<HJL23I964 


WAR  2  4  1982 


SANTA  BARBARA 
IKTERUBRAWr  IOAN 


REC'D  O3 

MAR  4   ^3 

LD  21-100TO-l,'54(1887sl6)476 


AUG191964 
STACK  DEAD 


06429 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 


